Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XXV, South Asia

460. Memorandum From Edward Hamilton of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Special Assistant (Rostow)¹

Washington, October 6, 1967, noon.

SUBJECT

• Indian Arms Purchases from the Soviets

We have disturbing new evidence this morning that the Indians are dealing from the bottom of the deck on arms purchases. The story goes as follows:

1. Last June, after considerable soul searching, we granted permission to the British to sell 24 Hawker-Hunter fighters to India on explicit GOI assurances that:

• —these would be replacement aircraft which would not increase total Indian combat capacity; and
• —that the Indians would not buy any aircraft from the Soviet Union. (There had been rumors for months that the Indians were trying to swing a deal for a large number—perhaps 200—of SU–7 fighter bombers.)

2. British-Indian negotiations have been underway ever since, and the Indians have become more and more concerned that the British are not a dependable source of supply—e.g., it now appears that the Brits have only 17 planes to sell rather than the 24 the Indians wanted.

3. We had a cocktail party rumor last week that the Indians and the Soviets were about to sign a contract providing for 200 SU–7’s at $1 million each. (Hawker-Hunters cost $200,000 per copy.)

4. Yesterday our DCM in Delhi spoke to the Defense Ministry official who had given the original assurance against SU–7’s (copy of the message at Tab A).² The conversation was imprecise, but the gist of it seemed to be that: (i) the Indians are going to buy SU–7’s from the Soviets; (ii) they believe this is necessary because of the short supply of British fighters, the need for a fighter bomber for use in the north, and the fact that the Paks have Mirage fighter bombers; and (iii) they will argue that their June assurance was limited to “fresh procurement” and that this does not represent bad faith. (It is not at all clear what “fresh procurement” means. It may mean that any aircraft purchased for replacement purposes is not covered by the assurance. In any event, it is clearly a transparent attempt to circumvent a promise which couldn’t have been more categorical.) I don’t need to lecture you on the idiocy of this action. It would represent bad faith with us, escalation of the arms race on the subcontinent, serious complication of our relations with the Paks, and a further blow to slim hopes we now have for generating some enthusiasm in the Indian Aid Consortium. (Aside from the distaste every donor feels for the worsening of Indo-Pak military problems, this contract—if it is anything like the size it is rumored to be—would certainly result in considerable diversion from development to defense.) In addition, we could expect real trouble on the Hill. Senator Symington knows and has followed the Hawker-Hunter deal very closely and could certainly be expected to reflect his displeasure with this development in an amendment to the Foreign Aid Appropriation Bill.

State has the following steps in train to head this off:

1. A strong cable to Bowles to read the riot act to Mrs. Gandhi.³ (She leaves Monday for Eastern Europe, so this will have to be over the weekend.) I transmitted to the drafters my own view that no language is too strong for use in this cable.

2. An immediate meeting between Secretary Rusk and B.K. Nehru.

3. Talks with the British, both here and in London. (We don’t yet know precisely where the Hawker-Hunter negotiations stand and whether they could be reversed.)

4. A Monday meeting between McNamara and Swaran Singh,⁴ the Indian Defense Minister. Singh is in town for other reasons, but we can certainly take advantage of his presence for this.

I think these steps are fine as far as they go. But they may not be nearly enough. The Indians have been debating this problem and probably negotiating quietly with the Soviets for months. I doubt that it will be possible to turn them around at this point with anything less than our biggest guns. If we don’t seem to be making progress over the next few days, I would suggest a Presidential letter—or perhaps even a quiet visit by a special emissary of the President. In the present mood of the Congress, a great deal hangs on whether we are able to turn this off. I think it is fair to say that public knowledge of a deal of this size at this time would almost certainly cost us a very sizeable chunk of our foreign aid appropriation—perhaps enough to eliminate aid to India.

I will keep you informed.

EH

1. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, India, Vol. X, Memos and Miscellaneous, 8/67–2/68. Secret.
2. Telegram 4150 from New Delhi, October 5. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, Central Files, DEF 12–5 INDIA)
3. Reference is to telegram 50373 to New Delhi, October 6. (Ibid., DEF 19–6 USSR) Bowles cabled on October 9 that he was unable to take up the issue of the SU–7s with Prime Minister Gandhi because she was leaving for a trip to Eastern Europe. He took up the issue instead with Morarji Desai. Desai’s initial reaction was one of “sharp but unfocused irritation.” India, he said, was confronted with a serious security threat in China and could not allow foreigners to judge the strength India needed to meet that threat. He also noted that Pakistan was building up its air force with purchases from Iran, Germany, and France. Bowles pressed the importance of reducing defense expenditures, and Desai agreed to raise the question of the purchase of the SU–7s with Defense Secretary Shankar. (Telegram 4310 from New Delhi; ibid.) Bowles met with Shankar on October 10, and Shankar defended the purchase of SU–7s as an agreement negotiated with the Soviet Union in February or March 1966, well in advance of the assurances offered the United States in June 1967 concerning additional purchases of Soviet aircraft. In response to Bowles’ question concerning the size of the purchase, Shankar said that the number of SU–7s involved was much smaller than the rumored 200. (Telegram 4432 from New Delhi, October 11; ibid.)
4. McNamara met with Singh on Monday October 9 and discussed the importance of holding down India’s defense expenditures. He did not bring up the issue of the SU–7 fighter bombers, however. (Memorandum of conversation, October 9; Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OSD Files: FRC 77–0075, Memoranda of conversation between Secretary McNamara and Heads of State (other than NATO))