114. Telegram From the Embassy in South Korea to the Department of State1
1205. For Secretary from Marshall Green. Subj: Meeting with Prime Minister Sato, Feb 29, 1972.
1. Early on morning February 29 and prior to regular cabinet meeting, PriMin Sato received Amb Meyer, Holdridge and me for hour-long frank and cordial discussion of the President’s visit to China. Sato obviously had been fully briefed on the substance of my discussion the previous evening with FonMin Fukuda (Tokyo 2050),2 who also was present. Discussion therefore evolved as a series of responses to Sato’s questions, although I went over number of key points I had made to Fukuda (and which I will not report in this message).
2. Sato opened with an expression of warm appreciation for the President’s personal message sent from the aircraft enroute home. I responded that my visit to Japan was undertaken at the specific request of the President and that he had asked me to extend his warmest wishes and regards to Prime Minister Sato and to reaffirm President’s view, as expressed at San Clemente, that U.S.-Japanese relations are foundation stone of peace in the Pacific.
3. Sato seemed puzzled by evident lack of discussion of third country issues during week-long talks in Peking. I replied that there was a great deal to discuss of a philosophic nature, particularly after [Page 406] more than two decades of non-dialogue between Peking and Washington. Furthermore both sides were reluctant to get into third country issues out of deference to our respective friends. Moreover, as Sato had undoubtedly noted from accounts of conversations Chou had had with visitors to China, he delighted in wide-ranging talks of a philosophic-historic nature and such discussions may have been helpful in removing certain misunderstandings with regard to our position and confirming our genuine desire to seek better relationship with PRC despite fundamental differences.
4. Sato, like Fukuda earlier, felt there was an apparent contradiction between our acceptance of the five principles and Dr. Kissinger’s subsequent statement to the press that we would honor our defense commitment to Taiwan. I repeated point I had made to Fukuda about sovereign rights of self defense and added that our recognition of the five principles constituted no departure from previous U.S. policy. Indeed, these principles offer a common standard accepted by Peking which provides us with better basis to criticize any acts of interference or aggression others might commit.
5. In response to a further question re Taiwan, I called Sato’s attention to fact that we had reaffirmed our interest in peaceful settlement by Chinese people themselves and that key phrase in communiqué “with this prospect in mind” referred to ultimate withdrawal of our forces. Full withdrawal is therefore contingent on a solution satisfactory to Chinese people on both sides of Taiwan Straits. This formulation was not a change in policy but simply a definition in different terms. As promised at San Clemente, we had not pulled the rug out from under our friends and allies.
6. Sato hoped I could persuade leaders in Korea and Taiwan of this “correct” understanding since they are relatively much more concerned. I commented that I was reasonably confident about reactions of Koreans, even though latter are passing through difficult period due to a number of factors. However, we had made it clear publicly in Shanghai that we would observe all our commitments (including that to ROC). Furthermore we will continue to give assistance to Taiwan and we will continue to promote trade and investment with and in Taiwan. Leaders on Taiwan would do well to focus world attention on Taiwan’s own impressive accomplishments in improving conditions of life for their people. It could thus best ride out the storm. In this connection I urged that Japan stay in close touch with us on this problem and that Japan too should promote trade and investment in Taiwan.
7. At another point in our conversation when discussing outlook of PRC leadership, I stressed that PRC leaders seemed to prefer direct, forthright presentation of views and to react negatively to any attempts [Page 407] to gloss over or paper-over differences where indeed such differences exist. I therefore felt that Japan would be well-advised to deal firmly with Peking as indeed Sato has been doing. Excessive conciliatory efforts would only make Peking more demanding and impair prospects for improved relations. The Peking leadership recognizes that time will be required to adjust fundamental differences with countries like U.S. and Japan. They are realistic in that regard.
8. As to PRC allegations about reviving Japanese militarism, we had rejected that viewpoint stating that Japanese people and government are strongly opposed to any return to militarism, that we understood their position and reasons for feeling that way and fully supported it.
9. On trade, I felt that PRC had limited interest in trading with us. Some Americans would be permitted to attend Canton trade fair. But all Chinese statements on increasing trade included the modification “gradually” or “step-by-step”.
10. In concluding I sought and received Sato’s agreement that substance of our talks would be held in the strictest confidence. I could assert, as we had promised, that no deals had been made under the table and that we were not colluding with the Chinese against the Russians since that would contradict the spirit of the President’s determination to promote dialogue and improve relations among all powers.
- Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 543, Country Files, Far East, Korea, Vol. V, 1 Jan–31 Dec 1972 [Part 1] Secret; Immediate; Exdis. Telegram 37964 to Tokyo, March 6, describes a meeting between Ushiba and Rogers on the afternoon of March 2, in which Ushiba expressed gratitude for Green’s meetings with Japanese leaders to brief them about Nixon’s trip to China, noting that these meetings had occurred “even before President had spoken to American people.” (Ibid., Box 537, Country Files, Far East, Japan, Vol. VII, Jan–Apr 1972)↩
- In telegram 2050 from Tokyo, February 29, Green reported that on February 28 he had given Fukuda an account of Nixon’s visit to the People’s Republic of China and attempted to reassure Fukuda that the United States would not forsake Japan, Taiwan, and South Korea in an effort to improve relations with China. (Ibid.) Kissinger reiterated Green’s message during his meeting with Ushiba on March 6. (Memorandum of conversation, March 6; ibid.)↩