Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XXVIII, Laos

82. Telegram From the Embassy in Laos to the Department of State¹

Vientiane, June 8, 1964, 7 p.m.

1559. For Secretary Rusk and Bundy. I am deeply distressed over events of past several days and am apprehensive that all our careful work of past two years may be largely vitiated. Problem as I see it is that air reconnaissance exercise, initiated (as far as I am concerned at least) primarily as political instrument to provide some encouragement here and serve as warning to Communists, risks becoming military exercise for its own sake, running rapidly out of control, seriously endangering our carefully managed position with regard to Geneva Accords, our good relations with PriMin and constructive relations with British, Canadians and others.

I now believe I made serious error in agreeing to approach PriMin Saturday night² to seek his concurrence in sending armed escorts with recce planes. I yield to no one in my concern over fate pilot of plane downed June 6 but these are risks everyone must have known we were taking and, given political background of situation, we should have resisted putting on fighter escorts.

Escorts were put on but on clear understanding with Souvanna Phouma that this would remain secret. After June 7 shooting down question of press handling arose again and statement contained Deptel 1148³ went long way to meet requirements here as well as U.S. Government requirement of maintaining its position with regard Geneva Accords. Release did mention “F–8 aircraft from carrier Kitty Hawk” but this we thought we could live with by continuing stick to publicity line already laid down.

Now I learn (Deptel 1151)⁴ that Department and DOD have authorized background identification of downed aircraft as fighter escort. I am at a loss to understand why this was done. As long as our previous line was maintained we could pass off bombings and strafings in PL area as work of T–28s however much PL presented eye witness accounts of U.S. jet involvement. Now, however, we have virtually acknowledged that U.S. aircraft, not invited by RLG, have been bombing and strafing in Laos in direct violation of Geneva Accords.

I have no idea what is likely be PriMin’s reaction when press queries him on these points.

Deptel 1151 proposes that I follow “same line” but am afraid I will require considerably more guidance than that both to reply to press, to PriMin’s further questions, to ICC inquiries (and perhaps charges), and to British and Canadian reps who will be visiting Khang Khay Wednesday and will undoubtedly be jumped on this one.

I apologize for negative tone taken here and you may of course be assured I will do everything possible at this end to minimize damage to U.S. position. I hope U.S. military can be put under more stringent orders to restrain themselves to actions that fit strictly into our political requirements. I am every bit as frustrated as they but want to be sure that if we move into U.S. military action we have chosen right time and place. In this connection see penultimate para my tel 1551.⁵ At this point it seems to me we would be wise to institute at once scaling down of recce flights as already recommended and withdraw fighter escort.

I may of course have entirely misinterpreted our actions, which were perhaps taken with full recognition of possible consequences mentioned above. Have we come to decision that after two years of Communist violation of Geneva Accords and aggression in Laos, we are also taking off wraps?

Unger

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 LAOS. Top Secret; Flash; Exdis. Received at the Department of State at 9:48 a.m., June 8.
2. June 6.
3. See footnote 3, Document 80.
4. Dated June 7. (Department of State, Central Files, INT 6 PHOTO LAOS)
5. In this paragraph of telegram 1551 from Vientiane, June 7, Unger agreed that photo reconnaissance over northwest Laos should not be lost track of, but he wondered if the Department had given consideration to whether it wanted to excite the Chinese at this stage. Unger suggested covering this area with reconnaissance flown by T–28’s out of Luang Prabang. Only if the results were unsatisfactory should U.S. jets overfly this politically sensitive area. (Ibid., POL 27 LAOS)