48. Telegram From the Embassy in Laos to the Department of State1

1329. This morning I raised three questions with Souvanna and got following answers: [Page 87]

1)
If appropriate targets presented themselves would Souvanna agree to use of bombs by T–28’s under present circumstances? Souvanna promptly replied that he would, adding only that target selection should be worked out in conjunction with General Amkha. Therefore we are now seeking get Gens Ma and Amkha together to bring T–28’s into action, if they can be useful. I take Souvanna’s okay to cover not only 100 lb but also, if necessary, 500 lb bombs.
2)
I referred to US-piloted T–28’s in Udorn which I said could be promptly converted to be indistinguishable from Lao T–28’s and flown with considerable effectiveness in sorties against PL/VM in present situation (JCS 5197; March 052153Z).2 I said I had been assured this could be done without American involvement becoming known. Souvanna concurred in this action.
3)
I exposed to Souvanna idea convening SEATO military advisors in Bangkok (as set forth Deptel 1006, para 4)3 and Souvanna said he thought this might have useful effect. He went on to speculate that current action here as well as South Viet-Nam probably timed from North Viet-Nam to coincide with McNamara visit Saigon and he volunteered thought that direct action (e.g. 7th Fleet against North Viet-Nam) would also provide effective warning.

Souvanna informed me that as of about 1030 am Gen Amkha in touch with Kong Le (not clear whether at Muong Phan or at Ban Khong, TG 9345). At about 1115 Col Law expected land Muong Phan if appears clear from air that situation permits. Thereafter we should have better understanding of Plaine des Jarres situation. Souvanna also told me PL/VM currently only about 30 kms north of Paksane; this word given him by Gen Ouane.

At time of writing this message (11 am) co-chairmen reps and ICC calling on Souvanna at his request. Denson and Munro have diplomatic actions well in hand and I am concentrating on material help to defending forces.

Do I have authority to: 1) bring 500 lb bombs into Laos and employ them and 2) can US T–28’s from Udorn be employed as discussed above?4

Unger
  1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 LAOS. Top Secret; Flash. Repeated Immediate to Bangkok, London, Paris, Saigon, and CINCPAC. Received at the Department of State at 2:34 a.m., May 17. Passed to the White House, OSD, JCS, and CIA at 3:36 a.m.
  2. Not found.
  3. See footnote 4, Document 47.
  4. In telegram 1007 to Vientiane, May 17, 4:52 p.m., Unger received authority to introduce 500 lbs. bombs and to use them. As for the use of U.S. T–28’s from Udorn, the Department of State informed Unger that the matter was under consideration and he would have a decision as soon as possible. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 LAOS)