Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XXI, Near East Region; Arabian Peninsula

434. Telegram From the Embassy in Saudi Arabia to the Department of State¹

Jidda, April 12, 1967, 1152Z.

4220. State 170451² and 170460.³ Yemen Mediation.

1. Two hour struggle session with King Faisal last night, at which Rashad Pharaon also present, produced somewhat inconclusive results. In summary: (a) Faisal still agrees in principle go ahead; (b) generally accepts terms of reference (TR), but was persuaded by Rashad seek some emendation; (c) generally accepted our interpretations of his qualifications re removing UAR influence from Yemen and possible USG aid to UAR and (d) utterly refused commit himself to stopping aid to Yemeni royalists during conciliation period. In order give flavor debate, and perhaps a fuller appreciation of King’s views, following reports pertinent talk in some detail:

2. I first presented TR amended to delete word “aggressive” from paras 2 and 3 per State 171462.⁴ These were read to him in Arabic translation prepared by EmbOff. In doing so I noted TR deliberately left general to give special representative maximum latitude in carrying out his functions. These same TR being simultaneously presented to President Nasser through FonMin Riad. I knew of no reaction as yet from UAR, but we hopeful both SAG and UAR will accept them. If they do, Amb Hare prepared promptly visit both countries to begin his consultations.

3. I then took up Faisal’s various “qualifications”:

A. In connection with essential acceptance of proposition that aggressive acts against each other should be suspended during conciliation, I stressed Saudis should agree suspend further support to royalists other than food. Added that Yemeni royalists should also continue to be restrained from resuming hostilities. On its part, UAR being asked cease bombings and support for harassment acts inside Saudi Arabia. This would at least insure standoff between principal antagonists and allow special representative see what he can from both sides should also tone down provocative propaganda. Noted that while we cannot vouch for Nasser’s genuine interest in reaching settlement, we heartened by his acceptance US conciliation and his suggestion of Amb Hare as mediator; conversely, we convinced he prepared keep troops in Yemen as long as necessary. In such situation, resumption Yemeni royalist hostilities likely delay rather than accelerate any prospects UAR military withdrawal. More important, they expose Saudi Arabia to retaliation. TR drafted to be consistent with obligations which both parties have already undertaken in international instrument such as UN and Arab League Charters.

B. Re Faisal’s qualification that all vestiges UAR influence in Yemen be removed, I said we interpreted this to mean withdrawal UAR military forces. In these terms, this consistent with Secretary’s statement to King at Blair House and has always been USG aim. Neither we nor Saudis nor anyone else could hope to remove every vestige UAR influence in Yemen or anywhere else in ARP world. As largest Arab state, UAR bound to have influence in this part of the world.

C. On subject USG aid to UAR, I said was sure he not attempting place conditions on our bilateral relationships with UAR which we seeking improve if ways can be found to do so. Although food not a factor in current USG-UAR relationships, we could conceive situation where some USG help to UAR would be of benefit to us and SAF in moving toward an eventual Yemen settlement. However, assured Faisal USG has no intention undertaking any special programs with UAR that would prejudice conciliation effort.

D. As footnote, and having in mind question he had voiced during previous audience, I explained to him how Amb Hare’s name had surfaced. Had earlier mentioned this to Rashad, but I wanted to be sure King got straight story from me.

4. After listening very carefully, Faisal commented as follows: Saudi policy has been and continues be seek peaceful settlement of Yemen problem. In this context King welcomes renewed USG conciliation effort. Qualifications he had set at previous meeting not intended obstruct this, but to reflect realistically his doubts about Nasser’s intentions. They are based on his past experience with Nasser:

A. Taking these qualifications individually, he stated had no right or intention to tell USG what to do or what not to do in its bilateral relations with UAR. In spirit of frankness he had merely wished give us friendly advice. Once before Nasser had been cooperative up to point when he assured of USG food aid, then dropped any interest in Yemen settlement. As result, USG had found itself with food commitment which was in fact aiding, directly or indirectly, Nasser’s foreign adventures. If any USG help is to be given to UAR once UAR military out of Yemen, he could have no objection. He fully satisfied with USG assurance no help would be given UAR which would prejudice conciliation effort.

B. He agreed reference to every vestige UAR influence in Yemen being removed should be viewed primarily as withdrawal all military forces. All other aspects of possible residual UAR influence could either be negotiated or be left to Yemenis to decide so long as they able make free decision. They unable do so when coerced by massive UAR military presence. SAG has no permanent interest in Yemen, and he perfectly willing take his chances in context friendly and peaceful competition in a free Yemen.

C. Faisal absolutely adamant in his unwillingness commit himself to any particular actions or restraints re Saudi aid to Yemeni royalists while mediation going on. While he was evasive on whether arms aid actually resumed, he reiterated would have to give arms aid if Yemeni royalists ask for it. Only condition on which he would again restrict his aid to Yemeni royalists and/or actively restrain them would be as part of agreement whereby UAR withdraws its military forces from Yemen. Fighting, he claimed, has never ceased in Yemen. Despite his efforts restrain Yemeni royalists during past year, UAR bombings of north Yemeni villages had continued without let-up. They still going on. He had first agreed Yemeni royalists should only defend themselves, but they have no defense against air and gas attacks. If they now retaliating more directly, this entirely up to them to decide and he not in position stop them. Insisted he is not actively encouraging Yemeni royalists, but could not accept equating his aid to royalists with what UAR is doing in Yemen. Although SAG recognizes Yemeni royalist govt, there are no Saudi soldiers in Yemen. This is in marked contrast massive UAR military presence. If because of Saudi aid to Yemeni royalists Nasser attacks Saudi Arabia, this makes no difference. He has already attacked Saudi Arabia when Saudi aid to Yemeni royalists still suspended. “We are not afraid of his attacks; all we can do is die defending our country.” We rehashed this one again and again, but he would not budge.

D. He dismissed UAR propaganda as unimportant. In answer my suggestion mutual toning down of hostile propaganda would be a helpful indicator that both sides willing improve relations, he agreed. Insisted, however, that Saudi propaganda activities hardly comparable with those of UAR. Saudi public media had not deliberately attacked Nasser. Neither had he in his speeches which he hoped USG has noted have in tone been conciliatory and in marked contrast to Nasser’s public utterances. Should Saudi Arabia, he wanted to know, be expected restrain its public media from stressing Islam as defense against godless communism? Or should Saudi public media be stopped from stating Saudi aversion to socialism? UAR has several times objected to articles critical of socialism. I said did not wish at this point get into details what respective parties ought to do to improve relations. This matter for special representative. However, I reminded him that SAG already has good relations with various countries that are in one way or another socialist. I had also read articles in Saudi press in which banner of Islam and anti-communism had clearly been waved as direct attacks on UAR. I doubted anyone would wish restrict constructive public media efforts. When they become instruments of attack on others, they breed distrust and ill will. In frankness I had to tell him Saudi public media sometimes also deserves share of blame. He agreed, but again insisted no comparison between what Saudis and UAR doing against each other in propaganda field. Added SAG willing stop direct attacks on UAR.

5. I then told him did not know whether USG would feel able carry on if other than food aid for Yemeni royalists is resumed, but nevertheless wanted to know more specifically his reaction to TR. He first said TR so general as to have little meaning. We could do without them: he did not wish at this time commit SAG to any “undertakings,” but quickly added that this should not be construed as Saudi disinterest in proposed USG conciliation effort. “Let it proceed and we will see what happens.” I pointed out both he and President Nasser had asked to see TR which, as result, now being presented to both. Speaking personally, I thought Faisal unwilling at this time accept broad undertakings of cooperating with special representative or refraining from prejudicial acts or hostile propaganda against UAR or UAR forces, there was little use in sending a special representative. There nothing in or inconsistent with SAG’s undertakings elsewhere. USG not offering its good offices again because of any keen interest in involving ourselves in Yemen problem. We doing so solely and reluctantly in order help friends like Saudi Arabia and try to keep peace in area. I had always understood latter is also what King wants. TR, while general, are at least a further expression of willingness both sides again look for peaceful solution and offer broad parameters in which special representative might work. While I appreciated his point, I did not see how in these circumstances I could recommend to my govt that we go ahead. Moreover, if UAR accepts undertakings in TR and SAG is unwilling do so, I wanted to tell him as friend he will be in poor position posturally. Onus for continued impasse will then be largely on him. He thought about this for a moment. Then, with a great gesture of his hand, he said somewhat wearily, “All right, I accept the undertakings in their terms of reference.”

6. At this point Rashad, who had sat by quietly during most of talk, intervened. (While King had not himself read TR and contented himself with hearing them, Rashad had been studying them closely.) Rashad argued inclusion of phrase “or UAR forces” in second sentence of SAG’s undertakings is redundant. Moreover, it implies SAG has in past acted against UAR forces. He referred to King’s earlier statement no Saudi troops in Yemen. He suggested this phrase be deleted. Faisal agreed. I said did not think this would be possible. TR had been written identically not to suggest that both sides had done the same things, but to avoid implication USG attempting prejudge issue. TR presented to SAG and UAR should remain identical. King accepted this.

7. Returning to charge, Rashad then argued both texts be changed to read “During the conciliation period, to refrain from aggressive acts or hostile propaganda against Saudi Arabia (the UAR) which would prejudice the conciliation effort.” (This reinserts “aggressive” and deletes “or UAR forces.”) The UAR, he insisted, has carried on aggressive acts against Saudi Arabia such as recent bombings on Najran. This should not be obscured by bland reference to “acts.” He thought his proposal placed into clearer focus obligations both SAG and UAR would undertake. I argued this a distinction without meaning. Our phraseology already encompassed that idea. Moreover, in terms his earlier concern about inference Saudi Arabia had acted against UAR forces, Rashad’s proposed change could be inferred to suggest Saudi Arabia had in fact carried on past aggression against UAR. Finally, these TR already presented to UAR and Saudi nit-picking at this time hardly helpful in getting effort underway soon. Unfortunately, King agreed Rashad’s proposed terminology preferable and would like it substituted for ours. I again pointed out to him that language Rashad proposed and that he now requesting could probably more easily be used against him in connection with his support for Yemeni royalists. He said wearily, “I suppose so, but they will do that anyway.” He concluded that SAG will accept TR if aforementioned change is made and if UAR also accepts them as amended.

8. Session frank but cordial throughout. Comments by immediately following telegram.⁵

Eilts

1. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27 YEMEN. Secret; Priority; Exdis. Repeated Priority to Cairo.
2. Document 433.
3. See footnote 2, Document 433.
4. See footnote 3, Document 433.
5. In telegram 4221 from Jidda, April 12, Eilts commented that the King’s reaction to the terms of reference was disappointing, even if not entirely unexpected, and that most disturbing was Faisal’s unwillingness to commit himself to stopping aid to the Yemen royalists during the conciliation period. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27 YEMEN)