Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XXXII, Dominican Republic; Cuba; Haiti; Guyana

7. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the Dominican Republic¹

Washington, June 6, 1964, 3:53 p.m.

667. For Ambassador from Crockett. Embtel 1106.²

Reftel arrived at particularly opportune moment. We had already scheduled interview with Bonilla for this morning in order explain nature contemplated AID program and U.S. objectives under Alliance per your tel #1099.³ Reftel provided valuable additional ammunition and help in focusing on problem Reidʼs unrealistic expectations and rash public pronouncements this respect.

Asst. Sec. Mann out of town today but will see Bonilla on June 8 to reinforce todayʼs representations.⁴ In this regard, agree you should request one or two day postponement of scheduled Monday meeting with Triumvirate to allow time for Bonilla to report to Reid after conversation with Mann.

Following is summary Crockettʼs talk with Bonilla today:

1. Bonilla reported that DOM financial delegation has now reached full meeting of minds with IMF and believes stand-by can be signed June 8. (We have not yet been able confirm this with IMF and have no details on what specifics agreement may entail.) In response this good news, Crockett emphasized that stand-by only first step on difficult road; that agreement will only prove beneficial if Triumvirate now hews line on fiscal and other reform measures necessary to put DOM economic house in order.

2. This led to point that Triumvirateʼs very raison dʼetre is its presumed capacity to take difficult measures for good of nation without undue regard for transitory political considerations. It was recalled that Council of State and Bosch regimes proved reluctant to grapple with countryʼs real problems because of political pressures but that Triumvirate has publicly recognized that it has no excuses this regard.

3. At same time U.S. fully aware of difficulties faced by Triumvirate, particularly severe pressures created by widespread unemployment. Reidʼs anxiety to show visible, immediate results in terms of public works projects therefore understandable. Nevertheless, in our opinion, would be error of first magnitude to pump money into employment-creating projects of this type which did not at same time increase countryʼs capacity to produce. Result would be compounding of current financial problem which has its roots in excess of consumption in relation to production.

4. Referring to Reidʼs extravagant and misleading promises re U.S. assistance, Crockett emphasized that aid of the type he apparently envisages cannot be justified. In addition damage it would do in terms of DRʼs financial situation, building of hospitals for which there are no nurses, schools for which there are no teachers and gaudy bridges for which there is no need would be essentially wasteful. Bonilla was told in clearest terms that U.S. has no intention embarking on a program of this sort and that Reidʼs statements can only cause mutual embarrassment.

5. It was then explained just what U.S. does hope do: assist in raising agricultural production, in improving education, in getting country launched on constructive self-help projects, and, generally, in establishing technical and educational base for genuine development. Crockett singled out Bonillaʼs own project for rural education as one which fits within framework.

6. Bonilla reacted most favorably. Said he agreed entirely; that our approach coincided with his thinking and that these representations would strengthen his hand in attempting influence Reid. He expressed desire for interview with Asst. Sec. to go over same ground so as to be able impress Reid even more strongly.

7. Referring to Reidʼs recent statements, Bonilla observed that former is inclined toward rash indiscretions and is at times victimized by bad advice, particularly from his uncles the Cabrals. Bonilla reviewed his own efforts over the months to prevail on Reid to lay aside empty words and make his mark with constructive action. As example, Bonilla asserted he had counseled Reid bring in qualified foreign economist and formulate economic policy on basis this expertʼs advice.

8. Throughout Bonilla emphasized his belief that Triumvirate must adopt practical programs for promoting basic education, increasing agricultural production, encouraging small industries and attracting foreign investment. Said he would continue urge his views (which appear remarkably similar to our own) on Reid.

In forthcoming conversations with Bonilla we will attempt strengthen these convictions (presuming they are genuine) by discreet coaching and re-emphasis of points made today. Bonilla intends return Santo Domingo next week following conclusion IMF negotiations. Judging from your own estimate of his influence on Reid, he should prove helpful. You may therefore wish follow up our efforts with representations of your own after he arrives.

Rusk

1. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, FN 10 DOM REP/IMF. Secret; Priority; Limdis. Drafted by Shlaudeman and approved by Crockett.
2. Document 6.
3. Not found.
4. Mann was scheduled to meet with Bonilla on Monday, June 8; see Document 8. No other record of this meeting has been found.