Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XXI, Near East Region; Arabian Peninsula

423. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Saudi Arabia¹

Washington, January 31, 1967, 7:35 p.m.

128727. Jidda tel 2930,² State 127476.³

1. Possible US responses to Saudi request for implementation our security assurances fall into broad fields of military and political. Separate message being sent indicating possible range our action in military field, which strongly limited by importance our avoiding direct involvement UAR/SAG hostilities.⁴

2. Action in political field required in first instance to prevent immediate outbreak hostilities and, subsequently, to bring Faisal-Nasser detente. (Anticipate that specific details Yemen solution would be outgrowth of latter rather than determining element.) As hours pass without renewal UAR bombing or immediate Saudi retaliation and with apparent continued SAG attempt keep diplomatic relations with UAR, certain amount of automatic cooling off is occurring. Prompt action by Kuwaitis could further ease immediate problem. Main aim at moment is to get Egyptians and Saudis talking again at any level as noted by Saqqaf (Jidda tel 2954).⁵ Following are among possibilities for achieving this:

3. Offer direct US mediation. As suggested Cairo’s 4239,⁶ such offer might be best technique for immediate requirement of gaining time in order permit a relaxation of currently rigid positions. Ultimate success doubtful in view our lack sufficient leverage, particularly in Cairo. Faisal may also have some doubts about usefulness direct mediation since he considers Bunker disengagement effort as failure.⁷

4. New Third Party Effort. If Kuwaitis are no more active or successful now than in last few months, may be useful for us encourage new mediator.⁸ With Saqqaf’s indication Pakistani effort would be acceptable (Jidda 2962),⁹ Ayub may offer practical hope for bringing detente.

5. Further possibility is to bring UN into problem. (Note from Jidda 2963¹⁰ that SAG also giving this active consideration. Baroody has seen UNSYG, but details this meeting not yet known.) Following factors enter into such consideration:

a. It is of importance that further increase in tensions and polarization of Arab world be avoided. Injection Saudi-UAR confrontation into UN framework could in fact sharpen polarization by focusing broad international attention on dispute in which US and USSR would predictably be taking opposite sides.

b. If, however, we become convinced Saudis must and will do something in retaliation Najran bombing which will complicate problem, more desirable alternative would be recourse to UN Security Council. Advantages of SC meeting are:

(1) It would provide cooling off period; and

(2) Saudis would probably have sympathetic response from most SC members and could reasonably expect 9 votes for satisfactory resolution even though USSR may veto. Disadvantages:

(1) Meeting would result in bitter recriminations with further worsening SAG-UAR relations;

(2) UAR could probably make damaging counter charges against Saudi’s continued support of group (Yemeni royalists) working to overthrow government accepted by UN;

(3) Saudis may not get as much in resolution—despite good case—as they might hope, e.g., condemnation of UAR. And in any event USSR might veto if UAR requested.

6. Foregoing assumes Saudi charge will be limited to Najran bombing. It impossible to predict what would happen if Saudis leveled poison gas charges. That would depend on how provable their case is. If they raise charge without providing convincing proof, they may cast doubt on their general credibility, including Najran charges. We would prefer to suspend judgment on this until further info available on poison gas accusations.

7. Since there is no clear case in favor of going to SC, might be useful consider prompting different type UN action as suggested para 5 Jidda’s 2930. Some interested party could ask SYG to step back into SAG-UAR problem with offer to continue his efforts which began in fall of 1962. On April 29, 1963 (S/5298) SYG reported he consulted regularly with SAG-UAR about “certain aspects of situation in Yemen of external origin with view to making my office available for such assistance as might be desired toward insuring against any developments which might threaten peace of area.” As result SYG appointed Bunche to fact-finding mission, which eventually with Bunker’s help ended in creation UNYOM. Although UNYOM terminated, SYG could revive his personal role and perhaps appoint a representative whose mission would be initially limited to easing current tension between UAR and Saudi Arabia and if successful to recommend additional steps for further mediation of basic SAG-UAR differences over Yemen. (In terminating UNYOM, SYG put himself at disposal of parties in search of peaceful solution.)

8. Whether USG or some other interested party requests SYG intervention could be decided later. It would be advisable, if possible, to obtain prior Saudi and UAR agreement before asking for SYG help. In any case SYG will insist on SAG and UAR concurrence at some point.

9. Posts are requested to comment urgently on foregoing possibilities.¹¹

Rusk

1. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27 SAUD-UAR. Secret; Priority. Drafted by Moore and Campbell; cleared by Sisco, Buffum, Davies, Brown, L. Bruce Laingen (NEA/PAF), and Bennsky; and approved by Handley. Also sent to Cairo, Rawalpindi, Kuwait, Sanaa, and USUN and repeated to Amman, Beirut, and London.
2. See footnote 4, Document 421.
3. Document 421.
4. Telegram 128587 to Jidda, January 31, a State-Defense message, authorized the U.S. Military Training Mission in Saudi Arabia to send a small number of technical experts to advise Saudi air defense units in the border area for a short period, but cautioned the Mission to exercise particular care that its role remained advisory and not operational. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27 SAUD-UAR)
5. Dated January 29. (Ibid.)
6. Document 422.
7. In telegram 3034 from Jidda, February 1, Eilts stated that he agreed with Battle’s proposal that the United States consider reintervening in the Saudi-UAR confrontation with a direct offer of U.S. mediation, either alone or in conjunction with the Kuwaitis. He commented that in view of the salability to Faisal of a renewed U.S. mediation effort, there might be distinct value in having a new mediator who could not be personally reproached with past failures, such as Governor Harriman. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27 YEMEN)
8. In telegram 4341 from Cairo, February 3, Battle stated his belief that the present Saudi-Egyptian imbroglio required more rapid action than they were likely to get out of the United Nations or the Kuwaitis and argued that if the United States wanted to seek a solution to the basic problem of Yemen, it was going to have to intervene actively. (Ibid.)
9. Dated January 30. (Ibid.)
10. Dated January 30. (Ibid., POL 27 SAUD-UAR)
11. In telegram 773 from Kuwait, February 2, Cottam argued that Kuwaiti mediation still seemed to afford the most likely means of eventually resolving the underlying dispute. Any new direct U.S. mediation initiative would increase U.S. involvement, but probably with no greater chance of success than the present Kuwaiti effort. Of the various alternatives suggested in the Department’s telegram, the Embassy believed reinvolvement of the UN Secretary General might be the most desirable. (Ibid., POL 27 YEMEN)