Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume XXIV, Middle East Region and Arabian Peninsula, 1969–1972; Jordan, September 1970

111. Telegram From the Departments of State and Defense to the Embassy in Kuwait¹

Washington, December 10, 1971, 0039Z.

222618. Subj: Kuwait Internal Security and Defense Programs. Ref: Kuwait 1293, 1358.² Joint State/Defense Message.

1. State and DOD wish to commend Ambassador for effective manner in which he has kept U.S. private firms rather than USG in front as Kuwaitis consider various possible military equipment purchases mentioned reftel. We agree that any of these sales would represent attractive commercial opportunity for American private companies and that those companies under consideration would appear capable of performing necessary training and maintenance services involved.

2. GOK and commercial firms wishing to sell military equipment and services to Kuwait should clearly understand that U.S. would prefer to see any sales handled on cash, progress payment, or private credit basis and that there is no assurance that FMS credits or guarantees would be available. Given Kuwait’s growing foreign exchange reserves, we would assume credit would not be major problem in these transactions. Moreover, present and foreseeable future financial position of GOK is such that reasonable additional military expenditures would not deprive civil sector of essential development funds. Each type of equipment under discussion, F–5’s, Hercules, Bell helicopters, Hawk missiles, would appear in itself a reasonable item for GOK to acquire. Question arises, however, when one looks at “total package” Kuwaitis appear to be considering, including 30 F–5’s, 16 helicopters, and Hawks. Before considering sale of such item USG would require fairly firm knowledge of totality of near term GOK equipment wishes. Problems we foresee are appropriateness of total package to reasonable Kuwait defense requirements and Kuwait’s ability to utilize and maintain total package. We need to strike proper balance between desires of American companies to pursue individual sales initiatives and desire of USG to not see Kuwait saddled with more military equipment than it can effectively use, maintain, and integrate into its armed forces. There is an additional question of disclosure of security information in foreigner-impacted society such as Kuwait’s and, of course, assurances as to use and non transfer of any equipment sold to Kuwait.

3. With these considerations in mind, it would be desirable for DOD to have its own independent assessment of Kuwait’s needs and capabilities. Reftel para 8³ indicates GOK interest in DOD assistance with studies and research in air defense matters. While we fully support Ambassador’s efforts to turn GOK into private channels for advice, we wonder if this request does not provide fortuitous opportunity for brief DOD survey of overall GOK military requirements and capabilities without commitment to subsequent sales of U.S. equipment. Would appreciate Ambassador’s assessment of desirability of such survey team as partial response to Kuwaiti request para 8 reftel. Team could visit early in 1972 to take look at overall Kuwaiti defense requirements. Team would also be available to advise GOK on general air defense and other requirements and might be useful in discouraging any Kuwaiti desires in excess of reasonable needs. Survey team would also provide basis for informed USG decisions on any sales request which might result from current private company efforts to interest GOK in U.S. military equipment and services. For moment would appreciate Ambassador’s views on basis his present assessment Kuwaiti attitudes and wishes without raising with GOK officials possibility that such survey team might be forthcoming.⁴

Irwin

1. Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 23 KUW. Secret; Exdis. Drafted on December 9 by Twinam; cleared in draft by Noyes (DOD/ISA), Kelly (DOD/ISA/SA), and Reed (DOD/ISA/NESA); cleared in substance by Padel Ford (NEA/RA) and Dorough (PM); and approved by Davies. It was repeated to CINCEUR, CINCSTRIKE/CINCMEAFSA, COMIDEASTFOR, and CINCUSNAVEUR.
2. Telegram 1293 is Document 108. In telegram 1358 from Kuwait, December 4, the Embassy reported that Kuwait was actively considering the purchase of six F–5B and 24 F–5E aircraft to replace existing Hawker Hunters, Lightnings, and Jet Provosts. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, DEF 12–5 KUW)
3. Reference is to telegram 1293, Document 108.
4. In telegram 1401 from Kuwait, December 13, Walsh explained the activities of Lockheed, Northrop, Bell, and Raytheon in Kuwait and noted that he had consistently emphasized the need for a requirements and capability study, and that the Minister of Defense had requested a Department of Defense in-country survey team, which Walsh supported. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 23 KUW) In telegram 225995 to Kuwait, December 15, the Department suggested that Walsh raise the subject with General Mubarak. (Ibid., DEF 1 KUW)