Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XXVIII, Laos

100. Telegram From the Embassy in Laos to the Department of State¹

Vientiane, June 23, 1964, 5 p.m.

1683. For Bundy. Appears essential and urgent that we seek to clarify what we aim to accomplish by military action in Laos in succeeding weeks and months. Essential also, at least for us here, that we have better understanding concerning our relations with the press on these matters as well as positions we should take when military actions raise questions concerning interpretation Geneva Accords. I continue operate on assumption we desire keep Souvanna in office as PriMin; this may become increasingly difficult in any case if and as military action begins to escalate toward full scale fighting but sure to be markedly aggravated if we continue have misunderstandings over public positions taken by RLG and U.S. Government (Deptel 1220 notal).²

As for military situation itself I feel there is still a dichotomy between on one hand U.S. action such as escorted recce flights taken on U.S. initiative to encourage friends and give clear sign our determination to Communists, and on other hand U.S. military help directly related to immediate threat which RLG armed forces currently face. Military action latter category would include range of actions from use Air America pilots in T–28’s, through employing SAW detachment, through use U.S. jet fighter bombers in support RLG forces, through actual deployment U.S. ground forces across Mekong (Embtel 1613).³ Another element to be introduced [garble]could be use Thai ground forces (Deptel 2319 to Bangkok)⁴ on this side Mekong.

I realize that over past several weeks U.S. action dictated more by need demonstrate clearly to Commies our posture, through such actions as June 9 bombing, thus supporting over-all Lao position, and less by consideration of direct assistance to RLG forces. Whether this phase is past no doubt depends on our assessment of effect these actions have had on Communists. I recommend in any case that in future we seek to relate our military action more directly to military efforts RLG. This could include not only graduated actions noted above which would be undertaken in response to Communist initiatives, but might also include “suppressive action” to cut Route 7 at favorable locations east of Khang Khay, to prevent PL/VM build-up for attack on Muong Soui now reportedly underway and to support neutralist push north from Vang Vieng to take Sala Phou Khoun (Embtel 1673).⁵ The more our military action directly supports FAR and neutralist forces, the better performance those forces likely to turn in and the greater morale boost to free Laos. Seems to me also our actions along these lines will demonstrate our intentions to Communists every bit as clearly as proposed “suppressive action” on Khang Khay (Embtel 1146 to CINCPAC, 1675 to Dept).⁶ How long such initiatives would go on would depend on whether we seeking stabilize status quo or roll Communists back.

If U.S. military actions are to serve our political as well as military objectives, then I must be able work out each new step with Souvanna Phouma so that we can count on his support of, or better his request for, each action undertaken in cases where such action publicly acknowledged. He and I must be able count on Washington silence in those cases, should they arise in future, where he insists on maintaining secrecy about U.S. involvement (and I am unable dissuade him from this) and we decide nevertheless to go ahead with action under his conditions. We must avoid instances in future where Souvanna has agreed to our action in Laos on condition it not be publicly acknowledged, and we nevertheless proceed to acknowledge it; in such cases we must not proceed with action if public acknowledgement deemed inevitable. Septel will provide some further observations on Deptel 1220 (notal).⁷

While recce flights in my mind need not involve us in questions of Geneva Accords, escort by fighters certainly begins to and employment those fighters in response to ground fire, to say nothing of “suppressive avion”, raises question in most active form. This also true, of course, of use Air America or Thai pilots, SAW detachment, to say nothing of U.S. fighter bombers supporting ground operations.

In U.S. public statements we have by now pretty well acknowledged some of these actions which are clearly in violation of Accords and justified them on grounds clear and continuous violation by Communists of Accords releases us from our obligations. At same time Department appears nervous about any acknowledgment that Air America involved in maintenance T–28’s in Udorn even though we have had to use Air America planes liberally in moving troops and munitions to and from areas such as Ban Na and Muong Soui where there are no aircraft which Lao can fly which can do the job. I understand of course we should avoid our involvement unnecessarily in actions which could be interpreted as violations but I am unclear as to our position on prohibited actions which are indispensable or at least very difficult to avoid in supporting RLG military effort. Initially I had also assumed that publicity about our actions would take this question into account, and we would seek avoid public acknowledgment of actions violating Geneva Accords, such as escort fighters responding to ground fire; however this evidently not Department’s position and therefore I would appreciate guidance as to position we should take with regard to Geneva Accords and our continuing to be bound by their provisions.

With respect to possible use of Thai ground forces which briefly discussed Udorn June 19 with Amb Martin and Generals Milton and Moore and Admiral Miller, I strongly recommend that planning on this point be closely correlated with planning for graduated responses and use of recce flights, etc. discussed above.

Answers to questions posed above also essential if I am to be able effectively respond to RLG questions or stimulate RLG action concerning employment FAR and neutralist forces. Reply to Kong Le about offensive northward on Route 13 relatively clear-cut but we may one day be faced with proposal, for example, for counteroffensive to retake Plaine des Jarres with American air support, an action which would certainly convey to Communists clear picture of our involvement but which might also invite much heavier response from Communist side than we are now anxious to have stimulated. I need to know whether to discourage, acquiesce in, or seek to stimulate such a move.

In light questions raised above would appreciate guidance soonest concerning (1) what we aim to accomplish in Laos by military action in immediate period ahead, (2) how we expect handle publicity concerning such actions and (3) what position we will take when such actions raise questions concerning Geneva Accords? Would be helpful if closely related questions raised Embtel 1613 could be answered.

Unger

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 LAOS. Secret; Immediate. Repeated to Bangkok, New Delhi, Saigon and COMUSMACV, London, Paris, and CINCPAC for POLAD. Passed to the White House,JCS, OSD, CIA, and USUN at 7:55 a.m. June 23.
2. In telegram 1220 to Vientiane, June 17, the Department informed Unger that it would “not employ or endorse fabrications or false denials. Whenever possible we will hold with no comment or silence.” The Department urged the Embassy to do the same when asked about U.S. participation in military operations over Laos. (Ibid.)
3. In telegram 1613 from Vientiane, June 13, the Embassy suggested that lines should be drawn beyond which Pathet Lao-North Vietnamese forces could not pass without triggering a U.S. reaction ranging from air operations to the introduction of U.S. troops. (Ibid.)
4. In telegram 2319 to Bangkok, June 19, the Department reported that a Thai official had suggested the use of Thai volunteers in Laos much as the North Vietnamese used their troops to bolster the Pathet Lao. (Ibid.)
5. Dated June 22. (Ibid.)
6. Dated June 22. (Ibid.)
7. Not further identified.