Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume XIX, Part 1, Korea, 1969–1972

150. Telegram From the Embassy in Korea to the Department of State¹

Seoul, July 7, 1972, 0630Z.

3946. Department pass to Secretary. Subj: Assistant Secretary Green’s Conversation with President Park Chung Hee, July 6, 1972.

1. Summary: Park made following major points in commenting on South-North communiqué: South had sought contact at high level to forestall reckless act by Kim Il Sung. ROK is still suspicious, but wants to make sincere test of North’s intentions. Continued U.S. support of ROK position of strength is essential. Reunification will take much time, but opening dialogue reduces chances of war. North wants to plunge into hot political issues. South wants gradual approach beginning with exchanges. North is already demanding U.S.–UN withdrawal, and will press this line. Green said communiqué welcomed, U.S. would continue to do what it could to help the ROK negotiate from strength. Park expressed hope ROK’s friends not get ahead in dealing with North. ROK would hope to delay world acceptance of two Koreas. End summary.

2. Assistant Secretary Green, accompanied by Ambassador Habib called on President Park for one hour twenty minute discussion. Foreign Minister Kim and Presidential Secretary General Kim Chu Yom also were present.

3. President Park inquired after the health of President Nixon. Mr. Green replied that the President was in very good health and had asked Mr. Green to convey his warmest personal regards to President Park as had Secretary Rogers. Park said President Nixon must be tired after his strenuous efforts during the recent trips to Peking and Moscow. Green replied the President is in excellent health and is the kind of man who is reinvigorated by such travels given his deep interest in international affairs.

4. Green said he had discussed with the Foreign Minister in some detail recent international developments including President Nixon’s Moscow trip, SEATO and ANZUS meetings and recent developments in Asia.² Among the latter were, of course, the latest developments in Korea concerned [contained] in the joint South-North communiqué. This was a development the United States welcomed and for which we commended ROK initiative and courage.

5. The President said he was sure the Ambassador had briefed Green on the details of the actual discussions with the North so he would not go into these details. The ROK had been concerned over the possibility of a reckless act by Kim Il Sung. Therefore last year they had started trying to solve this problem and had proposed the opening of a dialogue at any meeting place. The North Koreans accepted the proposal and proposed Pyongyang where the initial meting had been held. Park said he wished to stress that in order to achieve their objectives in this dialogue with the North and to obtain fruitful results, he believes it is imperative to have the strong support of the United States Government.

6. Park said he did not consider North Korean acceptance of the proposal for a dialogue an act of sincerity or sign of good intentions by Kim Il Sung. He anticipated there could even be unfavorable things arising during the course of the negotiations, knowing the nature and past record of the North Korean Communists. Agreement in principle in itself does not give the South Koreans reason to trust the North Koreans. On the other hand they are not appearing totally distrustful. They are willing to test North Korean sincerity and good intentions which must be proven by actions in the future. He noted that toward the end of the joint communiqué the observation of the aforementioned principles are pledged before the Korean people by both North and South. It is to be hoped that Kim Il Sung—as reckless as he is—will observe what he agreed upon but the ROK will wait to test his credibility and hope that there will be no unacceptable recklessness.

7. The reunification of a divided country requires considerable time with perseverance and patience. It is a difficult problem in view of the fact that North and South Korea are at two extremes of ideology and institutions. Neither side will accept the other’s institutions or ideology. They will have to be compromised, and he does not perceive how this would come about at the present time. The important thing was to open a dialogue and to avoid recurrence of war in order to reach the ultimate [goal?] of reunification. There were intermediate steps beginning with an exchange of people, goods and culture so as to improve understanding and eliminate misunderstandings. He does not at present expect the political talks to go into hot discussion on reunification. There will be much time and much to do before that. The North Koreans on the contrary want to get into the hot issues now. Park had explained to Park Sang Chol of North Korea that it is not time to go into the difficult political problems. The North Korean approach is far ahead of political realities. For example they proposed summit talks right away, which is impractical. If the atmosphere matures then, of course, political talks will be possible but this is not the case. There is no mutual confidence after a separation of twenty years. Direct confrontation on political issues now would only lead to charges and counter-charges. No fruitful results would follow and the meetings would end. So it would be better to eliminate the causes of separation and approach the easy problems before the difficult problems. Park Sang Chol said he would report these views to Kim Il Sung.

8. Park said that upon announcement of the joint communiqué the general public reaction was to welcome the move. They were simply glad a dialogue had been opened between the North and South. More thoughtful people who understood the problems expressed their welcome but at the same time showed some concern because they know the nature of Communism. In the joint communiqué North Korea has affirmed it would not use force to achieve unification. Park was pleased he had finally gotten North Korea to accept this principle. So long as the dialogue continued he did not expect Kim Il Sung would seek to use force. But he does expect the North Koreans to seek something else. The intention of Kim Il Sung is to realize his long-term demand that U.S. forces should withdraw from Korea. This is already demonstrated by the fact Park Sang Chol had stated in a press interview that with the agreement in the joint communiqué there was no need for foreign forces to remain in Korea and that UNCURK should be dissolved. These sorts of demands could be expected continuously in the future.

9. Another intention of Kim Il Sung is to use the communiqué to try and influence U.S. public opinion to call for an end of U.S. military aid to South Korea. It was encouraging to learn that the State Department’s spokesman had made it known that U.S. military assistance will be continued and U.S. forces will not be reduced as a result of the latest development. Park said he believes that if uncertainty arises over future U.S. support the South-North talks would either reach deadlock or break off. The South is trying to test the sincerity of the North. To do so it needs continuing U.S. support because without such aid it would not be possible to negotiate from a position of strength with Kim Il Sung. This is needed in order to gain fruitful results.

10. Green said he appreciated President Park’s lucid, articulate and convincing statement of motivation and prospects. He knew President Park as practical, realistic and tough-minded. He was particularly struck by the comment concerning inhibitions imposed upon the North Koreans. It would become more difficult for them to take provocative actions now that world attention was focussed on them and this was important. He also appreciated the truth of what the President was saying about North Korean objectives. Their objectives were obviously not friendly. As the President said, we distrust them but not to the point where we can’t have a dialogue and a step-by-step approach for a reduction of tensions and a long-run goal of reunification. We also appreciate the necessity of negotiating from a position of strength as well as the importance of solidarity at home and with friends abroad. The joint communiqué had been welcomed by Korea’s friends. The move into South-North talks and an expanding dialogue has our full support. The United States would do that which is within its capabilities to enable Korea to negotiate from strength. This would not be the kind of strength that would threaten the North but it was the kind that would produce honest negotiations. As with our own negotiations with the Soviet Union we did not believe in unilateral reductions or actions. We believe in reciprocity, so we fully understand the point President Park was making.³

11. Park said that the North Koreans had already started propaganda demands for immediate U.S. withdrawal and cut in the level of military forces in Korea. To people outside of Korea who did not understand the situation these proposals might sound good. Some might even feel that North Korea was being more positive and South Korea was being quite passive in the steps toward peace. But people who understood the situation knew better. Park hoped that he would have the full cooperation of the United States and other friends, as well as neighboring Japan. He hopes no one will suggest anything in advance of South Korean proposals. They have a program in mind but they did not wish others to jump ahead in advance of their own views.

12. Green said that we would take this into account. We recognize what has been done is on Korean initiative. We were informed and we welcomed it. We will not get into the business of interpreting what will happen. We hope there will be progress. We recognize the point the President was stressing and we want to remain in close touch on these and all developments. With regard to any such matter as withdrawal or anything that has to do with North Korea—these are subjects for consultation, as Secretary Rogers made clear in his statement of May 7. We appreciate that aside from the question of the reduction of U.S. military presence in Korea we appreciate the great importance of carrying through on the ROK forces modernization program.

13. Park said that they would stay in close touch with the U.S. through Ambassador Habib. They don’t consider this an interference of external powers but as assistance, and beneficial to their cause and therefore by definition it could not be interference. Green said that he did not see any reason to inerpret the call for independent Korean efforts for reunification as denying U.S. assistance. We do not impose or interfere in other people’s affairs. We have close relations with Korea as we do with many countries in the world.

14. Park said the opening of the dialogue with North Korea is only a beginning. He hopes to improve understanding through various actions which would create an atmosphere of mutual confidence. This would be the first half of an effort for Korean reunification. After that would come the political talks. What happens then will be dictated by internal developments and the course of events which are hard to predict.

15. Meanwhile as he had suggested, our friends should refrain from suggesting things that are in advance of their own proposals. Speaking frankly, he said, the reference made by Secretary Rogers to the “DPRK” of course had no significance of recognition or other political implications. But once the statement had been made the public wondered if the United States was beginning to recognize North Korea. This demonstrated Korean sensitivity to remarks by high-ranking U.S. officials. If someone outside of the government, in the press or in the world of sports, were to make such a statement there would be no significance attached. It is different when a ranking figure is involved. It makes the North Koreans happy and the South Koreans unhappy and he hopes that there is no reason to make North Koreans happy. He asked that we refrain from high official recognition of North Korea.

16. Green said that Park was aware that there was no implication of recognition or normalization of our relations with North Korea in the terms used. We have tended to use terms which countries used to describe themselves as a matter of civility. There was no other implication to be drawn.

17. Park said he had one further point to make before breaking up. Some scholars and others were claiming that in the long-run South-North talks would lead to dual representation in the UN: recognition of two Koreas. This may come sooner or later regardless of other desires but he was hoping to delay that time in order to improve Korea’s position in the world as in the case of East and West Germany. He believes that even some officials in the United States speak in these terms. While it is a practical reality and may come about, it would be better if it were delayed until the ROK is in the best possible position. He knows we cannot control the press or criticisms of those who wish to speculate but again he hopes that in matters like this government officials will refrain from getting out ahead of the ROKG.

18. Green asked what would be the most effective way of meeting the question as to whether the present course of events will eventually result in two Koreas. Park said he wanted discussion between the North and South to begin. He does not want to increase the problem at the UN but rather wished to postpone the debate there. As for two Koreas he hoped the U.S. Government would recognize the ROK is the only lawful government on the Korean peninsula and that it will not recognize any other [garble—lawful?] government. After all, the Soviet Union refused to recognize the ROK while characterizing the government in North Korea as the only legitimate government. The U.S. Government might say that when agreement is reached between North and South Korea on dual representation only then would the U.S. be able to support such a concept. At present the U.S. should recognize the ROK as the only lawful government. Green said that he did not see that this would create any issue. The U.S. recognizes the Government of the Republic of Korea alone on the Korean peninsula. As for the postponement of debate on the Korean question at the UN this year, Green read to the President a statement he had made in a press interview a week ago which expressed U.S. support for postponement and noting that with good progress in the bilateral talks between North and South there will be ample grounds to request postponement. This opinion would be reinforced by the latest developments.

19. Green expressed his appreciation for the clear views that had been expressed by President Park which would be most useful to our President and government.

Habib

1. Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL KOR N–KOR S. Secret; Exdis. Repeated to Taipei, Tokyo, Hong Kong, USUN, and CINCPAC for POLAD. Green visited the ROK July 5–6 as part of a trip to Southeast Asia taken at Nixon’s request in order to gauge reaction to the joint North-South Korean communiqué announced on July 4 concerning opening dialogue between the two countries.
2. Telegram 7140 from Tokyo, July 6, contains a report of Green’s conversation with Kim Yong Shik on July 5. (Ibid.)
3. Green also provided these assurances to Lee Hu Rak on July 6. According to telegram 3939 from Seoul, July 7, Green told Lee that the South Koreans could “count on the moral and material support of the U.S. Government and people” in their South-North initiatives. Lee said the South thought “it might be better at first to exchange people, material, and communications” than to work on the terms of achieving reunification. Green agreed with this and added “that to the extent exchanges can be achieved it will make it more difficult for North Koreans to create incidents.” He commented, “There is no question the South will gain from such exchanges and one can hope North Korean views will be moderated as they are exposed to the outside world rather than remain a closed garrison state.” (Ibid.)