207. Telegram From the Embassy in India to the White House1
655. For President Johnson. In view of many difficult problems that are crowding your plate I hesitate to communicate with you directly except under most urgent circumstances. However we have thus far had no reply to numerous messages on future PL 480 shipments and since we have now reached crisis point I believe such communication is justified.
PL 480 shipments to India have been coming in under sixty-day agreement signed July 26. Under this authorization the last shipments of foodgrains is scheduled to stop by end of October. Even if we should sign renewal agreement today, there would already be a gap between this date and arrival of shipments under new authorization.
In spite of massive increase in India’s foodgrain production of nearly 11 percent last year, situation in regard to food supplies and food prices has been serious. Increases in purchasing power, burdens on transportation system plus whisperings of hold-up in US supplied grains are starting to lead to scare buying, hoarding and rise in prices.
If under these circumstances PL 480 shipments were to stop, be curtailed or delayed, situation could quickly get out of hand. Food riots in major cities managed by Communists would be inevitable. As they put out word that growing shortages were caused by sudden stoppage of food shipments from USA to low income Indian families public antagonism would become dangerously inflamed.
[Page 400]Although agitation against US would not affect abilities of Indian Army in Punjab it would profoundly affect USG in Delhi and all that we have been working for here since India became independent.
Ever since fighting started on August 5 I and members of US Mission in Delhi have been bringing to bear every argument and every pressure to influence India toward course of moderation in regard to a Pakistan settlement while at same time seeking to buttress their faith in USA. Yesterday Indian Govt in spite of its growing military advantage agreed unconditionally to an immediate ceasefire. If following the all-out effort our Mission has been making here and GOIs affirmative response to U Thant request, USG should hold up urgently needed food shipments, our influence in India will [be] grievously eroded and Soviet influence increased.
With Soviet SAMs protecting Delhi and other cities from attack by Pak MAP-procured B–57s, Soviet tanks fighting US tanks in Punjab and additional MIGs apparently on their way, Soviets have already made deep inroads.
In my previous messages I had strongly recommended a 15 month extension, since this would enable Indians to make major advances in their agricultural policies which we have been supporting. In view of importance of helping India become self-sufficient in food I still believe this is proper decision. However, if USG feels that now is not the appropriate time to conclude such a long-term and substantial agreement I strongly urge you to authorize me to sign sixty-day contract. This would assure flow of food ships until latter part of December.
I have already been pressed hard for our decision by able, dedicated, highly pro-American officials who are responsible for Indian agricultural policy and who recently sent communication to Secy Freeman expressing determination to make India self-supporting in regard to foodgrains by 1971. Following GOI action yesterday in unconditionally accepting U Thant’s proposal for ceasefire these pressures will now be redoubled.
Because I did not know whether you were familiar with the problem I have gone into some detail. I assure you, however, that I am not crying wolf.
- Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, India, Vol. V, Cables, 6/65–9/65. Secret; Immediate; Exdis. Repeated to the Department of State, with the request that it be passed to the Department of Agriculture for Freeman.↩