Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XXI, Near East Region; Arabian Peninsula

341. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Yemen¹

Washington, July 7, 1964, 8:16 p.m.

10. In call on Assistant Secretary Talbot July 6 YAR Ambassador Al-Aini reported following re his recent visits to Sana’a and Cairo:

1. YAR leaders immensely disappointed with Nasser’s visit to Yemen. Although at first he had indicated understanding YAR viewpoint, just before returning to Cairo Nasser produced fait accompli of constitution prepared in Cairo. Instead of strengthening authority of Prime Minister, as YAR leaders had wished, UAR-imposed constitution accorded President “all authority.”

2. Despite foregoing, Prime Minister Jaifi and other YAR leaders resolved to “do their best.” Yemenis believe Nasser’s “plan” for Yemen will fail in long run. For his part Nasser evidently still looking for dramatic change elsewhere to help him out of Yemen imbroglio. Egyptians in Yemen refer optimistically to UAR “gains” in Iraq.

3. In several meetings with UAR Foreign Minister Riad in Cairo Al-Aini sought ascertain UAR intentions re Yemen and took exception to UAR use of Yemen as base for UAR attacks against “South Arabia.” Also urged UAR refrain from laying Aden problem before UNSC. He did not reveal nature Riad replies.

4. YAR leaders believe YAR-UK differences can only be resolved if UK recognizes YAR and allows “self-determination” for Aden complex. Once these achieved YAR prepared to make border settlement in accordance 1934 Treaty.² Without foregoing, deployment observers along SAF border, establishment DMZ, etc, impossible.

Ambassador asserted that in his private meeting with Sir Patrick Dean in New York before he left US he had stressed fact Aden liberal movement in existence long before Nasser became interested and UK policy vis-a-vis YAR only inducing UAR remain in Yemen.

In response Talbot question re prospect reconciliation divergent Yemeni factions, al-Aini said implicit UAR threats of reprisal made it difficult for Republican leaders keep in touch with northern tribes. Nasser had threatened that he could easily bring Badr back if Yemenis fail tow mark. Al-Aini acknowledged that Nasser’s determination maintain pre-eminent UAR position in Yemen serves as deterrent to USSR penetration.

Talbot again urged YAR agree engage in preliminary discussions with UK without setting pre-conditions. Stated difficult for UK recognize YARG in absence evidence YARG acting independently of UAR. Talbot noted UAR had acquiesced in UNEF without recognition of Israel.

In response Talbot query re talk unity, al-Aini said he had urged Sallal in Cairo to take “no other steps” until YARG consultative council formed.

For USUN and London: Suggest you withhold contents paragraph four from your British colleagues until USUN has had opportunity discuss subject further with Al-Aini during Harlan Clark visit to UN July 9-10.

Ball

1. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 17 YEMEN-US. Secret. Drafted by Seelye; cleared by Davies and in draft by Campbell and Frazier Meade of EUR/BNA; and approved by Talbot. Also sent to London and USUN and repeated to Cairo, Jidda, Dhahran, Aden, and CINCSTRIKE/CINCMEAFSA.
2. On February 11, 1934, the United Kingdom, India, and Yemen signed a Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation (the Treaty of Sanaa), whereby Yemen evacuated the areas it held in the Aden Protectorates and both sides, without renouncing any claims, agreed to accept the status quo as it had existed under the Anglo-Turkish border convention of 1914. For text, see British and Foreign State Papers, 1934, vol. 137, pp. 212-215.