Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XXV, South Asia

74. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Washington, November 3, 1964.

SUBJECT

• Chinese Nuclear Explosion

PARTICIPANTS

• B.K. Nehru, Ambassador of India
• William C. Foster, Director, U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency

Ambassador Nehru called at his request primarily to discuss the situation arising out of the explosion of the Chinese nuclear device.²

He stated that, as we knew, the Indian Government had made a formal decision prior to the explosion not to engage in the development of nuclear weapons no matter what any other country did. A formal reconsideration of this policy was undertaken after the Chinese explosion and the government confirmed its earlier decision not to go this route. The Ambassador recalled with satisfaction the comments that I had made at Geneva, the comments by the Secretary of State, and the comments by the President commending the Indian action. He said there was no intention to change this decision, but there were strong pressures in India to have the government explode a nuclear device so as to offset the genuine psychological advantages which the Chinese had obtained in Southeast Asia by virtue of their explosion. He said that this act of theirs, instead of being condemned by most of the non-aligned nations, was actually being commended to some extent on the basis of showing that the white world was no better than they and that the United States, at least in the Far East and Africa, was not the super power it used to be.

He said that Dr. Bhabha³ had estimated that India could develop a reasonable nuclear capability for $20 million. He said that, on the other hand, in the course of a year or two China probably could work out a makeshift capability by which they could drop a nuclear bomb on New Delhi without much fear of Indian defense against it. He spoke feelingly of what had been interpreted as a defeat of India by China in the land attack of a couple of years ago. In his opinion, it was really not a defeat since India had chosen to defend wrong positions to begin with, but based on withdrawal to better and more appropriate positions would have been able to repel any later Chinese attack.

The nuclear explosion, however, had the potential for seriously degrading India’s position in the Far East and therefore political pressures within India might indeed build up so that it would be politically impossible to resist proposals for an Indian bomb. He asked our thinking with reference to these questions.

I told the Ambassador we understood the pressures which might build up and yet his government must recognize that if India were to make the decision to produce nuclear weapons, this would be a long step toward proliferation of such weapons throughout the world. It seemed to us a much better decision, both from the viewpoint of best utilization of economic resources and indeed the security of the world, to devote the Indian influence to non-proliferation. I said that the United States is planning active attempts to achieve some sort of universal non-proliferation agreement, that this was a continuation of our proposals at Geneva, and the Soviet Union appeared to have a genuine interest in this, which interest had been stated by them to be blocked by the Multilateral Force.

I said we do not agree with the Russians’ appraisal. We feel that the MLF actually can contribute to non-proliferation by our retaining veto power in the multilateral group. It is also planned that no single nation in the group will have the option of utilizing the nuclear weapons assigned to it. I stated we could well understand why Germany and indeed all of Western Europe wished to participate in offsetting the hundreds of Soviet IRBM’s and MRBM’s pointed at Western Europe, and the Multilateral Force was designed to meet this desire.

I called attention to President Johnson’s statement of a week ago Sunday as to the United States support of nations which would be subjected to nuclear aggression or blackmail. He said, “But the United States would not come to our aid by attacking China if at the same time the Soviet Union said that it would assist China under such an attack.” I said I could not speculate on such a contingency, but we had commitments with many nations in the North Atlantic Alliance to come to their aid, even though the United States was not attacked in the particular situation where North Atlantic countries were attacked by the Soviet Union. He said that the informal offer of aid could not be made formal since India because of its non-alignment policy could not enter a firm defense agreement with the United States.

He expressed an interest in our plans for non-proliferation. I outlined some of these briefly. I said that India could be of great influence in helping to promote non-proliferation at the General Assembly and I hoped his government would support these efforts.

Moving on to another question, he asked our intention concerning a meeting with China in response to the U Thant proposal for a five power nuclear conference. I said we thought that the Chinese proposal was for propaganda purposes only since they had shown no serious interest in disarmament questions; that a proposal by China for a conference to discuss the destruction of all nuclear weapons with China sitting in as a nuclear power was somewhat ridiculous in that they had exploded their one device and had suggested we discuss giving up all of ours in exchange for the meager demonstration China had given.

The Ambassador said that the important point to keep in mind is that any participation by China in a five power conference concerned with nuclear weapons, which conference had been approved by the U.S. with the implication that China is a nuclear power, and excluding India, would be the end of Indian influence in Asia. In view of India’s status in Asia and her peaceful nuclear achievements, such a meeting without her would be a disastrous blow psychologically and every other way to the Indian Government. Any such conference, therefore, in his opinion, should include all nations capable of nuclear weapons development of which India is one.

In leaving, he said that India was deeply interested in any findings we had concerning the technology and so forth of the Chinese explosion, and I said that the Indian Government’s request for this information had been forwarded by the State Department to the suitable agencies and whatever could be given to them I was sure he would hear about in the reasonably near future. I said the analysis of these events sometimes took considerable time, however, and there might not be detailed information available for some time.⁴

In response to my question concerning Krishna Menon’s new activities, he said that, in his opinion, Menon did not have any additional influence and the comments made about Menon’s participation in the All India Party Congress referred only to an internal policy statement which had no bearing on the governmental position.

The discussion, which began at 3:30, ended at 4:45.

1. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, DEF 12–1 CHICOM. Confidential. Drafted by Foster.
2. China detonated a nuclear device on October 16. On October 28 Secretary of Defense McNamara transmitted to Secretary Rusk an October 23 JCS paper that commented on a Thompson Committee report entitled “The Indian Nuclear Problem: Proposed Course of Action.” McNamara and the JCS concurred with offering general assurances to non-nuclear states in light of the Chinese nuclear explosion. The JCS recommended, however, that if discussions with India were begun, no action be taken that would alienate Pakistan. (Ibid., DEF 19 US–INDIA; also available on the Internet, National Security Archive (www.gwu.edu/nsarchiv), Electronic Briefing Book No. 6, “India and Pakistan—On the Nuclear Threshold,” Document 2)
3. Homi J. Bhabha, Secretary of the Indian Department of Atomic Energy.
4. Telegram 918 to New Delhi, November 2, informed the Embassy of a telegram received by the Chairman of the AEC, John G. Palfrey, on October 23 from Minister Babha, in which Babha requested an arrangement to exchange information on the effects of the Chinese explosions. The Embassy was instructed to deliver Palfrey’s response, which informed Babha that arrangements should be made through Ambassador Bowles since “a number of agencies of the USG would likely be involved.” (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, DEF 12–1 CHICOM; also available on the Internet, National Security Archive (www.gwu.edu/nsarchive), Electronic Briefing Book No. 6, “India and Pakistan—On the Nuclear Threshold,” Document 4) Ray Cline, CIA Deputy Director for Intelligence, briefed Prime Minister Shastri in New Delhi on October 27 about the Chinese nuclear program. (Telegram 1297 from New Delhi, October 27; National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, DEF 12–1 CHICOM)