312. Memorandum of Conversation1

SUBJECT

  • Middle Eastern Developments

PARTICIPANTS

  • The President
  • Ambassador Angier Biddle Duke, Chief of Protocol
  • The Honorable Lucius D. Battle, Assistant Secretary for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs
  • Mr. Harold Saunders, White House Staff
  • Mr. William D. Brewer, Country Director, Arabian Peninsula States
  • His Royal Highness Crown Prince Khalid Ibn Abdul Aziz
  • His Excellency Ibrahim al-Sowayel, Ambassador of Saudi Arabia
  • Interpreter—Camille Nowfel

The President welcomed Crown Prince Khalid, expressed pleasure that he was able to visit the US and asked how long he would be here. Prince Khalid explained that his final tests at the hospital would not be completed until Friday (July 5); so that his onward plans were still uncertain. He had talked the other day by telephone with King Faisal who had particularly asked that his respects be conveyed to the President. On his own behalf, he wanted to express appreciation for all the facilities extended, including the medical checkup at Bethesda. The President offered to arrange for any further help which His Highness might require.

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The Crown Prince then referred to his first visit to the White House 25 years ago, during President Roosevelt’s Administration. The late President had been a great friend of his own father, the late King Abdul Aziz. There had been a meeting of the minds between these two leaders on the Middle East. Perhaps if both had lived longer the situation might have been different.

The President said the situation in the area was indeed difficult and he hoped His Highness would be having detailed discussions with Assistant Secretary Battle while here. Mr. Battle confirmed that he would be seeing the Prince separately. The President continued that he was very troubled regarding the Near Eastern situation and had spent a good deal of time going over it with Mr. Battle. He had a high regard for our Saudi friends. We would like to do things which would resolve problems. The difficulty was that what we wanted to do often could not be done because our friends would not be responsive to our suggestions.

Prince Khalid replied that King Faisal had the greatest appreciation and respect for the efforts the President had made in this difficult situation. The President remarked that some people believe that major actions are possible simply on the basis of an indication from the US Government. We had found, however, that even our strong indications to both sides had not been enough to bring our friends around. Prince Khalid said he hoped that the President would continue to do what he could to reach a solution. The President confirmed that USG actions would continue to be impartial and fair but one could not control one’s friends. Right now he had a difficult problem even in controlling his own grandson. The President said he had strongly urged Premier Eshkol and Foreign Minister Eban not to move last June but they had not heeded this advice. He stressed to His Highness that we had been in no way involved, despite unfounded allegations which had misrepresented our position and our inability to convince Nasser at the time. We had tried to get an immediate ceasefire but the parties had not promptly agreed.

Noting that the Saudi Government appreciates the problems which the President has faced, Prince Khalid said it was still the Saudi hope that UN resolutions on the problem could be enforced so that the entire area would not be lost to the radicals, and ultimately to the communists. King Hussein right now was in a predicament involving pressures from his people, from Egypt, from Israel and from the communists. He hoped that the USG under the President’s wise leadership would induce Israel to accept the UN resolutions, notably with respect to withdrawal and Jerusalem.

The President said that we had endeavored to be helpful. We continued to support the efforts of Ambassador Jarring to bring the [Page 598] two sides together but his success would require the cooperation of both sides. His Highness responded that it would be impossible for any Arab leader to arrange a face to face encounter with Israel. Nasser would like to see Hussein take this step but simply could not do so.

The Crown Prince concluded that he did not want to take too much of the President’s time but would hope to continue his talks with Mr. Battle. The President asked the Crown Prince to convey his greetings to King Faisal, to assure him of America’s continued high esteem for his leadership and to remind him that, while the USG is preoccupied with Viet Nam and other problems, the United States intends to stand by its commitments there as well as our assurances to Saudi Arabia and our other friends. The Crown Prince promised to do so and said that he wanted simply to sound one note of warning: Saudi Arabia feared being surrounded by “communists” from various quarters, north, south, east and west. The President expressed understanding of the Crown Prince’s views and thanked him again for his call.

On the way back to his hotel, Prince Khalid commented to Ambassador Sowayel on the President’s statement that the USG cannot impose its will on other nations by saying: “Perhaps, after all, this is true. Israel has a mind of its own, and it is conceivable that the USG is not able to sway her in any way.” Ambassador Sowayel reportedly demurred.

  1. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 7 SAUD. Secret; Limdis. Drafted by Brewer, approved in S/S on July 11 and by Saunders at the White House the same day. The meeting was held at the White House, and the times are taken from the President’s Daily Diary. (Johnson Library)