Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XXV, South Asia

68. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Pakistan¹

Washington, August 16, 1964, 5:31 p.m.

194. Karachi’s 301.² Definitive assessment of appropriate response to Ayub must, of course, await your comment.³ Initially we read his conversation with you as confirmation of two already apparent trends in Pak foreign policy: a pulling away from alliances, and a narrowing of a Pak relationship with U.S. to bilateral interchange. At same time we are puzzled that his response shows no comprehension that his “reappraisal” will necessarily lead to similar action on our part.

Whatever his professed willingness to do anything for U.S. (as contrasted to third country in SE Asia) may mean, we are more concerned at this juncture with Ayub’s pronouncement that in talking of reappraising GOP policies he “only had had in mind a possibility of re-examination of Pakistan’s tie to SEATO.” Such threat is of course not new and we find it difficult to believe Ayub would judge in his interest to move precipitously to follow through on this threat as he would obviously forfeit his bargaining counter and in process run risk of seriously jeopardizing aspects of U.S.-Pak relationship in which Ayub remains interested. Nevertheless, in our present confrontation with Chicoms, we must guard against sudden GOP move to withdraw from SEATO and we consider we must respond quickly and firmly to Ayub’s observation. We have following series of steps in mind:

1. You would be instructed see Ayub without delay. You would state that we of course do not question GOP’s sovereign right to determine where its national interests lie. However, we have same right. We want Ayub to know that we would regard GOP withdrawal from SEATO during our present critical confrontation with Chicoms as adversely and seriously affecting our national interest and such action could not but affect adversely U.S.-Pak relations. He must realize that any actions appearing to support Chicom position will elicit profoundly adverse reaction from Congress and U.S. public. Since we cannot believe President Ayub would knowingly launch upon a course that is bound to have such serious consequences for Pakistan, we wish to request that before GOP decides to initiate action to terminate its SEATO membership we be consulted to ensure that there is a full mutual understanding of the consequences of this action for Pakistan before it is taken.

2. Simultaneously with your approach we would call Ambassador Ahmed in to get across same points. We also would plan to give Ambassador additional food for thought by recalling to his mind general lines of Secretary’s talk with Bhutto on April 29.⁴ You will recall that in this talk Secretary described “political climate” which could affect our delivery of additional 104s in terms of developments in our confrontation with Chicoms. We would want the Pakistanis to draw the conclusion that Pak actions which adversely affect our posture against Chicoms will inevitably affect our ability to continue same quality of assistance to Paks. We shall also find way to get across to Ambassador that course of action and reaction such as this will unfortunately prejudice continuation of personal exchanges at the highest level which have characterized our relations with Pak and which we had looked forward to continuing at appropriate opportunity in future.

3. When Shoaib arrives in September we would take soundings to ensure that our exchange of signals is understood and hopefully to arrest any further deterioration of our relationship.

Your views on above course of action urgently requested.⁵

Rusk

1. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, POL 1 PAK. Secret; Priority; Limdis. Drafted by Laise and Cameron, cleared by Director of the Office of Regional Affairs in EUR Joseph A. Mendenhall and Harriman, and approved by Talbot. Repeated to London and New Delhi.
2. Document 67.
3. McConaughy provided his assessment of his August 10 conversation with Ayub in telegram 347 from Karachi, August 18. McConaughy viewed the conversation as further evidence that Ayub had deliberately charted a course of limited disengagement from Pakistan’s ties with the United States. McConaughy felt that Ayub had made clear that as long as he considered U.S. policies toward India inimical to Pakistan’s national interest, Pakistan would pursue a China policy that interfered with U.S. objectives in Asia. McConaughy feared that Pakistan’s ties with the West were slowly ending. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, POL 1 PAK)
4. See Document 41.
5. McConaughy replied in telegram 348 from Karachi, August 18. Although he did not view Ayub’s threat to leave SEATO as implying an imminent move, he felt that Pakistan’s policies in Asia were running sufficently counter to U.S. interests to warrant the type of firm response outlined in telegram 194. He was slightly more optimistic about Ayub’s mood and intentions than the Department, however, and suggested that the response be tempered by probing for what Ayub meant when he offered to do anything to help the United States. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, POL 1 PAK)