Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XXI, Near East Region; Arabian Peninsula

384. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Yemen¹

Washington, December 30, 1965, 6:39 p.m.

132. Taiz tels 215,² 218.³ Yemen Settlement.

1. Concur with Embassy’s characterization Nu’man explanation Haradh Conference breakdown⁴ as “oriental deviousness.” Appears from here that basic reason for failure conferees reach agreement lay in continued individual and group jockeying on both sides for immediate power advantage, regardless of professed desires for peace and cessation foreign interference. Each side now blaming other (and Faisal and Nasser) for failure, wellsprings of which are decades-long Yemeni inability develop consensus support for central government rather than tribal diversity. More immediate contributory factors may of course include built-in ambiguities of Jidda Agreement and somewhat obscure role of certain SAG and UARG representatives, but we inclined believe these subordinate to foregoing.

2. Apparent continued efforts Faisal and Nasser press for solution offer hope for future. Anticipate, however, next two months until resumption Yemeni conference may see new strains in Cairo-Riyadh relationships, particularly if Faisal encourages some royalist military activity either in response any delay of UAR troop withdrawal or independently.

3. Pending further developments in Nasser-Faisal relationship re Yemen, do not believe it appropriate or useful for us try play more active role by, for example, exploring receptivity to neutral groups’ supervision future conference as suggested by Nu’man. (YARG has easy access to Arab League and UN if it desires make use of it.) However, action addressees should use appropriate opportunities in discussion host government officials to indicate our continued desire peaceful settlement and to probe for information on next moves contemplated by UAR and Saudis.

Rusk

1. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 27 YEMEN. Secret. Drafted by Moore, cleared by Symmes, and approved by Davies. Also sent to Cairo and Jidda and repeated to London, CINCSTRIKE, and USUN.
2. In telegram 215 from Taiz, December 29, Clark reported that Numan, now ranking member of the republican delegation to the Haradh conference, told him that the conference had not succeeded because Yemeni delegates on both sides were closely controlled by Nasser and Faisal respectively and were not permitted to reach a settlement. Numan argued that the only chance of an acceptable Yemen settlement would be for the Arab League or the United Nations to preside over the next session of the conference, and asked the United States to support his idea. Clark pointed out that in the eyes of the world the Yemenis themselves were to blame for failure to reach agreement, and argued that the Yemen complex of problems could only be solved by the parties directly involved. His report referred to the “oriental deviousness” of Numan’s exposition and noted that Numan and several other YARG officials had left for Cairo by air that morning. (Ibid.)
3. Dated December 29. (Ibid.)
4. The Haradh conference adjourned on December 24 after failing to reach agreement on even the first steps toward a Yemen settlement.