Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XXXII, Dominican Republic; Cuba; Haiti; Guyana

78. Telegram From the Embassy in the Dominican Republic to the Department of State¹

Santo Domingo, May 18, 1965, 1900Z.

1776. From: Bundy, Mann, Vance, Palmer, Bennett, Martin.

A. Three basic difficulties we have encountered from outset here in seeking POL solution are that (1) it has not been clear that men we are negotiating with truly represent real power; (2) each side, like Chinese warlord, has true mil force and can and has used that force to disrupt every POL move we have attempted if it thought disruption was to its advantage; (3) we have not had true control because we have not in fact physically interposed our superior mil forces between the contending mil forces.

B. To meet these difficulties and improve atmosphere in which POL negotiations are conducted, we propose that we physically interpose our mil forces between the contending DOM mil forces.² We would first consult with both sides and decision to proceed would depend on reactions. This would be done through SYG–OAS Mora, supplemented by approaches through our own channels. We would also ask Amb Bunker to give OAS Comm in Wash an opportunity to concur in proposed action. Bunker would explain to Comm that this action is essential because of continued heavy fighting in north side of city.

C. The advantages to this course are (1) it would show the world we are truly neutral, truly humanitarian, truly desirous of stopping the killing; (2) it would give us more control since we could prevent either side from shooting POL negotiations out from under us and, hopefully, would limit radio capabilities of both sides; (3) it would enable us to pursue POL negotiations with reduced pressure of threats from either side to resume mil action; (4) if taken with OAS Comm endorsement, it will serve to demonstrate that OAS is acting effectively to enforce a cease-fire and this will reduce pressure in UNSC for further UN involvement.

A bonus of significant value would be demonstrable indication to local U.S. and international observers, including press, of neutrality of U.S. forces with respect to both DOM sides. Since loyalist forces are able to concentrate in NW part of city, while bulk of the rebel forces are confined to southern part of city through presence of U.S. troops, present mil situation definitely favors loyalist side in area north of LOC. Thus, U.S. is credibly open to charge of greatly favoring loyalist side.

Military Plan: Operation involves establishing a new corridor starting from intersection of present LOC with Avenida 30 de Marzo and extending to NW along this road to intersection of Avenida San Martin with Avenida Maria Montes, then north along latter to 28th Street, thence west to Avenida Maximo Gomez and finally north along latter to Peynado Bridge. First part of new corridor would include seizure of studios of Radio Santo Domingo which is currently heavily defended and inoperable. As an alternative, Radio Santo Domingo could be bypassed by establishing detour one or two blocks south of Avenida San Martin in area of radio studios.

From intersection of Avenida San Martin with Avenida Maria Montes north to Peynado Bridge, corridor is presently held by loyal DR forces. Thus this operation must be based on at least accepted replacement of those forces by U.S. troops and withdrawal to west of any loyal forces east of Avenida Maria Montes. A brigade of 3 bns from 82nd ABN Div would be used for this operation with 2 bns moving north in column from a line of departure at LOC where it crosses Avenida 30 de Marzo and linking up with 1 bn helicopter lifted into the area south of Peynado Bridge.

The above operation would provide (1) an effective interposition of U.S. forces between loyal and rebel forces which would prevent either side from attacking the other; and (2) an effective sealing off of rebels in city since, in addition to corridor operation, the far bank of Isabela River would be screened from Peynado Bridge to its junction with Ozama River and latter screened south to its mouth flowing into sea; and (3) positive security of major industrial area of city.

Finally, this operation seems to us likely to increase whatever chance there is of agreement on lines we have sought. It would show rebels we can and will ensure cease-fire and it would greatly reduce possibility of armed action by Imbert after agreement is announced.

Bennett

1. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, POL 23–9 DOM REP. Secret; Flash; Exdis. Received at 3:23 p.m. and passed to the White House at 3:52 p.m.
2. Bundy introduced this proposal to President Johnson during a telephone conversation at 11:55 a.m., May 18. (Johnson Library, Recordings and Transcripts, Recording of telephone conversation between President Johnson and McGeorge Bundy, Tape F65.33, Side A, PNO 3)