Mr. President:
A North African herewith reports, in a quite credible way, on a visit to
Communist China. We know so little about how they think that I thought you
might like to read it.
Attachment2
SUBJECT
Malley freely spoke to Pedersen and Thacher yesterday for over an hour
about his recent visit to Communist China and said he would be willing
to answer further questions. Detailed report pouched Department
(Sisco-IO, Bundy-Fe and S-Walsh). Highlights as follows:
The visit lasted 18 days. The highlight was a 2–1/2 hour discussion with
Chou En-Lai on March 28.
Chou and other leaders
constantly spoke of U.S.-USSR collusion
and spoke more about USSR than U.S.
They traced collusion back to Khrushchev’s 1958 refusal to reaffirm that
an attack on China would be considered an attack on the USSR.
Chou thought U.S. would move to
attack China when we were sure it would not affect the stability of the
Soviet Government. U.S. action against China would involve Chinese
reaction against all bases of attack, specifically mentioning Japan,
Philippines, Laos, and Thailand.
Chou said he was considering the
termination of Warsaw talks because they were being exploited by the
USSR.
Malley thought the Chinese wanted to enter the Vietnamese War. Chou had reiterated China prepared to
send volunteers to North Vietnam a day after North Vietnam requests
them.
North Vietnam representative in Peking confirmed the offer and said North
Vietnam (a) Did not want Chinese and (b) Would have to accept Eastern
Europe volunteers if they took the Chinese with consequent political
problems for themselves.
North Vietnam representative said, however, Chinese and North Vietnamese
were then discussing, on contingency basis, terms and conditions under
which volunteers would be accepted if a decision was made.
Chou said North Vietnam’s
proposal to talk to U.S. if we stopped bombing had been cleared with him
by Pham Van Dong. Said he had warned him U.S. would then stiffen its
position, and that Hanoi would be stuck with its offer. Said he had been
right.
Chou identified Liu Shao Chi
with Soviets from time of his assumption of office. Said Central
Committee had voted against Liu on March 26, but Malley had the
impression that legal quorum was not present.
[Page 547]
Malley concluded that Mao Forces
would clearly win and said Chou
is confident of this also. Chou
said the Government fully controlled 8 provinces. Army Chief of Staff
admitted there had been revisionists in the army but denied any
split.
In chance meeting with North Vietnamese Colonel Van Lau, who had gone to
Burma to talk to U Thant, Van Lau heaped
abuse on U Thant and said he had rejected
U Thant’s ceasefire idea in Burma. He
expected U.S. to exploit Thant’s proposal.
Van Lau said North Vietnam expected U.S. invasion for purposes of seizing
and holding enclaves (which it could probably do) and for purpose of
holding them to trade against withdrawal of North Vietnam’s presence in
South Vietnam.
Van Lau said North Vietnam had released an exchange between President
Johnson and Ho Chi Minh because U.S. constantly
was implying it in meaningful contact with Hanoi and they wished to make
clear no meaningful discussion is going on.
Malley concluded Mao was deified
in China to the extent that groups rallying around his name are certain
to be successful. But thought he was far removed from day-to-day conduct
of government. He also felt adulation attached to him could not be
transferred to others and that if he died succession would be difficult
question. He thought Chou En-Lai
had no power base and could be easily removed at will by those now
holding the power.
Chou told Malley, in context
Soviet untrustworthiness, that he had received a message from the
Embassy in Cairo reporting Nasser’s anger at finding Gromyko had come to Cairo to urge
United Arabic Republic to go slowly in Saudi Arabia.
