88. Memorandum of Conversation1
SUBJECT
- Indian Nuclear Energy Program
PARTICIPANTS
- His Excellency B. K. Nehru, Ambassador of India
- Dr. Homi Bhabha, Secretary of the Department of Atomic Energy, Government of India
- Mr. Ball, Under Secretary of State
- Robert Anderson, U
- David T. Schneider, NEA/SOA
Calling at his own request, Dr. Bhabha opened the conversation with a description of India’s nuclear power reactor program. Analyzing the economics of nuclear power plants he concluded that although capital costs were somewhat high, in areas where hydroelectric power potential was fully exploited or did not exist and where the sources of coal were remote, nuclear power was very much less expensive in India than coal power.
Dr. Bhabha then directed the conversation to what he called the dilemma India faced regarding what to do to counteract the “noise” of Communist China’s nuclear explosion. He explained that India needed to make some dramatic “peaceful” achievement to offset the prestige gained by Communist China among Africans and Asians.2 Mr. Ball noted however that African opinion on the Communist Chinese detonation was divided. The Africans had been impressed but they were also disturbed regarding the possible effects of fallout. Dr. Bhabha granted that this may be so but said very few Africans had been willing to join in criticism of Communist China. He believed that if any of these countries could secure nuclear weapons they would. Mr. Ball replied that the problem was to get the major non-nuclear countries to agree to forego nuclear weapons; then the way would be clear for other nations to follow. Dr. Bhabha said that in order to do this a way must be found so that a nation will gain as much by not going for nuclear weapons as it might by developing them. It was not helpful to differentiate between members of the “nuclear club” and non-nuclear nations. Mr. Ball agreed and said that we want to prevent countries from gaining status by developing nuclear weapons.
Dr. Bhabha then examined India’s accomplishments in the area of nuclear energy and contrasted them with those of China. He noted there were really only two nuclear powers in the world, the United States and the USSR. Britain and France were on quite a different level; [Page 189] still at a much lower level was Communist China. India could quite easily have achieved China’s capability.
Dr. Bhabha explained that the Chinese were greatly indebted to the USSR for helping them on their weapons program. At the end of the five-year period of Soviet assistance (about 1959 or 1960) the Soviets had been putting up a diffusion plant, which was not completed, however. The Chinese had asked for a model nuclear bomb but the Soviets had refused; the Chinese had then alleged that the Soviets were backing out of an agreement with them. The Soviet Union must nevertheless have left the blueprints for a nuclear device with Communist China.
Dr. Bhabha explained that if India went all out, it could produce a device in 18 months; with a U.S. blueprint it could do the job in six months. It was clear from this analysis how the Chinese gained time because of the Soviet help. In fact the Chinese in 1958 had admitted to the Indians that their first nuclear reactor was Soviet-built and that only the Soviets were fully acquainted with its operation. When Chou En-lai had visited the Indian Atomic Energy establishment at Trombay some years ago, he had said it would take China 15 years to accomplish what India had. Dr. Bhabha noted that even if this was exaggerated, China at that time was at least three years behind India.
Dr. Bhabha noted that even today we do not know if all of the U–235 used in the Chinese device was produced in China. He said that an Indonesian representative at the recent inauguration of the Indian plutonium separation plant at Bombay had said she had learned in Peiping recently that the Chinese reactor there was operated only when VIP’s visited it. “What other reason except shortage of fuel could there be for this?” asked Dr. Bhabha.
Dr. Bhabha explained that if India is to maintain its prestige relative to the Chinese in the fields of science and technology two things should be done: (1) ways must be found for it to demonstrate to other Asian and African countries India’s scientific achievements, (2) a greater awareness of Chinese indebtedness to the Soviet Union for its nuclear achievements must be created. Mr. Ball responded that the Department should look into what could be done about it.
Concluding his presentation, Dr. Bhabha said that during the next four or five years there were very few countries which had the capability of developing a nuclear device. Even Japan and Germany had no plutonium separation plants and so were some four years away from being able to produce a device. In fact India was much the closest. India’s plutonium separation plant is quite large, large enough to process all of the plutonium from the reactors India is now building. In five years India could produce 100 nuclear bombs per year.
Dr. Bhabha stated that it was the policy of his government, with which he agreed, not to seek nuclear weapons. If his government is to [Page 190] justify this policy, however, ways must be found by which his country can gain at least as much by sticking to peaceful uses as it could by embarking on a weapons program.
- Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, DEF 12–1 INDIA. Secret. Drafted by Schneider on February 25 and approved in U on March 8.↩
- On November 23, 1964, AEC Commissioner John G. Palfrey wrote to Llewellyn E. Thompson suggesting discussing with Bhabha during his February visit U.S.-Indian cooperation in the peaceful uses of atomic energy. Palfrey attached to his letter a “Discussion Paper on Prospects for Intensifying Peaceful Atomic Cooperation With India.” (Ibid., Thompson Files: Lot 67 D 2; also available on the Internet, National Security Archive (www.gwu.edu/nsarchiv), Electronic Briefing Book No. 6, “India and Pakistan—On the Nuclear Threshold,” Document 3)↩