Office of the Historian

532. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom1

Washington, November 18, 1967, 2155Z.

71787. We wish following message2 from Secretary delivered to King Hussein, who we understand is presently in either London or Paris, as soon as possible:

  • “1. We wish His Majesty to know of our appreciation for determined effort he made in New York to obtain successful outcome of negotiations on Middle East resolution. We regret it did not prove possible for agreement to be reached on US resolution. We wish King specifically to know that both in conversation with Riad and in public statement Ambassador Goldberg made in SC, US stated its willingness to make amendments to the US draft discussed with His Majesty. UAR, however, refused to agree to US resolution as so amended.
  • 2. Since that time and largely as result inconclusive result those efforts, UK has presented another resolution, of which His Majesty no doubt fully informed.

  • 3. We have concluded in circumstances that UK resolution should be adopted without change and that it can be basis for constructive action in area with assistance of a UN representative. US is correspondingly prepared to vote for UK resolution. We would also be prepared to extend our diplomatic and political support to UN representative under that resolution, inasmuch as we consider it to be consistent with President’s speech of June 19, which remains our policy.

    FYI: Ambassador Goldberg said in SC on November 9 with respect to US resolution:

    ‘On behalf of my Government, I pledge to the SC and to the parties concerned that our diplomatic and political influence would be exerted under this draft resolution in support of the efforts of the UN representative to achieve fair and equitable settlement so that all in the area can live in peace, security and tranquility.’

    We are prepared to give similar support to his efforts under UK resolution. End FYI.

  • 4. We do not understand current trend of UAR policy on such matters. It was our impression that UAR blocked efforts to reach agreement on US resolution. It also supported Soviet move in SC Friday3 to delay vote on UK text and in our opinion has recently been following obstructive policy in SC. These UAR moves do not appear to us to be consistent with Nasser’s agreement of October 17 with you.
  • 5. We are, of course, aware that Prime Minister Talhouni has gone to Cairo. We consider this weekend to be a critical one. If UK resolution is not adopted Monday we foresee deterioration of diplomatic situation in New York from one of effort to achieve real action to one of political maneuver and argumentation. We would not see such development as being useful to Jordan or indeed to anyone.
  • 6. Accordingly, USG would appreciate any further efforts His Majesty may be able to exert with Nasser this weekend. We are also conveying information regarding our support of UK resolution directly to Cairo, and urging UAR to cooperate with UN representative on this basis.”

Rusk
  1. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files, 1967–69, POL 27–14 ARAB–ISR/UN. Secret; Flash; Nodis. Drafted by Walsh; cleared by Goldberg, Sisco, Battle, and Katzenbach; and approved by Rusk. Also sent Flash to Paris and repeated to Amman and USUN.↩
  2. The message was drafted in New York. Telegram 2384 from USUN, November 18, transmitted the text and requested that it be delivered to King Hussein. (Ibid., POL 27 ARAB–ISR/UN)↩
  3. November 17.↩