Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume XXIX, Eastern Europe; Eastern Mediterranean, 1969–1972

334. Telegram From the Embassy in Greece to the Department of State¹

Athens, April 21, 1972, 1137Z.

2222. Subj: Future of King Constantine and Greek Monarchy.

1. Summary: Chances of King Constantine returning to Greece appear increasingly dim, although we have no way to determine just what moves Prime Minister may decide to make. Papadopoulos may find it advantageous to keep Constantine dangling on string in Rome, both as means of neutralizing him and keeping his own options open. We now believe there greater likelihood that Papadopoulos will eventually declare republic but doubt that he will move precipitately in this direction. In any case, PM will assure himself of solid support in armed forces before making any move. For time being he probably has decided to do nothing. End Summary.

2. We view Kingʼs chances during Papadopoulosʼ tenure as poor, and even if a transitional government should eventuate, we doubt that his prospects would improve greatly. Although it is conceivable that institution of monarchy, embedded as it is in traditions of past 150 years of Greek independence, may survive in some restricted form, Constantineʼs personal prospects must be considered on different basis in light of his role before 1967 coup, in abortive counter-coup of December 1967, and legitmate apprehension that were he to return he could again present obstacle to independent course charted by Prime Minister.

3. We have been inclined to believe preponderant evidence supported conclusion that immediate interests of present regime were probably best served by leaving King in Rome, keeping him dangling about prospect of his possible return to Greece and in this way insuring that he would be reluctant to reengage himself in the political process in any overt way so as to avoid giving present regime any pretext for denouncing him. Regime would presumably have continuing interest in leaving him in this ambiguous status and not moving actively against him so that he cannot become vocal in behalf of, or rallying point for opposition.

4. On other hand, in light of dismissal of regent and assumption of regency by Prime Minister Papadopoulos, he is probably in improved position to move directly on issue since it is only question of his own tenure as regent that is involved. On this basis several courses of action merit attention: (A) to remove himself as regent in favor of King Constantine on basis of certain advance understandings limiting authority of monarch (we consider this quite unlikely); (B) to continue as regent on basis of arrangement anticipating accession of Crown Prince Paul when he comes of age (this has advantage of keeping issue on ice but leaves little room for political evolution); or (C) to eliminate institution of monarchy altogether on basis of popular referendum following declaration of republic with Papadopoulos as President (probably most likely choice). At same time we continue to believe it is prudent to assume that Papadopoulos (see Athens 1937)² wants to keep his options open until such time as he is prepared either to announce date for elections or decides to arrange referendum on issue of King.

5. In long run there are various circumstances that support our present conclusion that greater likelihood is for declaration of republic. Papadopoulos clearly wants a free hand in devising Greeceʼs future political structure. Apparently even Zoitakis was obstacle in this respect, and history demonstrates that Greek monarchy would be even more so. Current two-part article by Former Deputy Stiropoulos proposing new constitution providing for republican form of government suggests timing of such a move could come relatively sooner than we have previously been inclined to believe. There are number of risks, however, in moving rapidly, and articles may be no more than trial balloon or part of a process of conditioning; they also give Papadopoulos chance to make it seem as if something is happening without actual commitment to any action. Probably many Greeks, irrespective of political views, would like to see monarchy end. However, if choice is republic under presidency of Papadopoulos or monarchy, there is no assurance such republican sentiment would prevail and indeed opposition might exploit opportunity as chance to register its anti-Papadopoulos stand.

6. In any case on assumption Papadopoulos will be compelled to begin at some point to build new Greek political structure he must settle question of monarchy one way or another at outset before elections can take place. In this sense issue of King appears to be massive impediment to elections under present Constitution.

7. We believe too much significance should not be attached to such points as omission of royal family from prayers on occasion of national holidays, removal of royal chair from cathedral, decrees downgrading way in which royal portraits shall be displayed in public buildings, etc. Greek regime tends to operate in rather capricious and free-hand fashion, and same significance cannot be attributed to such actions as would be case in monolithic state governed by all-powerful bureaucracy such as USSR. GOG runs such matters in essentially slovenly way and probably does not even have administrative apparatus organized to arrange details of this character on such a basis as to comprise first elements in policy decision involving eventual abolition of monarchy.

8. Among other considerations which are relevant is attachment that former political world continues to show for institution of monarchy, principally because they see the King as providing an orderly transition back to democratic future, but in some cases with an effective transfer of power away from Papadopoulos and his followers. Transitional role for monarchy would not serve interest of Papadopoulos and would seem to us to constitute additional negative factors favoring move to republic.

9. We have also been interested in observing general touchiness of regime with respect to publicity concerning official contacts of any character with King Constantine, including particularly those of U.S. Department will recall press play at time Ambassador Tasca visited King in Rome. Similarly, press reaction to presidential messages on occasion of Greek Independence Day both this year and last, as well as Christmas holiday greetings, has been sharply critical, and pro-government press has taken line that King Constantine effectively supplanted by mechanism of regency and that regent rather than King is proper recipient of such gestures of courtesy.

10. Last and probably most important is position of army on monarchy. Greek military is probably less divided than Greeks generally on this question. We have impression that military in general opposed to King, particularly at higher ranks. Senior officers who chose to side with Papadopoulos rather than King at time of attempted counter-coup would additionally be motivated by fear of retaliation should Constantine return and eventually regain influence. We believe passage of time has severely eroded historical loyalty of armed forces to monarchy, but PM would unquestionably assure himself that he has solid support in military before raising issue of abolishing monarchy or deposing Constantine.

Tasca

1. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 594, Country Files—Middle East, Greece, Vol. III Jan 72–Oct 73. Secret; Exdis.
2. Dated April 6, it provided an assessment of the Greek political situation in the light of Zoitakisʼs dismissal. (Ibid., RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL GREECE)