Office of the Historian

66. Telegram From the White House to the Johnson Ranch in Texas1

Washington, May 29, 1964, 1:12 p.m.

CAP 64145. To Jack Valenti at LBJ Ranch, for the President from Mac Bundy and Forrestal.

1.
Next following telegram is going from George Ball to Dean Rusk tonight and gives summary of current thinking on Laos.2 This part of Southeast Asia crisis which could move quite soon into a new phase on its own steam, and for this reason you should know what is being considered even though no decision is called for today.
2.
In essence, telegram to Rusk reports results of two long and comprehensive meetings here today in which Harriman, Stevenson, and Attorney General have been included with constructive results in all three cases.
3.
Current proposal is that we should encourage Souvanna to accept a leading role in meeting proposed by Poles of representatives of the International Control Commission, Soviet and British Co-Chairmen, and three Laos factions. Virtue of this forum as against full Geneva conference is omission of French, Chinese Communists, and North Vietnamese. Also some slight tactical advantage to us in our own absence.
4.
Key point in Souvanna acceptance would be statement that if no satisfactory restoration of situation in Laos emerges from Polish meeting, he would have to ask active foreign assistance and has assurance that U.S. at least would respond.
5.
Form of our response would be international deployment to Thailand with probable company of British, Australians and Philippines, and readiness to execute air strikes, on Souvanna’s request, against Communist supply lines in Laos (moving into North Vietnam only if total SEA picture made it desirable).
6.
Thus, basic decision which may come to you is authorization of assurance to Souvanna that U.S. would act on this basis if situation in Laos remains unsatisfactory and Polish meeting should fail.
7.
You will see at once that on this plan U.S. readiness to act in support of Souvanna is key element, both internationally and in terms of your own decision. Reason for thinking in terms of this decision now is that any international meeting with no show of U.S. will is bound to have [Page 121] gravely weakening effect not only in Laos but in South Vietnam, and so in other countries as well. This is unanimous judgment of both meetings today, including Stevenson and still more Harriman and the Attorney General.
8.
Nevertheless, object of this scenario is to move actual use of force with respect to Laos further down the road and to limit it more tightly than any other alternative now apparent. Moreover, even if Polish meeting should fail, this scenario leaves open further appeal to UN at time of deployment and before any actual strike.
9.
We repeat that no decision is required tonight or, in all probability, before your return. But because the problem of Laos has been somewhat in the background in your discussions of recent days, we believe it important for you to have this up-to-date report of current thinking here.
  1. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, Southeast Asia, Vol. II, 5/64–6/64, Memos (B). Top Secret; Exdis.↩
  2. This telegram was a White House transmission to the Johnson Ranch of Document 67.↩