Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XXI, Near East Region; Arabian Peninsula

426. Information Memorandum From the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs (Davies) to Secretary of State Rusk¹

Washington, February 6, 1967.

SUBJECT

• U.S. Military Involvement in Saudi-Yemen Border Area

1. U.A.R. air strikes on January 27 against the Saudi town of Najran, only a few miles from the Yemen border, have prompted the Saudi Government to invoke our long-standing assurances of support in case of unprovoked attack. We have sought to implement our commitment mainly by diplomatic means, e.g., the Under Secretary’s representations on January 28 to the U.A.R. Ambassador and your letter of February 3 to the Kuwaiti Foreign Minister² encouraging continued mediation efforts. We have turned down a Saudi request for two U.S. Army-manned Hawk missile batteries to be stationed near Najran. The Saudis continue however to urge us to “do something” to protect them.

2. Saudi faith in our friendship would be seriously undermined if we were to be completely unresponsive to their requests for military assistance. We have accordingly authorized our 235-man Military Training Mission in Saudi Arabia to detail no more than three officers for short visits to the Yemen border area to advise on Saudi air defense arrangements. The officers, who are to visit Najran on February 8, have been instructed to maintain as low visibility as possible and to avoid any operational involvement. We have also approved in principle a Saudi request for purchase of Sidewinder air-to-air missiles for four Saudi Air Force F-86s, although delivery may be delayed for some time owing to unavailability of mounting devices. Our Defense Attache in Jidda has just returned from a visit to Najran to survey the damage caused by the U.A.R. air strikes.

3. The Raytheon Company, which holds the Hawk missile contract with the Saudi Government, has agreed to a Saudi request, made directly to the Company and without our knowledge, to position its recently arrived first Hawk battery near Najran. Raytheon technicians would erect the battery, which could be in place by the middle or end of February, but would not fire the missiles. We are aware that placing the Hawks so near the border could result in their being fired into Yemeni airspace. Additionally, if Raytheon technicians at Najran should be inadvertently involved in hostilities it would add to U.A.R.-U.S. frictions. It could also pose legal problems for the individual Americans concerned. (We will be advising them of their legal position and of possible limitations on the extent of official U.S. protection which could be afforded them.) However, we have no legal control over the Hawk battery since it is now Saudi property. More importantly, we believe any official U.S. move to prevent Raytheon from complying with the Saudi request would result in loss of all Saudi credence in us and our oft-repeated assurances of support. On the other hand, continuation of the low-key type of support we are giving will come as no surprise to the Egyptians and, of itself, should not lead to a more serious confrontation with them than we are already in.

1. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 32-1 SAUD. Secret. Drafted by Korn and Moore. A copy was sent to the Under Secretary. The initials “DR” on the memorandum indicate that the Secretary read it.
2. See Documents 421 and 425.