Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XXV, South Asia

79. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in India¹

Washington, December 12, 1964, 1:28 p.m.

1185. This relates to your plans to see Shastri soon for further discussion of Indian nuclear problem. Since your last talk he has presumably had opportunity reflect on problem and climate may therefore be good for moving further along course we have charted. We hope, and his statements suggest, his exposure in London to variety of views and questions on nuclear matters may have stimulated more thought about what India needs to do to reinforce its present nuclear policy.

We believe our focus with Indians should be on problem of building prestige of Indian science and technology, but first you will need to find out extent to which Indians have reflected on this question and ideas they have about coping with it. It seems to us that time at which we can offer assistance designed to increase Indian prestige depends upon the extent to which GOI thinking has developed.

Consequently, our first need is to probe and if necessary to direct GOI thoughts in this area. If GOI has recognized and weighed full dimensions of their prestige problem, they are probably looking for ways to deal with it and may be receptive to our help. If their analysis of their situation and alternatives has not reached this stage, however, an immediate offer from us might either make them suspicious of our motives or cause them to think we are trying to buy their adherence to a peaceful uses only policy, thereby increasing their leverage over us. You are, of course, best judge of proper timing of raising subject possible US assistance with them.

As you know, we still believe it is quite important that Indians take initiative and we play responding role.

We note that during and immediately after Shastri’s London visit there has been some public talk about assurances of support to India in event of Chicom nuclear attack.² As you know, we do not wish to proceed at present beyond general statement of assurances included in President’s statement of October 16 and his speech of October 18.³ We are therefore in position of wanting to know what Shastri may have in mind of not wanting to take any initiative to explore subject with GOI.

When you believe time appropriate to discuss with Shastri possible US assistance to Indian science and technology you may draw as appropriate on following points:

1. We are impressed by achievements Indian science and technology which we believe exceed those of Communist Chinese.

2. We agree with Indians that world should know more about these achievements.

3. We wonder what plans Indians have for making known Indian progress and for further scientific endeavor.

4. (In response Indian request) USG would be pleased to talk over any plans Indians may have to achieve these objectives to see how we can appropriately assist.

We have in mind jointly exploring possibility of developing one or more ventures in fields peaceful uses nuclear energy and space technology that would serve highlight India’s capabilities.

5. We recognize that Indian need is to demonstrate Indian progress. Any possible US assistance would therefore be directed toward clearly identifiable Indian projects with US role unobtrusive. When discussions reach this point would appreciate your suggestions for next step. Before taking such step, know you agree on need to have established general framework with Indian political leaders for any expansion of cooperation in peaceful uses or space field. We see this as essential preliminary for making the most of discussions with Bhabha during his visit here next February.

Ball

1. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, FSE 13 INDIA. Secret; Priority; Limdis. Drafted by Schneider in NEA/SOA; cleared by Officer in Charge of Atomic Energy Affairs in SCI Charles W. Thomas, Hall of AEC, Wreatham B. Gathright and W. Howard Wriggins of S/P, Samuel DePalma of ACDA, and Raymond L. Garthoff of G/PM; and approved by William J. Handley. Repeated to London and Ottawa.
2. The Reuters news agency reported from London on December 4 that Shastri had publicly urged the world’s atomic powers to consider how they could guarantee the security of the non-nuclear nations against attack. (Johnson Library, National Security File, Committee File, Committee on Nuclear Proliferation, India) British Prime Minister Wilson told President Johnson in a conversation in Washington on December 8 that Shastri had told him that he was under strong domestic pressure to authorize the development of a nuclear weapon. Shastri stated that he preferred not to, but the Chinese bomb had shifted the balance of power in Asia, and the only alternative he saw to an Indian nuclear program was a protective nuclear umbrella provided by the existing nuclear powers with the Soviet Union playing an important role. Wilson said that Shastri had asked him to pass his concerns to Washington. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Presidential Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 66 D 149)
3. President Johnson issued a statement to the press concerning the Chinese detonation of a nuclear device on October 16, the day of the test. On October 18 he made a radio and television address to the nation in which he offered the following assurance to non-nuclear nations: “The nations that do not seek national nuclear weapons can be sure that, if they need our strong support against some threat of nuclear blackmail, then they will have it.” The October 16 statement is printed in Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Lyndon B. Johnson, 1963–64, Book II, p. 1357. For text of the October 18 address, see Department of State Bulletin, November 2, 1964, pp. 610–614.