Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XXVIII, Laos

84. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Laos¹

Washington, June 8, 1964, 9:40 p.m.

1158. Highest levels concluded mission June 9 should go forward. In view time factor we did not await your reply Deptel 1155² but assumed it would generally follow lines your 1559 and 1562³ which as we saw it indicated Souvanna would certainly not publicly approve and might even disavow but that even another incident and loss plus firing would not be likely drive him seriously other actions. Incidentally, you may rest assured all decisions this subject being reached closest consultation Department and Defense with higher approval as necessary and in light most careful weighing we can make of political factors.

We all feel badly we did not cut you in full sequence events and particularly regret operations message did not reach you.⁴ We are now clear that we will in any event take a few days after June 9 mission to assess next step and will hold off on further recce operations on any basis during this period. Hopefully you can catch up a little on sleep.

We also regret that in sending you text our statement on June 7 shootdown⁵ we did not make clear that we felt we would have to admit on background aircraft was escort although we did not admit and have not yet admitted that we have actually fired. Our basic problem here is to maintain credibility and we assumed, as it turned out rightly, that Communist radio would immediately charge us with firing and that we would be in impossible position unless we admitted that aircraft were being escorted. If as we expect Communists again respond by propaganda attack to firing by June 9 mission we will do maximum hold this line and to avoid conceding that ground positions were actually taken under fire.

For your further information we had informed British and Canadians our probable intention institute escort missions and they and others must now know that they took place and infer that we did actually fire. So far no reaction reported. We are perhaps more concerned about Indian reaction than any other and you should perhaps seek hold Indian Ambassador and ICC hand to maximum.

Naturally, Souvanna himself remains critical. You can best judge whether it useful discuss problem with him during day June 9 or whether it best you await results and act accordingly. Obviously you should not indicate in any way prior knowledge extent June 9 mission, but you might tell him you believe this escorted mission planned but to be followed by recess. You should certainly make clear to him and to all others our actions concerning recon mission do not indicate in any way we throwing away Geneva Accords but rather that we taking necessary action to carry on recon operations which fully justified within spirit Geneva Accords and in light RLG request and ICC inability to act to get facts about Communist military violations.

Above drafted before receiving your 1563.⁶ We weighed alternative possibilities continuing recce missions without escort and attacking anti-aircraft sites with T–28’s. We rejected former on grounds no safe flight path could be guaranteed and another shootdown without active US measures would above all give Hanoi and Peking another lift and would almost certainly be heavily criticized in US and possibly lose us crucial support for whole course of action we pursuing in Southeast Asia. We rejected latter on grounds military judgment here that it would be ineffective and almost certainly produce serious loss unless napalm used which we thought had other serious disadvantages particularly in international sphere.

We also rejected alternative another generalized escorted mission on grounds this might produce another loss with no offsetting advantage damage to other side and thus really force our hand for next move.

We understand fully your point about risks being daily incurred by your aircraft and those from Udorn and our hats are off to all concerned. Fact is that damage to our overt reconnaissance creates different pressures both in relation to Hanoi and Peking and in relation to US public.

Your 1564 now received.⁷ You should certainly follow line with Souvanna that attacks in June 9 mission were in response hostile fire (which indeed probable once aircraft in area).

Secretary wants you to know that he feels our principal chance of turning the Southeast Asian situation around without large scale military action of one sort or another lies in our getting effective signals to Hanoi and Peiping that they must leave their neighbors alone before events go too far. In your discussion with Souvanna, if the strike of June 9th comes up in a different form, you are authorized to tell him that certain steps are underway, which you are not at liberty to disclose, to make very clear to Hanoi that they are embarked upon an exceedingly dangerous course of action in their gross and persistent violations of the Geneva Accords. The timing of our reaction as of June 9 is related to that signal to Hanoi.

Secretary also believes that you should not, even within your own staff, take the view that such actions on our part are themselves violations of the Geneva Accords. It is a well established principle of international law that where one side grossly violates particular provisions of an agreement such as those forbidding Viet Minh personnel in Laos or the use of Laos as a corridor to South Viet-Nam that those unilateral violations relieve other parties of relevant restrictions upon themselves. Our objective remains the fullest execution of and meticulous compliance with the Geneva Accords. We are ready to work with everyone and anyone to obtain full compliance on all sides. Central to our policy is full support for Souvanna Phouma despite repeated and contemptuous rejection of his role and authority by the Pathet Lao.

Deeply appreciate your thoughtful series this subject.

Rusk

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 LAOS. Secret; Flash; Exdis. Drafted by Rusk and William Bundy; cleared with Manning, Harriman, Sullivan, and U. Alexis Johnson; and approved by Rusk and William Bundy. Repeated to Geneva for Ball.
2. Telegram 1155 to Vientiane, June 8, 4:33 p.m., in which the Department asked Unger if he was still opposed to a strike mission on June 9 even if it was a sharp single retaliation against a worthwhile target followed by a reduction in reconnaissance operations. The message also asked Unger to gauge Souvanna’s reaction to the operation. (Ibid.)
3. See footnote 2, Document 83.
4. The operations message has not been found.
5. See footnote 4, Document 78.
6. In telegram 1563 from Vientiane, June 8, Unger stated that since the strike against Xieng Khouang was designed to demonstrate that the Pathet Lao could not shoot down reconnaissance planes without punishment and to offset the international psychological lift of their having done so, attacks by T–28’s armed with napalm and continued reconnaissance flights would have the same effect. Unger stated that acknowledgment of U.S. armed attack in Laos put the United States in severe risk of going “over the dam” of the Geneva settlement. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 LAOS)
7. In telegram 1564, June 8, Unger stated that it would be impossible to ascertain Souvanna’s reaction, but given that he agreed to armed reconnaissance only with the promise of no publicity, Souvanna would hardly approve of an acknowledged air strike. (Ibid.)