230. Intelligence Memorandum1
SOME ASPECTS OF SUBVERSION IN AFRICA2
Summary
In their efforts to gain influence and to reduce the Western presence in Africa, the Soviets and Chinese Communists have come to concentrate most of their efforts on normal overt means such as economic and military aid, student training, cultural exchanges, and propaganda. Externally promoted Communist subversion in the classical sense appears to be limited. This does not mean that covert Communist activity is absent; it is not. Early attempts by the Soviets in the 1960s to promote subversion in the newly independent African states through the use of ideologically oriented, foreign-trained agents was almost a total failure, however. Most of their assets were not able to sustain themselves against the regime in power. Similarly, the Chinese Communists continue clandestinely to assist and aid various antiregime elements, with little success to date.
The Communist emphasis on normal diplomatic means stems partly from current conditions in Africa. There are no effective Communist parties, and leftist-oriented labor organizations have yet to become useful tools. Moreover, African political parties with leftist or Communist sympathies are either totally outside the power structure, or are the mass party of a regime whose leaders, although pro-Eastern, have no intention of letting their government evolve into an outright Communist regime.
The most immediate threat currently confronting virtually all established African governments is overwhelmingly internal and indigenous. It usually stems from disaffected native elements often motivated by narrow tribal, personal, or professional considerations. Where broader factors are involved these are usually rooted in the misdeeds and failures of incumbent regimes, e.g., their corruption, or economic mismanagement. Instability—the source of most African upheavals—is inherent in the weak economic, sociological, and political underpinnings of nearly every regime.
[Page 383]The over-all Communist effort in Africa is considerable in the apparent hope that through aid and the training and indoctrination of individual Africans some Communist regimes may eventually be installed. Since 1954, the Soviets have extended some $900 million in economic aid and about $300 million in military aid, exclusive of Egypt. The Chinese have extended some $350 million in economic aid, and an unknown amount of military aid. In addition to diplomatic personnel, the Soviets and Chinese together have over 6,000 technicians in Africa. The Soviets also have some 225 known or suspected intelligence officers, and the Chinese a considerably lesser number.
[Here follows the body of the paper.]
- Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Africa, Union of South, Vol. III, 10/66–9/68. Secret; No Foreign Dissem. According to a note on the source text, “This memorandum was produced solely by CIA. It was prepared by the Office of Current Intelligence and coordinated with the Office of Economic Research, the Office of National Estimates, and the Clandestine Services.”↩
- The Arab countries of Egypt, Libya, and the Sudan are treated only cursorily in this paper. [Footnote in the source text.]↩