144. Letter From President Nixon to Korean President Park1
Dear Mr. President:
The North Vietnamese invasion of South Vietnam has bogged down badly and is well behind schedule. Our South Vietnamese allies have stiffened their defenses on all three fronts and have taken a heavy toll of the enemy.
However, General Abrams informs me that the South Vietnamese lack mobile reserves for some of their immediate problems, especially in the Second Military Region. One of the most pressing problems with which they are unable to cope is the task of reopening Kontum Pass on Route 14 between Pleiku and Kontum.
General Abrams feels this is a mission which could be effectively performed by a combination of Korean and United States forces, operating against a limited objective for a limited period of time. Once the pass is opened, he believes our two forces could retire, and the terrain could be held secure by the South Vietnamese forces now available to the Second Military Region. He also assures me that the requisite Korean forces could be temporarily spared from the area where they normally operate.
Under this concept, the United States would be prepared to contribute the airlift, the helicopter units, the air support, and other associated support elements. The Korean contribution would consist of combat elements temporarily withdrawn from their current area of operations.
I would very much like to have our two countries cooperate in this particular effort to assist our South Vietnamese allies. I feel that a successful mission of this type would have psychological as well as military benefits which could instill a helpful momentum into the defense of Kontum.
If you share my view, I would greatly appreciate your authorizing the Commander of the Korean Forces in Vietnam to work out the details [Page 357] of the mission with General Abrams. If your reply is favorable to such a combined mission, I will then instruct General Abrams to provide the United States elements essential to the proposed operation.2
Sincerely,
- Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 757, Presidential Correspondence 1969–1974, Korea, President Park (1972). Secret. Holdridge sent a draft of the letter to Kissinger on June 2, noting that such a message had been proposed at the June 1 WSAG meeting (see Document 143) and that minor changes had been made to a Department of State draft, and recommending that he send it to the President. Kissinger sent it to the President under cover of a memorandum of June 3 with the recommendation that he sign it. Kissinger approved for the President. The text of Nixon’s letter was transmitted in telegram 98489 to Seoul, June 3. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 757, Presidential Correspondence 1969–1974, Korea, President Park (1972))↩
- Park’s reply was transmitted in telegram 3425 from Seoul, June 13. Park stated that he believed that “the operation of recapturing Kontum Pass would be one of the most difficult missions of the Korean forces in Vietnam, involving many casualties on our part.” However, he added, “in consideration of Your Excellency’s special request, I have decided to offer assistance of the Korean forces in the Kontum Pass operation. Korean combat elements will be dispatched to participate in the joint ROK–US operation in the Kontum Pass area, and upon completion of their mission they will return to their current area of operations.” (Ibid.)↩