44. Memorandum From Michael V. Forrestal of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy)1
SUBJECT
- Laos Cross Border
The aftermath of the NSC meeting this afternoon2 revealed the basic problem here in Washington. I think I am accurate in stating the two positions as follows:
[Page 81]When Max Taylor talks, he is representing a composite view of the Chiefs. There is an element in that body (presently Admiral McDonald and General LeMay) who wish to bomb or otherwise interdict the infiltration routes in Laos. This is consistent with their view that the war in Vietnam is essentially a conventional one, which should be fought by the United States with all the conventional resources at our disposal, especially those which involve a minimum loss of American life, i.e. air and sea power. General Taylor and General Wheeler have a more sophisticated view of the military situation in Southeast Asia, but they are naturally unwilling to ask a subordinate command (MACV) to undertake an action which in their view can have no real military effect on the enemy. General Taylor probes deeply into the soft spot of the State position when he suggests that it may not be worth risking the Geneva Accords merely for small probes to gather intelligence of doubtful value. In other words, General Taylor would prefer actually to invest a Viet Minh base in Laos even at the cost of a pitched battle, rather than to send a hundred men on a mission which he does not believe would be successful.
The State Department, on the other hand, is fundamentally worried about the precarious situation in Laos. I suspect that the position they took today was an attempt to appease the military and to satisfy their own need for hard information without compromising that fundamental interest. General Taylor, and probably Bob McNamara, saw through this maneuver quickly.
In my own opinion, our real problem is that we have given to the military (MACV) missions in South Vietnam which they are unwilling and unable effectively to perform. We do want hard intelligence on the Ho Chi Minh Trail, both for military and political reasons; but in the getting of it, we do not want an overt invasion of Laos at this time. Our regular military command structure has neither the desire nor the capability of tackling such a messy problem.
Until August of last year the CIA was preparing and beginning to carry out just the kinds of operations we were talking about this afternoon. As I have explained to you in previous memoranda, they were called off this and several other jobs in Vietnam in “Operation Switchback” and transferred virtually all CAS operational assets in Vietnam to MACV. It will be extremely difficult partially to reverse this transfer; but if I were the President, I would tell my people to try to get it done.
- Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Laos, Vol. II, 4/16/64–4/30/64. Secret.↩
- See Document 43.↩