Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XXVIII, Laos

50. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Laos¹

Washington, May 17, 1964, 6:22 p.m.

1011. 1. Following actions should be taken urgently to meet Laos crisis brought on by Communist attacks in Plaine des Jarres and south of Tha Thom:

a. We here see great advantage in Souvanna calling for paragraph 4 consultations² at once, envisaging that these would take place in or from Vientiane, would cover local reps signatory countries, and might include on-the-spot looks by these reps to supplement ICC. Believe such diplomatic action would be useful prelude any further action we might take and would probably tend to cut down rather than increase any pressures for a Geneva Conference. Therefore, unless Vientiane feels otherwise, believe you should approach Souvanna urgently with this suggestion.

b. Vientiane ask Souvanna to issue request for small number of low-level reconnaissance missions by US jet aircraft over Paksane/Tha Thom road and over key areas of PDJ. Objects of this action, in addition obtaining essential target information and other intelligence, would be morale lift Kong Le forces and show of US concern and determination to PL/VM.³ Alerting messages have been sent by military channels. Bangkok should seek RTG concurrence for overflights and/or staging of jets at Don Muong should this prove necessary. Saigon should seek GVN concurrence for overflights and/or reconnaissance flights from Vietnamese air bases.

c. We believe use US pilots in T–28’s represents excessive risk at this time. [2 lines of source text not declassified]In view ineffectiveness Lao pilots, believe substantial operational advantages would be realized if Thai prepared to furnish pilots and Bangkok should approach RTG urgently with this suggestion. [1–1/2 lines of source text not declassified] However, pending receipt such permission, Vientiane authorized to turn over aircraft at once to Lao for operations dispatched through Vientiane. USAF unit at Udorn being instructed accordingly.

d. Bangkok to seek immediate meeting of SEATO Perm Reps with MILAD Reps in attendance, for discussion of situation and exchange of information and plans, based on threat to area (dodging question whether Laos considered in SEATO area in light 1962 settlement). We do not know yet just how far we are going in such a session but believe it useful initial move in any case.

2. FYI: Following additional actions being taken or contemplated:

a. Secretary today calling in SEATO Ambassadors to express concern and need for maximum SEATO collaboration and participation in actions taken. Secretary also talking separately to UK, Soviet, Polish, and Canadian-Indian Ambassadors, or Charges, urging appropriate action in each.

b. If Souvanna agrees to approach Co-Chairmen on Para 4 consultations, we planning strong message to Co-Chairmen in support.

c. We urgently considering whether to propose to Thai immediate deployment of US forces to Thailand in approximately same strength as in 1962 (5,000–6,000 men including ground and air units). If we do so, we will seek restoration of UK, Australian, and New Zealand units to full 1962 strength plus units from Philippines. We considering whether this can be tied in some way to forces already being deployed for LIGTAS exercise due begin 30 May in Philippines.

d. Kitty Hawk task group has been directed take up positions off Vietnam soonest.

e. We do not at present plan make press statement but will let press know of our concern and of urgent consultations with interested countries which are going forward.

Rusk

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 LAOS. Secret; Flash. Drafted and approved by William Bundy; cleared by McNamara, McNaughton, Harriman, Rusk, and the White House per McNamara. Also sent Flash to Bangkok and Immediate to Saigon. Repeated Immediate to Paris, London, Canberra, Wellington, Karachi, Manila, New Delhi, Ottawa, Warsaw, Moscow, and CINCPAC.
2. Paragraph 4 of the Declaration on the Neutrality of Laos, July 23, 1962, which declared that in the event of a violation of Laos’ sovereignty, independence, neutrality, unity, or territorial integrity, the signatories would consult with the Royal Government and among themselves to ensure observance of the principles and provisions of the declaration. The text of Declaration and its accompanying Protocol is in American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1962, pp. 1075–1083.
3. In CAS Saigon telegram 6415, May 18, Personal for McGeorge Bundy, Forrestal (who was in Saigon) recommended against “the meaningless gesture of U.S. reconnaissance flights.” He believed that the tactic had been so overused in the past that it gave the wrong signal, that of an ineffectual response. Forrestal suggested moving the Kitty Hawk offshore near Hanoi, use the Canadians’ visit to Hanoi to express U.S. determination in Laos, and/or send U.S. Marines to Thailand. (Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Laos, Vol. IV, Cables, 5/17/64–5/20/64)