Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XXV, South Asia

226. Telegram From the Embassy Office in Pakistan to the Department of State¹

Rawalpindi, September 29, 1965, 1520Z.

121. Indo-Pak crisis: Sept 29 meeting with Pres Ayub.

A. Cease Fire and Withdrawal.

I met today with Pres Ayub for 55-minute discussion. Also present were FonSec and notetaker. Stull accompanied me. Ayub opened saying didn’t know what Indians up to in current half dozen or more major cease fire violations. He said one instance Indians gave Pak frontline commander notice that if he didn’t pull out would attack. Paks remained, Indians attacked and were driven back. Maintained GOP knows such Indian actions based on instructions from superior commanders. Said GOP has good info of continuing orders from superiors including Chavan and Chaudhury to Indian forces in Kashmir to press attack wherever possible. Cited one recent instance where Indian unit commander threatened with dismissal if he failed take Pak-held bridge. Asked what is GOI after?

Pres said, however unfortunate war has been, it inconceivable either side can retain international territory of other. Commented, “We are dealing with a diseased people and don’t know how much control exists at highest level. Chavan wishes to make history now but should have done so during serious fighting.” Observed Indians nibbling here and there at cease fire. Referring Indian use air power yesterday in Rajasthan, said PAF desired retaliate soonest but he had responded, “Let’s see what they are doing tomorrow.” Said GOP dealing with very irresponsible people GOI. His expressed hope that early positioning UN cease fire observers would dampen current violations. Ayub responded GOP can’t tolerate Indian actions if they continue too long. I urged Pak forebearance noting restraint would not be lost on world opinion. Ayub noted two-company size Indian attacks at Rajasthan and another Indian attack in southern sector in area where no fighting had occurred previously. Characterized Indians as cowardly enemy observing no rules of decency or of war. I told Pres we had relayed all info and cease fire violations passed US by GOP to Emb New Delhi. Said not surprisingly Indians had alleged violations initiated by GOP. Ayub cited Rajasthan violation, saying Pak forces had held area for two weeks. Stated military withdrawal is matter for mutual governmental agmt and is not local commanders’ responsibility. Reiterated top Indian leadership irresponsible and castigated “little man Shastri.” I interjected that UNSecGen fully apprised of seriousness cease fire violations, and his public reports should have some deterrent effect. Ayub argued GOP wishes observe cease fire but there must be some understanding between India and Pakistan about disengagement, some understanding as to how it must be regulated, controlled and supervised. Said given such understanding, carrying out those functions little more than routine military exercise.

I asked Pres Ayub whether he favored separate UNMOGIP and UNIPOM operations. Ayub indicated approval, saying Gen Nimmo too old, any event one man can’t handle everything, and good idea that observer organizations separate but still interrelated. I observed effectiveness UN observers would depend importantly on caliber personnel and expressed passing hope Latin Americans would have good command English language. Ayub seized on this to suggest gratuitously that Alliance for Progress may have succeeded bringing Latin Americans well under U.S. influence.

I demurred re influence and noted had referred only English-language capability.

I asked Pres Ayub how he envisaged actual arrangements for mutual withdrawal. Ayub responded GOP has told SecGen and “among us” he has agreed that along with arrangements for military disengagement a body should be set up to arrange also for political solution. Ayub pointed to “good example for fruitful negotiations in Rann of Kutch precedent.” Said some such sort of arrangement has to be laid on. However, “This thing bedeviled by four powers wanting to go together, and we do not know how that could work.” Said small team of people necessary and pointed to British, “who know us” and to Americans, “who also know us a little.” Commented French and Sovs appear more or less to agree and perhaps there could be understanding on inclusion a Frenchman. Added while latter would be ignorant of specific circumstances here, that would be all right. Said, “We want some such arrangement like that.” I asked if suggested body would not always be under UN auspices? Ayub replied affirmatively (but without enthusiasm). Said UNSecGen should authorize such a team to go and negotiate. Commented skeptically he does not know how much relevant experience SecGen has. Noted “UK has more experience,” and “Americans have some experience.” Said some initiative necessary to break ice and get things moving gradually. Observed had not spelled out this concept in last week’s telephone conversation with President Johnson, but had done so to PriMin Wilson. Reiterated Rann of Kutch good precedent and some such approach could create common ground and understanding for possible later Indo-Pak mtg. He referred Pres Johnson observation that Paks wish U.S. become directly involved, but UN must take that on. Commented, “That’s all right with GOP.” I asked Ayub if he had in mind something comparable to Dixon, Graham or contemplated Admiral Nimitz’ mediatory roles but with broader mandate. Ayub replied, “That’s it, that’s it!” I asked if any mediation or good office effort would not have to take place after withdrawal. Ayub said, “No, now,” adding, “if Indians can’t agree, Paks can’t either. Looking at future events, one can see that. What we want is withdrawal alongside cooling of tempers.” I observed GOI could be expected disagree this Pak position. FonSec interjected if necessary go along with Indian position, there can be no agmt. Ayub said it’s in SC resolution and SecGen is to arrange implementation that resolution. FonSec said resolution provides that after cease fire effective withdrawal will be considered and parties at same time will attempt find solution, and resolution calls on SecGen assist this process. Quoted Ayub, that “Military disengagement and political disengagement must go hand in hand. Withdrawal without a settlement will enable Indians procrastinate and preclude settlement.”

Pres Ayub commented didn’t think Indians for their part would actually withdraw, rather, intended stay in positions in Kashmir. Repeated present need is for cooling off arrangement alongside withdrawal. I asked Pres if he meant Indians would refuse withdraw from wrong side cease fire line. He replied, “Not in a hurry. They are diseased people, and I wouldn’t put anything past them.” I asked Ayub if he considered withdrawal from occupied national territory and from disputed territory (Kashmir) were separate questions. He replied, “Undoubtedly.” I asked if he could envisage a phased withdrawal, and he replied, “That might well be so.” I suggested Indians might well insist on single continuous procedure. Ayub replied, “That is why I said political and military must be side by side so both parties will know what is intended. After all, political and military aspects are combined and not separate watertight compartments. Without political arrangement India will not give up its military vantage points, and we will not give up our vantage points either.” I remarked this could be interpreted by Indians as holding threat of force over any negotiations. Ayub replied GOP should be using that argument. Said, “I wouldn’t be a bit surprised if meaning of these Indian cease fire violations is that GOI seeking to preclude political arrangements. Both we and they have to be reasonable.” I interjected there must be concessions each side and Ayub agreed. I pointed out this always had been U.S. position and cited 1963 Ministerial discussions this regard. Ayub agreed and observed that with negotiated settlement one can’t have all one wants. “That’s why one negotiates.” I stressed U.S. has no favorite solution Kashmir problem and Ayub replied, “We do hope you will stick to that position. We also hope you realize your objectives cannot be realized on the subcontinent without a settlement, and we hope you will help bring that about.”

B. U.S.-Pak Relations.

President Ayub said, “It great misfortune that what we had been trying to do on your behalf to moderate ChiComs has not elicited word of appreciation from you. We may not have achieved, but we have tried and shall continue to try. These efforts may not be so fundamental, but they must also be considered. We got no credit, rather, I won’t say bullying, but something akin to it. On top of that, solemn pledges were almost revoked.” I commented US need make no apology concerning fulfillment its pledges to Pakistan. On contrary, US thinks it has fullfilled its pledges. Perhaps not in way evisaged by GOP but effectively and through UN. I told President Ayub what he had said was hard. I pointed out US had maintained many beneficial programs for Pakistan. Ayub continued, “We cannot become Communist, and we don’t want to become Indians. The last thing we will accept is Indian dictation. We are prepared to be reasonable and to cooperate with India, but not to be subjected by her. Any policy which aims at the subjection of Pakistan by India we shall fight.” I said of course that was fundamental, and we understood and respected this.

Pres Ayub referred to “rubbish of this scheme and that scheme,” for example, published in British press (i.e., Victor Anante Daily Telegraph article). Asked what good can come for U.S. from saving ineffective weak governments? Said governments must be able to carry populace with them. Referred to unfortunate experiences as, for example, Vietnam escalation. States U.S. can never be driven out of Vietnam, but said question whether viable govt can be established there is bedeviling everybody and this despite military successes. Noted improvement military situation but questioned if also psychological improvement. Questioned if viable govt possible Vietnam and answered saying only possible if U.S. remains there for years. Concluded, “There are these lessons to be drawn about danger of rushing in.” I said Viet Cong pressures must first be relieved before favorable psychological climate and stable govt can be assured. Ayub commented that entire structure Vietnam must be rebuilt which means U.S. must occupy country 15 to 20 years. I said “occupation” not accurate word to describe our assistance to Vietnam. Ayub stated it was evident that weak govt always heavily beset by extremist opposition. In civil conflict, he thought that side which has to enlist outside military support always loses. To bolster up govts with outside direct military intervention “always fails.” They can be supported with material by outsiders, but they must fight their own battles on their own feet. He conceded my notation that South Vietnamese Army making a pretty good battle record now, and that govts weakened by military insurrections over period of years must have unusual help or be overwhelmed, as was GRC on mainland of China in 1949.

Comment follows in separate tel.²

McConaughy

1. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, POL 27 INDIA–PAK. Secret; Immediate. Repeated to Moscow, USUN, New Delhi, London, Hong Kong, Tehran, Ankara, Karachi, CINCMEAFSA for POLAD, Paris, the White House, CIA, DOD, and USIA.
2. McConaughy provided his assessment of the conversation in telegram 123 from Rawalpindi, September 29. He noted that the stiff atmosphere of the discussion was a marked contrast to his meetings with Ayub the previous week. Ayub “seemed to be going out of his way to upbraid the US” for revocation of prior pledges of military support, for failure to appreciate Pakistani efforts to moderate the Chinese, and for something akin to “bullying” of Pakistan. McConaughy speculated on the reasons for Ayub’s apparent change of attitude, but admitted that he was at a loss to do so with confidence. He concluded that the Kashmir dispute was the touchstone of U.S.-Pakistan relations. If the Kashmir dispute were resolved satisfactorily, U.S. relations with Pakistan would thrive. (Ibid.)