Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XXI, Near East Region; Arabian Peninsula

436. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the United Arab Republic¹

Washington, April 25, 1967, 5:54 p.m.

181932. Ref: Cairo’s 6665,² Jidda’s 4389.³ Yemen Mediation.

1. View unhelpful and dilatory nature el-Feki’s response to Nes approach and unsettling effect of GUAR-sponsored trip of ex-King Saud to Yemen, we believe Charge should seek earliest opportunity make following points to UAR Fonmin Riad:

a) Offer of USG to assist in mediatory role in UAR-SAG dispute over Yemen, made by Ambassador Battle in his farewell call on President Nasser, was based on a desire to help parties directly concerned avoid what could be an increasingly dangerous situation. We believed then as we believe now that USG could not hope to be of any assistance unless both Saudi Arabia and UAR voluntarily and wholeheartedly accepted our offer of assistance and were prepared to work with us.

b) We were therefore heartened by GUAR’s preliminary and affirmative response to our offer. Matter has subsequently been followed with interest at high levels USG.

c) Identical terms of reference were delivered both to SAG and GUAR over two weeks ago. King Feisal immediately gave us his initial reaction to these terms of reference. Fonmin will understand why it would be inappropriate for us to discuss details of SAG response with GUAR at this time. Proper procedure is for USG to await substantive response of GUAR to terms of reference after which it can make another simultaneous approach to both capitals.

d) We are concerned at delay in GUAR response to US draft terms of reference. Document is brief, simple, contains no hidden meanings, and requires parties to assume no obligations beyond those already incumbent upon them through various multilateral undertakings such as UN and Arab League charters. We believe that 17 days which have elapsed since April 8 have been ample for GUAR to prepare a position on terms of reference.

e) Our concern is heightened by recent surfacing of ex-King Saud in Yemen. Though it was Sallal rather than GUAR leaders who hailed Saud as “legal King of Saudi people,” we do not wish to get into such legal niceties. Fact remains Saud was taken to Yemen in official GUAR airplane and in company of some of highest Egyptian officials. SAG has not complained to us about this behavior on part GUAR. Nor does USG propose insert itself into legal or political effects of this incident on UAR-SAG relations. We are, however, concerned at its effect on prospects for our own mediation proposal. Actions such as this make it more difficult for USG to be helpful.

f) USG has felt throughout that without some degree of cooperation and responsiveness from both parties, there would be little point in pressing mediation effort. We have no desire allow ourselves into situation in absence desire of both sides to work with us.

g) We would appreciate the GUAR’s considered views on these matters.

2. FYI re para 4, Cairo’s 6665. Ambassador Kamel has been informed by Cairo of US offer and UAR acceptance of US mediation. He has been told by us that terms of reference have been delivered both in Cairo and in Jidda. In response to his questions re Feisal’s reaction he has been given line contained in State’s 173904,⁴ i.e. it would be inappropriate for USG to discuss SAG response until GUAR responds and USG can make simultaneous approach to both capitals. Kamel has accepted this as proper diplomatic procedure and has not pressed for details. End FYI.⁵

Katzenbach

1. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27 YEMEN. Secret; Priority; Exdis. Drafted by Bergus, cleared by Brewer, and approved by Battle. Repeated to Jidda.
2. Document 435.
3. In telegram 4389 from Jidda, April 25, Eilts commented that the United Arab Republic action in taking Saud to Yemen was obviously a deliberate slap at Faisal. He noted that some Saudis might ask if, assuming the U.S. mediation effort was already formally underway, this kind of blatant UAR action would be regarded under U.S.-drafted terms of reference as reason for the mediator to terminate his effort. Nor was the long delay in the UAR response likely to be helpful in persuading Faisal that Nasser genuinely wanted U.S. mediation. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27 YEMEN)
4. Dated April 12. (Ibid.)
5. Telegram 182453 to Cairo, April 26, informed the Embassy that the Department was not impressed with el-Feki’s explanation that the UAR response to the U.S. terms of reference was being held up pending a meeting of the Supreme Executive, noting that this small group was composed of individuals in daily contact with Nasser. It expressed concern lest the United Arab Republic have the impression it could keep the United States on a string while it acted as it saw fit in Yemen. (Ibid.)