Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XXVIII, Laos

16. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Laos¹

Washington, March 16, 1964, 9:08 p.m.

749. Ref: CAS Saigon 5161 repeated Vientiane.²

1. As stated by Secretary McNamara to Khanh,³ our approval any plans along lines described reftel must depend on whether they acceptable to Souvanna Phouma. Saigon should ascertain urgently whether this condition made clear to Phoumi and, if so, what indications Phoumi gave of when he would take them up with Souvanna.⁴ Assuming Phoumi has now returned Vientiane, Ambassador should immediately reach him to reiterate condition and find out how he plans to handle.⁵ Advise soonest timing. If Phoumi has already seen Souvanna Ambassador should see him also and inform him USG aware of proposals.

2. Our own preliminary views are that several of the points agreed between Khanh and Phoumi could be put into effect at an early stage. We would heartily endorse the assignment of an Ambassador to Vientiane and would agree to the covert establishment of a 5-man military liaison team with Laotian forces at Savannakhet. We would also feel that the establishment of a liaison with the US in Vientiane could be executed even before the commando action east of Xieng Khouang is mounted.

3. Our thoughts on the commando action along route 7 would be not to discourage it but to be certain that the GVN feels confident it could be mounted from a Meo base and could fit into the general pattern of Plan 34 A.

4. On the other hand, we feel that air strikes on the targets named (some of which, such as Saravane, are now in friendly hands) and regimental size military operations in areas under Communist control would involve drastic changes in Laotian situation and specifically would breach underlying understanding that, until Geneva Accords can be fully applied, territorial control of the respective parties should remain as it stood at the time of the Laos Accord in July 1962. Thus, proven Communist (i.e., Pathet Lao) control of territory in the Laos panhandle is not ipso facto cause for retaliatory action out of Viet-Nam. In other words, actions proposed in paras 1 A and 1 B of reference message might will cause Souvanna Phouma to assume that we were no longer supporting the Geneva and related accords on Laos and therefore to abdicate. Moreover, the result could be to invite Communist retaliation in Laos, that would almost certainly take the form of early introduction of North Vietnamese units (as in Na Kay plateau during January) and could readily set in motion a major chain of events. We therefore believe action along these lines should not be undertaken unless and until we were ready to move to considerably more drastic action in the area as a whole and had made specific preparations including such action as the introduction of substantial US ground forces into Thailand.

5. Above preliminary views should be used as background by Ambassador Unger in sounding out Phoumi plans and, if Phoumi has already gone to Souvanna Phouma in discussion with the latter.

6. FYI. While these are our current preliminary views, we recognize possibility that we may obtain hard intelligence of North Vietnamese activity that would present worthwhile targets. In absence such intelligence, operations such as proposed seem to us to offer very limited chance of fruitful results in any case. If and when we get such intelligence, we would be prepared to re-examine question of selective specific operations into Laos, but even these would still have to be weighed for their military advantage as against the possibility that they would disrupt our current posture in Southeast Asia before we have a clear and firm plan for graduated pressures that would take account of possible responses both in Laos and with reference to North Viet-Nam. End FYI.

Rusk

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 LAOS. Top Secret; Priority; Exdis. Drafted by William Bundy, cleared by McGeorge Bundy and Harriman, and approved by William Bundy. Also sent to Saigon as telegram 1448.
2. Document 15.
3. During a meeting among McNamara, Taylor, Lodge, Khanh, and Khiem on March 13, as reported in telegram 1738 from Saigon, March 13. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 LAOS) For additional documentation on McNamara’s and Taylor’s visit to Saigon, see Foreign Relations, 1964–1968, vol. I, pp. 130–173.
4. In telegram 1767 from Saigon, March 17, Lodge reported that Phoumi’s discussion with Khanh was “held with the permission of Souvanna” and that King Savang was informed of it. Lodge also recommended that the United States support South Vietnamese covert operations in Laos. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 LAOS)
5. See Document 17.