Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XXI, Near East Region; Arabian Peninsula

388. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Washington, February 23, 1966, 12:40 p.m.

SUBJECT

• Yemen

PARTICIPANTS

• His Excellency Anwar al-Sadat, President of the U.A.R. National Assembly
• His Excellency Dr. Mostafa Kamel, Ambassador of the U.A.R.
• His Excellency Ahmad Hassan al-Feqi, Under Secretary of the U.A.R. Foreign Ministry
• The Secretary
• NEA—Raymond A. Hare, Assistant Secretary
• NE—Michael Sterner, Escort Officer

After welcoming Mr. Sadat and his colleagues, the Secretary asked how the meeting with President Johnson had gone.² Mr. Sadat expressed his entire satisfaction at his meeting with the President, and Ambassador Hare also indicated that it had been both a friendly and productive discussion. Secretary Rusk commented on Mr. Sadat’s personal familiarity with Yemen and asked for his assessment of the present situation there. Mr. Sadat replied that first he wanted to express his warm thanks for the Secretary’s invitation and for the cordial reception he had received in the U.S.

As the Secretary knew last August Nasser went to Jidda and reached an agreement with King Faisal for a settlement in Yemen. The Secretary commented the U.S.G. had felt this was a very constructive episode in Arab affairs. Mr. Sadat said the main provisions of the agreement had been the holding of a conference to set up a provisional government, after which there was to be a plebiscite to approve this government. Thereafter, the U.A.R. would begin to withdraw its military forces from Yemen. The U.A.R. was in fact prepared to do this, but it could not leave the country before a workable provisional government had been set up. The Haradh Conference had failed to accomplish this task. Sadat personally had foreseen that the Haradh conference would fail unless the Egyptians and Saudis got together beforehand to agree on what the conference was to accomplish. The Saudis refused at that time and the conference had failed as expected. Again, the U.A.R. had asked the Saudis to sit down with them after the Haradh conference to discuss where the two sides went from there. This offer also was rejected by the Saudis. All told, there had been six offers by the U.A.R.G. for direct contacts with S.A.G., including an offer by Marshal Amer to go to Riyadh, all of which had been rejected by the Saudis.

The Secretary asked what exactly the point was on which the Haradh Conference had foundered. Mr. Sadat replied that on the surface it centered on the question of the title that should be given to the country while it was under the provisional government. The Saudis disliked the title “Republic” so the U.A.R. readily agreed to the term “state”. Underneath, however, the dispute was really a question of whether the Hamid al-Din family was to participate in the future political life of the country. Because of the amount of blood and money the U.A.R. had expended in Yemen, the U.A.R. could not accept a restoration of the Hamid al-Din family in Yemen. This was also the way the vast majority of Yemenis felt about it. The U.A.R. thought it had an understanding with King Faisal on this subject but apparently not. It was clear at the Haradh Conference that King Faisal had not given clear orders to the Royalists that the Hamid al-Dins were to be exiled from future Yemeni political life. The Secretary said he had the impression that the Yemenis on both sides were somewhat resentful that the Saudis and Egyptians were making decisions about their country without consulting the Yemenis themselves. Sadat said this was indeed one problem, but not nearly as important a factor as the lack of U.A.R.-Saudi agreement as to how the Jidda agreement was to be carried out. The Secretary wondered whether, even if the U.A.R. and Saudis were in complete agreement, they could make it stick with the Yemenis. Sadat indicated his firm belief this was the lesser of the two problems. Once the Saudis and Egyptians had a meeting of minds, the Yemenis would have no choice but to fall into place.

The Secretary hoped the Saudi reply to Nasser’s recent Yemeni proposals would be constructive. Ambassador Hare noted that the Saudi Ambassador in Cairo had been expected to get back to Cairo with a reply the very day that Mr. Sadat left the U.A.R. The Secretary commented that he had a feeling the personal equation was especially important in dealing with King Faisal. It seemed to him that the meeting in Jidda in August had been successful largely for this reason. Mr. Sadat agreed. He said the U.A.R. appreciated this and it was for this reason the U.A.R.G. had repeatedly tried to have direct contacts with the Saudis. It was difficult to know where to go in view of Saudi rejection of these offers. The rejections had been polite but rejections nonetheless.

Ambassador Kamel said he thought King Faisal’s ultimate objective was to create a confrontation between the U.S. and U.A.R. Mr. Sadat added, that and to see the U.A.R. humiliated by a continuing costly involvement in Yemen as the only alternative to “total surrender”, i.e., a restoration of the Hamid al-Din Imamate.

The meeting adjourned for lunch.

1. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 27 YEMEN. Secret. Drafted by Michael Sterner (NEA/NE) on February 24 and approved in S on March 3. The time of the meeting is taken from Rusk’s Appointment Book. (Johnson Library)
2. See Foreign Relations, 1964–1968, vol. XVIII, Document 274.