76. Summary Record of the 533d Meeting of the National Security Council1
LAOS
[Page 141]Secretary McNamara reported that an RF–8 jet reconnaissance plane from the USS Kitty Hawk had been shot down by antiaircraft fire approximately six miles from the town of Ban Ban in the Plaine des Jarres. The pilot was observed to have parachuted to the ground and was surrounded by Pathet Lao troops. Rescue attempts have been made but have not been successful.
Secretary McNamara reported his own recommendation and that of the Joint Chiefs of Staff that aerial reconnaissance be conducted tomorrow. A single flight plan was recommended, to be carried out by two reconnaissance aircraft, escorted by six to eight fighter bombers, with instructions to return any ground fire.
General LeMay and General Greene stated that they had personally recommended that the antiaircraft unit which had fired upon the downed aircraft be attacked but both concurred in the recommendations of the Joint Chiefs and the Secretary of State [Defense]. Both were certain that future reconnaissance planes would be subject to ground fire.
General Wheeler said we should wait for further ground fire before hitting antiaircraft positions. All the military officers, the Secretary of Defense, and the Deputy Secretary of Defense agreed that it was important militarily to continue reconnaissance.
Secretary Rusk agreed that reconnaissance should be continued with armed escorts who would return ground fire; but that such reconnaissance should be limited strictly to what is militarily required, and should be scheduled in accordance with real needs. The Secretary of State further wanted an opportunity to obtain, during the day, Souvanna Phouma’s concurrence in the recommended action, to which the Secretary of Defense agreed.2.
[Page 142]The President inquired what had been the results of previous reconnaissance. Secretary McNamara replied that reconnaissance had shown the location of antiaircraft sites, troop dispositions and movements, supply routes and depots, and the movement of numbers of trucks down these routes. Night reconnaissance had also disclosed a significant increase of night movement on the supply routes from North Vietnam into Laos.
The Secretary of State agreed with the Secretary of Defense that reconnaissance had also had a political effect and may have prevented the complete breakdown of the Government of National Union.
The President specifically asked the Attorney General, Mr. McCone, Speaker McCormack and Mr. McGeorge Bundy whether they agreed with the recommendations of the Secretaries of State and Defense and the Joint Chiefs. All agreed and no one present made any further observation.
- Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, NSC Meetings, Vol. 2, Tab 6, 6/6/64, Laos. Top Secret. Prepared by Forrestal.↩
- In telegram 1138 to Vientiane, June 6, the Department informed the Embassy of the decision to conduct a single reconnaissance flight of 2 aircraft on June 7 with 6–8 fighter-bomber escorts able to respond if the reconnaissance planes were fired upon. The Department instructed the Embassy to explain to Souvanna that this action was needed to offset the psychological effect of the shooting down of the U.S. plane and to demonstrate U.S. will, and that Souvanna need not specifically request the armed reconnaissance; he need merely acquiesce. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 LAOS) In telegram 1537 from Vientiane, June 7, Unger reported that Souvanna raised no objection to the plan, but insisted upon no publicity↩
- Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.↩