Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XXVII, Mainland Southeast Asia; Regional Affairs

142. Memorandum From the Director of the Office of Southeast Asian Affairs (Trueheart) to the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Bundy)¹

Washington, July 30, 1964.

SUBJECT

• Talking Points for Your Forthcoming Conversation with [less than 1 line of source text not declassified]

1. The President is sending Ambassador Kidder to Cambodia in the hope of establishing a more effective, rapid and useful channel of communication with Prince Sihanouk and his government. It is the Presidentʼs hope that Ambassador Kidderʼs mission will provide occasion for a frank and continuing exchange of views.² In this connection, it is our hope that the Royal Government will see fit to reconstitute its Embassy in Washington. We have found with Cambodia and other countries that this double channel of communications has been most useful. To quote Ambassador Nong Kimney on several occasions before his departure—“Diplomats should keep talking regardless of what happens.”

2. We were frankly shocked at Huot Sambathʼs letter to the Secretary³ wherein we and the Government of Vietnam were jointly accused of having caused the death of Cambodian peasants through dropping powders over Ratanakiri province. I would like to stress that the most careful investigation of all available sources shows that there were no defoliant operations in any of the Vietnamese provinces bordering on Ratanakiri, nor have we any knowledge that any herbicide operations have ever crossed into Cambodia. Further, and particularly important, it is common knowledge that the chemicals used in herbicide/defoliant operations in Vietnam are common garden weed killers which are sprayed as a liquid and never as powders. The liquid does not evaporate to form a white or yellow powder and is harmless to humans as used in Vietnam. It is difficult for us to escape the impression that the RKG may have formulated its accusations hurriedly on the basis of information which may have been supplied by persons or elements desiring to harm our relations with Cambodia. In addition, we consider the tone in which these accusations were formulated particularly unfortunate and inopportune.

3. We have for many years been aware of Prince Sihanoukʼs unhappiness with the treatment he has received from the American press. We have for an equal number of years attempted to convince him, his former Ambassador and other Cambodian officials that statements made in the press do not reflect the opinions and attitudes of the government. We are surprised that Prince Sihanouk, who is no mean journalist himself, appears to be unwilling to draw a distinction between official American policy and articles which appear in a free press. It is unfortunate, but many of these articles are reflections of journalistʼs attitudes toward some of the means which the Prince has employed to achieve the goals we share. The Prince must nevertheless be aware that several important journals, notably the Washington Post, the New Yorker and the National Geographic Magazine, have often given Cambodia very sympathetic treatment.

4. We recognize, appreciate and acknowledge the attachment of the overwhelming majority of the Cambodian people to the Prince. We consider Prince Sihanouk to be one of the most popular leaders in Southeast Asia and the acknowledged and effective leader of his country. We understand that the Princeʼs speeches and the commentary thereon in the press, the press bulletin and on the radio are the principal opinion forming organs of the kingdom. For this reason, we are somewhat startled at the Princeʼs stated fears that he might be overwhelmed by “public opinion” and therefore be forced to realign himself. We understand Prince Sihanoukʼs concern with assuring the survival of Cambodia within the present frontiers. We regret the loss of life resulting from the frontier incidents that have occurred and consider an effective demarcation and effective international observation as suggested in the Security Council report could provide a means of reducing, if not eliminating them. It is for this reason that we consider the recommendation for the initiation of bilateral talks with the Government of Vietnam of particular importance and would be happy to do whatever is necessary to achieve an outcome acceptable to both parties.

5. We have read with interest the Princeʼs proposal for broader regional arrangements of neutral states guaranteed by outside powers. Although this idea is well worth exploring, we have strong reservations as to the good faith of other powers which have agreed to similar undertakings in the past, notably in the case of Laos, and have abrogated them at their convenience. We have no clear image of what guarantees or controls could be provided.

6. The Prince has on a number of occasions expressed doubt as to our determination and ability to hold in Vietnam. He should have no doubt as to either. A somewhat similar and far simpler revolutionary war was won in Malaya after almost 12 years of effort and the issue was in doubt for many years. As long as the Government of Vietnam desires our presence and cooperation, we intend to stay.

7. We are sorry that the Prince continues to hold us directly responsible for events which flow essentially from operations directed against the Viet Cong. All available technical means are being used to prevent incursions but in the heat of battle regrettable mistakes have been made. We would hope that Cambodiaʼs completely understandable desire to prevent the continuation of frontier incidents would not lead the Cambodian Government into undertaking the kind of acts which would force the Government of Vietnam into a position where it has no recourse but sharp retaliation.

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL CAMB–US. Secret. Drafted by Hirschfeld. Trueheart added a covering memorandum noting that these points had been approved by Kidder and passing on a request from CIA that they receive a copy.
2. Randolph A. Kidder was appointed Ambassador to Cambodia on July 9 and proceeded to Phnom Penh. Prince Sihanouk refused to accept his credentials, and Kidder left the Cambodian capital on September 18.
3. UN doc. S/5894, July 28, 1964. For the U.S. denial at the United Nations, see American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1964, pp. 863–864.