Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XXVIII, Laos

98. Memorandum for the Record¹

Washington, June 17, 1964.

SUBJECT

• Meeting with Secretary McNamara in his office on 17 June, 4:00 to 5:15

1. We exchanged views on Southeast Asia and both were in agreement on the following scenario in which political and military actions would parallel one another:

With respect to political action, we agreed:

a. Polish proposal seemed dim in view of the attitude of Peiping, Hanoi, Souvannavong and now Moscow. Furthermore, State believes that the advantage of the Polish proposal as a means of separating Moscow from Peiping seemed questionable.

b. We probably had to go through the United Nations but it would not be productive.

c. We would end up in Geneva and it was probably better for us to move progressively towards Geneva charging the Communists with violations of the ‘54 and ‘62 Agreement instead of being hauled in and put in the defender’s box

As these diplomatic efforts proceeded, we should continue to make preparations for extended military operations along the following lines:

a. Do all possible to reinforce Khanh’s base.

b. Intensify the Vietnam information service.

c. Face up to the probability of the early replacement of Lodge and select a proper Ambassador. In this regard, many names were mentioned but none agreed to.

d. Continue occasional reconnaissance flights and continue the T–28 bombing missions out of Vientiane. It was recognized the latter will become increasingly vulnerable as anti-aircraft guns are installed in PL territory.

e. Release ARVN to bomb Laotian corridor.

f. Deploy ground, air and military units so that they can be placed in appropriate places in Laos and elsewhere in minimum time if decision is reached to extend north.

Concurrently we should probe every way of obtaining a Congressional Resolution. We recognized a Resolution was necessary. The difficulties of getting it were also recognized, however the prospect of committing U.S. forces to action in Southeast Asia made a Congressional Resolution almost mandatory.

McNamara expressed himself as feeling that as a result of the Honolulu meeting and other information, he did not feel the immediate dangers were as serious as he had thought. He did not agree with Lodge or Gen. Westmoreland that things would “jog along and get better.” He thought they would get worse, but not collapse. I said I was not quite that sanguine, that I felt some unexpected situation might occur which would confront us with a severe crisis unexpectedly.

[Here follows discussion of items unrelated to Laos.]

1. Source: Central Intelligence Agency, DCI (McCone) Files, Job 80–B01285A, Memos for the Record, 6 Apr-8 July, 1964. Secret. Dictated by McCone and transcribed by his secretary.