Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XXVIII, Laos

34. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Washington, April 22, 1964, 10:07 a.m.

SUBJECT

• Laos

PARTICIPANTS

• The Secretary
• Anatoliy F. Dobrynin, Soviet Ambassador
• David Henry, Deputy Director, SOV

After brief discussion on another subject the Secretary, who had asked the Ambassador to call, raised the matter of Laos. He said that he had received within the last ten minutes a telegram reporting on current developments in that country and in particular interviews of several chiefs of mission with the King and later Souvanna Phouma (Vientiane’s 1168, April 22).² He said that the United States continues to support the Government of National Union and considers it necessary to restore that government to full authority. He added that Souvanna Phouma is ready to stay on as Prime Minister and that General Siho is the primary obstacle to restoration of the previous situation in Vientiane. He added that the Laotian armed forces elsewhere are not participating in the current revolt and that the King has asked General Phoumi to take care of the Siho difficulty. After mentioning that the United States Ambassador to Laos is in close touch with his Soviet counterpart, the Secretary emphasized that the United States had nothing to do with the military coup but that it arose from the recent breakdown of talks between the three factions in Laos, which had been making good progress toward agreement in principle when Phoumi said that he must consult with his supporters and Souphanouvong insisted on immediate agreement and broke up the meeting on this issue. Souvanna Phouma felt that Souphanouvong had been very unreasonable. As a result of the breakdown of the talks Souvanna Phouma became discouraged and wanted to resign as Prime Minister. The United States attempted to discourage him from this course. When Ambassador Unger came to Saigon to discuss the subject with the Secretary, the coup broke out and the Secretary immediately sent Unger back to tell Siho and Kouprasith that the United States supports the Geneva Accords and the tripartite government formed under them.

The Secretary continued that he wished to emphasize how important it is that the Pathet Lao should not act now in any way to damage the Geneva Accords. He requested the Ambassador to ask his government to do everything possible to get the Pathet Lao to support the Geneva Accords. He said it is vital to keep the 1962 Geneva Agreements effective. We (the United States) have been discouraged by the Pathet Lao’s actions against the Geneva Accords, in particular their introduction of North Vietnamese forces into Laos and their allowing the North Vietnamese to use Laotian territory as a corridor into South Vietnam. The Secretary emphasized again that both the United States and the USSR should do everything possible to restore the Geneva Agreements of 1962 and said that if all of us worked toward this objective, there seemed a reasonable chance that we could attain it.

The Secretary then referred to an Izvestiya commentary (see Moscow telegram 3225 of April 21³) which links the United States to the Vientiane coup. He said that he hoped the Soviet Government would not continue to follow that line, for the United States is sincerely trying to support the Geneva Accords.⁴ He added that the recent meeting of the Ambassadors with the King had confirmed that the latter, as well as Souvanna Phouma, is in agreement with this United States position, that there may be a meeting in Luang Prabang with all three factions of the Government of National Union present, and that if Phoumi succeeds in handling Siho, it should be possible to restore the previous situation in Laos.

The Secretary then turned to the broader subject of Southeast Asia as a whole, mentioning that he wished to make a comment which he had not had in mind when the Ambassador came in. He said that the United States is not looking for military positions in Southeast Asia. If Hanoi and Peiping would leave this area alone, the United States would not have troops there. The United States is concerned about Hanoi and Peiping’s actions and intentions and wishes to protect the Southeast Asian countries. A very unpleasant situation could develop if Hanoi and Peiping continued to push. The Soviet Government as well as the United States should try to keep the situation under control.⁵

After discussion of another subject the conversation turned again to Laos. The Secretary noted that Izvestiya’s commentary had said that “all sources” agree that the tripartite talks broke down over Phoumi’s refusal to agree to neutralize Luang Prabang. This was not the United States Government’s understanding. We understood rather that Souvanna Phouma felt Souphanouvong had been unreasonable. The Secretary also noted with amusement that Izvestiya’s commentary had quoted former Vice President Nixon and pointed out that Nixon is not speaking for the United States Government at the moment.

Ambassador Dobrynin said that the USSR considers the situation in Laos a serious one; that it had asked the United Kingdom to make a joint appeal to restore the situation; that the Soviet Government supports the Geneva Accords and therefore Souvanna Phouma; that his only information on current developments in Laos came from the April 21 TASS statement; that he understood Phoumi was responsible for the breakdown of the tripartite talks, noting that Phoumi seemed freer in action since the coup than Souvanna Phouma; that the USSR has been doing its best to support the tripartite coalition government and the Geneva Accords; and that he did not need to repeat but could confirm that the Soviet Government’s view on the Laotian situation as set forth in “our” note of March 31 [sic, but probably the Ambassador’s note of March 25].⁶

With regard to Southeast Asia as a whole, Ambassador Dobrynin said that his government disapproved United States activity in general in this area. The Soviet Government believed it better to let people alone to make their own decisions.

The Secretary responded that South Vietnam should be free from the pressure of the North Vietnamese men and weapons. There followed an exchange on the situation in South Vietnam and North Vietnam’s responsibility for it. The Secretary and the Ambassador disagreed on the facts and on their interpretation. The Ambassador emphasized that the Viet Cong, like all guerrillas, could not succeed without popular support, while the Secretary emphasized the North Vietnam role in the fighting.

The Ambassador concluded that he was sure both he and the Secretary understood each other’s positions in this matter.

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 23–9 LAOS. Confidential. Drafted by Henry and approved in Rusk’s office on May 2. The time of the meeting was taken from Rusk’s Appointment Book. (Johnson Library) The source text indicates it was Part II of III. The meeting was held in Rusk’s office.
2. See footnote 2, Document 36.
3. The commentary argued that Lao neutrality was dependent on the end of the war in South Vietnam. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 23–9 LAOS)
4. See Document 10.
5. On May 5 Dobrynin, acting under instructions, made an oral statement to Rusk responding to this discussion. Dobrynin noted the presence of U.S. military personnel in Laos and the activities of AID and Air America. He pointed out that the organizers of the coup were those forces in Laos which the United States supported. Notwithstanding U.S. assurances, Vientiane was not safe for Souvanna Phouma and many neutralist ministers, nor was Vientiane in control of the Government of National Union. Should the Neo Lao Hat Xat be forced from the Government and the civil war resumed, Dobrynin stated that “it is difficult to imagine the external forces to remain indifferent to the situation.” (Memorandum of conversation, May 5; Department of State, Central Files, POL 23–9 LAOS)
6. Brackets in the source text.