Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XXII, Iran

311. Telegram From the Embassy in Iran to the Department of State¹

Tehran, September 17, 1968, 1600Z.

6606. Subject: Shah’s USSR Visit. Summary. Shah himself is aware there may be some adverse public reaction in West to his Moscow visit.² However, he believes visit ultimately will benefit Iran and free world causes. Certainly he is under no illusions as to Soviet aims.

1. Shah and I 17th discussed at length his forthcoming U.S.S.R. visit. He said developments in Czechoslovakia had caused him to consider in depth pros and cons of proceeding with trip as scheduled. He had concluded life must go on. He noted USG announced continued support for NPT and had indicated contacts with Soviets would continue. It clear Soviet actions in Czechoslovakia not going to be reversed by outside powers and canceling his visit would certainly not do it. Meanwhile, he hoped his speaking frankly to “those damned people” might do a little good.

2. Providing him with President’s speeches re U.S.-U.S.S.R. relations and following other suggestions from Dept, I urged Shah to convey to Soviets his own views re detente and bridge-building, re Czech invasion, re Viet Nam, re Arab-Israel situation, etc. He promised to report to us his impressions re all these subjects, as well as re state of play inside Kremlin leadership.

3. Re Arab-Israel situation, Shah said he had been encouraged by his talks with King Hussein but this was offset by report that Arab FornMins had decided on military rather than political action. Nasser’s speech had conciliatory note but current Arab arms and propaganda build-up very disturbing. Shah reiterated his view that Israeli demand for direct negotiations unwise. He also recalled Kosygin’s telling him that Arab arms supplies had been replenished after June disaster. Shah said he now questions assumption that Soviets will or can control irrational Arab action, i.e. early resumption of hostilities with Israel.

4. Shah said he also haunted by another remark by Kosygin i.e., Western powers are organizing for world war. Shah realizes this is nonsense but fears Soviets as is typical may be projecting their own intentions. Shah noted reports that Soviets have virtually closed ballistic missile gap and that they may feel desperate in their efforts to hold Commie Bloc together. If Kosygin reiterates suggestion that West, particularly Germans, are bent on war, Shah said only response he can think of is that there is no imaginable reason why West should invite mass destruction. I ventured suggestion that when Kosygin made that remark he undoubtedly preoccupied how Kremlin was going to bring Czechs in line and might have been concerned that military move by Soviets would precipitate world conflict; thus accusing West was smokescreen. Shah agreed this might be explanation.

5. Noting how Sovs will seek maximum exploitation his visit to restore their image, I urged Shah to avoid Commie lingo which characterized Kosygin visit communiqué, e.g., “atmosphere of friendship,” “together with other peace-loving countries,” similarity of views re European security, belief of signatories in “non-interference,” etc. Shah showed clear desire to avoid playing this Soviet game to extent possible. Re European security, he did, however, reiterate his belief in nuclear-free zones, e.g., Central Europe (he believes we also do not wish Germans to have nuclear weapons), as well as for Mideast countries (“those crazy Arabs”).

6. In discussing value of neighborly relations (within limits) with Soviets, Shah noted such relations forestall Soviet clamor against Iran’s building up military strength in interest of Persian Gulf security. This opened opportunity to suggest that it is not necessary to punch US in nose when target is USSR, e.g. Hoveyda’s statements and DPA quotations of Shah that Americans will not be permitted to replace British colonialism in Iran and in Gulf area. Shah agreed it preferable to refer to other powers in general.

7. Opportunity was also afforded to point out that real Soviet aim, as is so clear from Soviet broadcasts, is ouster of U.S. presence and driving USG back into isolationism. Shah agreed, saying Soviets would then have free hand. He added that his own regime is equally target of clandestine broadcasts but agreed with my view that Soviets are “cultivating the land” for day when Shah’s firm hand is no longer at tiller.

8. Comment: My impression is that Shah realizes there may be raised eyebrows in West re his USSR visit, but he hopes to prove that visit ultimately is to free world benefit. FornMin Zahedi tells me no other Cabinet minister except himself will accompany the Shah, thus limiting scope for Soviet propaganda exploitation. Ali Khani, Minister of Economy, was originally scheduled to go to expand economic cooperation further. Also Toufanian who is arms purchaser has been eliminated from entourage.

Meyer

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 7 IRAN. Secret; Limdis. Repeated to Moscow.
2. On September 5 Ambassador Ansary informed Under Secretary Rostow of the Shah’s decision to make a visit to the Soviet Union beginning September 24. (State Department Activities Report, September 6; Johnson Library, National Security File, Agency File, State, Department of, President’s Evening Reading, Vol. IX)