165. Telegram From the Embassy in Israel to the Department of State1
1060. For the President, Rusk and McNamara. Personal from Harriman.
Part III. Comments. We have stood foursquare on President’s instructions. I am also quite mindful of Secretary’s desire we stick it out until understanding reached.
Increasingly clear that key to matter is fact Eshkol, with his relatively unstable coalition government, faces real difficulty in carrying his Cabinet even as far as tacit acceptance US arms sales to Jordan. Eshkol says he can only get Cabinet acceptance Jordan arms deal, and their collaboration on essential secrecy, if Cabinet can get feel of actual hardware, not merely of carefully hedged statement that US will eventually make some kind of direct sale.
Frankly, I believe we must give Israelis some hope on hardware if we want a deal in time to give Hussein his answer. Minimum needed is a promise to consider favorably Israel’s tank and plane requests, subject of course to later agreement on type, number, price, delivery schedules and timing of each step in each specific sale.
This seems relatively small added price for larger agreement we seek. It is essential to lend credibility to our commitment to direct sales. Nor do I see it as involving more than a spelling out of our general undertaking, under which it is implicit anyway. We can’t avoid selling tanks, or planes either, at some point. So the more specific we can make this undertaking the more quickly agreement can be reached, and the more leverage we have on other points we want.
I believe that if we in position to satisfy Eshkol on provision hardware, we can reach prompt meeting of minds on our desiderata at least to extent that Israelis will 1) tolerate i.e. acquiesce in our Jordan arms supply and will so advise their Ambassador and their key friends, 2) maintain maximum secrecy re arms sales provided we agree coordinate public statements when matters become public knowledge, 3) understand that US will oppose use of force to preempt Arab water diversion and be prepared with our cooperation to have recourse to all peaceful means to prevent such diversion, which includes resort to [Page 359] UN in some manner without specific mention, 4) reaffirm what they have already stated as to their intention not to embark on nuclear weapons program, leaving question of IAEA to future. We have of course not in any way accepted the above, and will continue trying to improve on it. Believe some chance of doing so, but am not so sanguine even in event extended bargaining.
Therefore, Komer, Barbour and I recommend adding some more specific wording to key para on direct arms sales in 21 February 1965 Presidential instruction. We suggest following addition after underlined portion at end of that para.2
“USG recognizes that Israel’s highest priority arms needs are for (a) replacement of 90 M–48 tanks if West Germany fails to meet this commitment; and (b) certain aircraft such as the B–66.USG is willing to consider favorably sale of such items provided all above conditions are met.”
Request further negotiating instructions. I realize weekend burden this places on you, but would be most grateful for earliest answer, if possible by noon local time 28 February. Also, if B–66 or comparable aircraft at all in cards, would appreciate such positive or negative info on general availability and possible timing of delivery as I could be authorized pass to Israelis. Am of course prepared stay as long as desired, but suggest that the longer we stay the more it will look as though we engaged in detailed negotiations.
- Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, DEF 12–5 ISR. Secret; Flash; Exdis/Tan. Received at 9:58 p.m. and passed to the White House and DOD.↩
- The underlined portion is italicized in Document 157.↩