52. Memorandum of Telephone Conversation Between the Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (Harriman) and the President’s Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy)1
H: In Mike’s [Forrestal] absence may I say to you what I would have been saying to Mike in last couple of days.
B: Yes.
H: I don’t think we are hitting this thing hard enough. Morale very bad. I have recommended for some time that we put two battalions back in [to Thailand]. We have just got to do something to support morale.
B: The only objection I have seen to putting those troops in is the Thais are so strongly against it.
H: If they [Pathet Lao/North Vietnamese] move into the Mekong, we have got to do something to stop them. Have you seen the telegram in from Unger saying he has talked to Souvanna saying got to now head north.2 I tried to get them to agree to put some low-flying reconnaissance in over Laos and supply road in North Vietnam. I thought it was agreed to but it was cut out after I left. We have got to send a message to North Vietnam. I had hoped we could do it from strength.
[Page 92]B: What do you mean, Averell?
H: If we send the low-flying reconnaissance in, it will be an indication that we have a very serious interest in where they are and what they are doing.
B: We have flown some low-flying reconnaissance.
H: Only in Laos. Not in North Vietnam. I thought it was agreed we would fly over supply routes in North Vietnam and that was cut out after I left the room. We’ve got to send a message which is thoroughly understandable. I think we should consider flying over Hanoi. It is all very serious; I have been very cautious about all this, as you know, but I think there comes a time when if you are overly cautious it is not good.
B: The whole problem about Moscow is they don’t have much to say about it.
H: No, they’re not interested. One of the staff of the Embassy keeps in touch with Bill Sullivan, knew him at the Laos Conference. He saw Bill and said that Pushkin had indicated they would agree to talk about it, but that I turned them down. That just isn’t true. I think I have six times taken up with Pushkin about taking up with North Vietnam and getting them to call off the dogs. The major thing Khrushchev has in mind is row with Peking. It is a long shot but I think our being ready to be vigorous will have more influence on them than to sit back and try to get him to pull chestnuts out of the fire. They’re not going to do that.
B: I agree with that.
H: As of the moment I would take two steps—have low level flights over North Vietnam. There are supply dump, airfield, and roads which we know about from high level reconnaissance. The other thing I would do is ask the Thais whether they can’t agree to put these troops in; that we cannot decide what we do later but we have every intention of taking steps to protect the Mekong and having these troops in will help further steps. They have moved their own troops in, and I think we should have some witness to the world that we are doing something.
B: I agree with you Averell.
H: This may be a signal to them. Very hard to know what the facts are. Pathet Lao is hot-headed. They are commanded now by two Peking-trained people. North Vietnamese have a certain hotheadedness. I don’t believe at this time that ChiComs want to take on United States. Of course, one can’t do anything without thinking that this may be in their minds. But they are going after a show of peace to the world, sending people to Africa, etc. Trying to compete with Khrushchev in more vigorous way. This would reverse their policy in India. Well, this is what I would be saying to Mike if he were here, and I wanted to tell you what I think.
[Page 93]B: Mike came in on the private wire telling me he doesn’t think low level reconnaissance means anything and would prove weakness, not strength.3
H: You mean in Laos? Not North Vietnam. I am speaking of North Vietnam.
B: I know.
H: I was against going into Laos unless Souvanna approved. I don’t mind what they did in the Plaines de Jars yesterday. Laos [is] not afraid of outside attack; North Vietnam is. I wish I could be more helpful.
B: It is very helpful, Averell. Thanks.
- Source: Library of Congress Manuscript Division, Harriman Papers, Chronology, Telephone Conversations, April–May 1964. Transcribed in Harriman’s office.↩
- Apparent reference to telegram 1368 from Vientiane, May 20, in which Souvanna expressed the view that the only way Laos could be saved from the Communists was by military intervention by the Western powers. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 LAOS)↩
- See footnote 3, Document 50.↩