Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XXI, Near East Region; Arabian Peninsula

403. Telegram From the Embassy in Saudi Arabia to the Department of State¹

Jidda, July 7, 1966, 1230Z.

67. Jidda 36 (Notal).² Kuwaiti Mediation Effort.

1. In my first talk with King July 6 since his and my return to Jidda (Jidda 66),³ I recalled our conversation in car en route JFB airport June 30 when King told me had just received details latest UAR proposal as conveyed by Kuwaitis. King’s initial reaction had been UAR proposal represented retrograde step over what Kuwaitis had earlier led SAG to believe was Nasser’s position (Jidda 1272),⁴ but King had wished study matter further following his return to Saudi Arabia. I asked King if he had any further thoughts on subject and about status of Saudi reply. King answered SAG still studying latest UAR proposals. Dr. Pharaon currently drafting reply for his consideration. Observed he personally had not had much opportunity since his return to consider question further in view heavy accumulated backlog of work.

2. I recalled Secretary’s observation to King that most important aspect Yemen problem is to get UAR troops out (Deptel 867).⁵ In this context I stressed need keep dialogue going and expressed hope that King not overlook any practical opportunity achieve this aim even though some price might have to be paid for it. While caution clearly needed in dealing with Nasser, I urged that King earnestly consider further areas of “give” which would not jeopardize Saudi security. Where King felt he could not agree to UAR proposals as advanced by Kuwaitis, I further urged he offer constructive counter proposals. Seemed to me that area of disagreement was being reduced, even though slowly and painfully, and it important effort do so continue. In this context it also important that ways be sought give Nasser honorable way out.

3. King listened carefully. Re last point, claimed he had been seeking offer Nasser honorable way out of Yemen for last three years. Trouble is Nasser cannot be trusted. He recalled had agreed with Secretary’s view on importance getting UAR troops out. He also recalled Secretary’s observation that perhaps problem could be tackled piecemeal, first by setting up Yemeni interim govt on 50-50 basis and carrying on from there. Latter would have been consistent with earlier Kuwaiti proposal which Saudis believed Kuwaitis had first cleared with UAR. Latest UAR proposal, as conveyed by Kuwaitis, drops equal representation in interim govt and deliberately seeks weigh govt on republican side. King emphasized he not prepared give UAR diplomatic victory in Yemen when its massive military interventions had failed to achieve this.

4. King then dwelt on UAR insistence that he specifically agree to exclusion Hamid ad-Din. Reiterated he had no interest in Hamid ad-Din or anyone else in Yemen, but claimed sole purpose Nasser desire name Hamid ad-Dins is to achieve by political means what UAR has failed achieve militarily. King candidly admitted that Hamid ad-Din family, with all its shortcomings, is currently core of royalist cause. In King’s view, the moment he specifically agrees to exclusion Hamid ad-Din, royalist cause will disintegrate and transform into tribal rabble. Nasser knows this which is sole reason, King insisted, that Nasser is so persistent about point. Moment King agrees to specific exclusion Hamid ad-Din, Nasser will leak word of it. Thereafter, he will jettison any guarantee he has given and keep in Yemen whatever number UAR troops remain there. This is constant Nasser tactic. I argued any such effort by Nasser to renege on solemn guarantee would mobilize world public opinion against him. King dismissed argument saying world public opinion, even if it could be mounted which he doubted, had never deterred Nasser from overt or covert activities against other states.

5. King continued his position remains that interim Yemeni Govt, if constituted on mutually agreeable basis, should be authorized exclude any Yemenis whose continued presence is believed to be harmful to stability, but that he would not agree to specific exclusion Hamid ad-Din except after last UAR soldier out. Thereafter Yemeni people could decide in plebiscite or any other way type of govt they want for future and persons they want in it. If such Yemeni Govt wants financial help, SAG, along with other states, would be prepared consider such help.

6. I said I appreciated King’s position, but cautioned against SAG appearing inflexible. If latest proposals not fully agreeable, I again urged that constructive counter proposals be offered. For example, would 2/5-3/5 ratio be so bad if Yemeni third force were charged to republican side. In any event, once UAR troops out, there likely be considerable realignment of political forces in Yemen on both sides with various what are now republican and royalist elements crisscrossing to form new groupings. I understood anti-Egyptianism rampant in Yemen which should offer some safeguard against UAR influence. As for Hamid ad-Din, could they perhaps be kept out during period of interim govt before plebiscite or perhaps they might be withdrawn after larger number UAR troops out than half but before all are out. I stressed I was advancing purely personal thoughts solely for illustrative purpose to identify possible further areas of “give” which might be explored in order to achieve principle aim getting UAR troops out. King, in his wisdom, Dr Pharaon and other Saudi officials intimately acquainted with Yemeni situation could doubtless devise other even better alternatives which would show SAG willingness compromise, yet prove viable. Important thing was that SAG-UAR dialogue carry on. King said SAG would do utmost, but noted “after three years of futile talks, UAR has tired US on Yemen just as USG efforts with North Vietnam to find peaceful solution have tired you.” I seized on this to remind King that, despite all frustrations of Vietnam, President has made it clear USG continues search for peaceful solution and is doing so. I hoped King would do likewise in Yemeni situation. King merely responded “I will continue to do my best.”

7. I shall also seek opportunity discuss matter with Dr Pharaon next few days. Deptel 1924 July 6⁶ just received. I believe my remarks consistent with it.

Eilts

1. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 27 YEMEN. Secret; Limdis. Repeated to Beirut, Cairo, Kuwait, London, and Taiz.
2. Dated July 5. (Ibid.)
3. Dated July 7. (Ibid., POL 7 SAUD)
4. Dated June 13. (Ibid., POL 27 YEMEN)
5. Telegram 867 to Jidda, June 24, summarized the Secretary’s June 22 conversation with King Faisal. (Ibid., POL 7 SAUD)
6. Telegram 1924 to Jidda, July 6, endorsed the Ambassador’s intention to further explore with the King specific areas of give in the Saudi position, and instructed him to encourage Faisal not to overlook any practical possibilities for achieving withdrawal of UAR troops from Yemen. (Ibid., POL 27 YEMEN)