Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume XXIX, Eastern Europe; Eastern Mediterranean, 1969–1972

398. Minutes of the Washington Special Actions Group Meeting¹

Washington, February 11, 1972, 2:34–3:14 p.m.

SUBJECT

• Cyprus

PARTICIPATION

• Chairman—Henry A. Kissinger
• State
  • Mr. John N. Irwin, II
  • Mr. Joseph Sisco
  • Mr. Thomas Boyatt
  • Mr. Martin Herz
• Defense
  • Mr. G. Warren Nutter
• JCS
  • Adm. Thomas H. Moorer
• CIA
  • Mr. Thomas Karamessines
  • Mr. John Waller
• NSC
  • Gen. Alexander M. Haig
  • Col. Richard T. Kennedy
  • Mr. Harold H. Saunders
  • Mr. Mark Wandler

It was agreed that:

• —We would send a cable to our Embassies in Greece, Turkey and Cyprus, giving our analysis of the situation and asking for their views.²
• —We will not take any actions during the next 24 hours.
• —Ambassador Tasca will use his meeting with Prime Minister Papadopoulos as a listening exercise.³

Dr. Kissinger: Whatʼs the problem?

Mr. Karamessines: I can give you a brief rundown on whatʼs been happening, although it has been slightly overtaken by events. We also have two Embassy cables which just came in.⁴ Do you want to start with the briefing or the cables?

Mr. Sisco: Let me go first because I have the cables, and they give us the most up-to-date information. Essentially, the Greek Government has given Makarios an ultimatum—and I donʼt think it is inaccurate to describe it as an ultimatum—which is composed of two elements. First, the Greeks want Makarios to place the arms which he just received on a secret basis from Czechoslovakia under UN control. Second, they want to see a new government in Cyprus, a government of national unity without Makarios. I think the Greeks are using the Czech arms issue to bring about a new Cypriot government which will be more responsive to Athens.

Dr. Kissinger: Why are the Greeks doing this now?

Mr. Sisco: Primarily, I think, because the arms issue has given them a pretext. I am also sure that Greece and Turkey have talked about this situation, and I feel—although I am waiting for Tom [Karamessines]⁵ to provide the evidence—that there has been a certain amount of collusion.

Mr. Karamessines: You are right, Joe. The Turks have indicated that the Greeks have talked with them. Turkey has agreed to stand by for the moment.

Mr. Sisco: Last night we cleared a cable with you, Henry, setting out the line that Tasca [U.S. Ambassador to Greece] has already taken.⁶ Tasca pointed out to the Greeks that their move could be dangerous and that it could precipitate a crisis. He asked them to hold off giving the ultimatum to Makarios. The Greeks came back today, saying they were going ahead with it.⁷

Dr. Kissinger: What is the deadline? How much time are the Greeks giving Makarios?

Mr. Sisco: There is no deadline. They donʼt say they are giving Makarios 24 or 48 hours.

Adm. Moorer: They just say “after a new government is formed.”

Mr. Sisco: The latest cable we have says that Makarios rejected the ultimatum.⁸

Dr. Kissinger: Yes. I saw the cable.

Mr. Sisco: Let me give you my analysis. Makarios has hinted, through his Under Secretary, that if the U.S. offers its good offices, he would consider making a deal. He would turn the arms over to the UN in return for General Grivas leaving the island.

Dr. Kissinger: What kind of arms did he get from Czechoslovakia?

Mr. Karamessines: He received enough light and medium weapons—including ammunition—to equip 2,000 men. We estimate that the total deal is worth $1.3 million. About 6,500 crates were delivered, and approximately two-thirds of them contained ammunition.

Dr. Kissinger: How did Makarios do it? What are our choices?

Mr. Sisco: First I think we should see what we can do to encourage the UN—with a new Secretary General—to play a role of good offices. Or we can play the role of good offices ourselves. The Cypriots will pull out their Russian support very early in the game. We should expect the Russians to give a good deal of support to Makarios, and we can also expect the Chinese to take a position parallel to that of the Soviets.

I guess that if there is no quiet diplomatic process underway to tone down the situation, the Cypriots are likely to take the problem to the Security Council—where they will try to prove that Greece is dismembering Cyprus. They will try to get all countries committed to an independent Cyprus. We will probably be under pressure from Greece and Turkey to give them support. The public attitude will probably be that Greece is trying to change the government of Cyprus.

From the point of view of domestic politics in the U.S., it will be easy to draw an analogy between Greece vis-à-vis Cyprus and India vis-à-vis Bangladesh. Critics will say, for example, that we tried to get India because of Bangladesh, and they will say we are responsible for the dirty colonels in the Greek Government.

Dr. Kissinger: You can follow the Bangladesh model very well.

Mr. Sisco: I was just trying to draw the analogy. You know, itʼs very tempting to make the argument that we should just stand by now and do nothing. Itʼs tempting to say we should let Greece do what it wants—and if that means that Makarios falls, so be it. Makarios has been a thorn in the side of all concerned parties, anyway. If Greece pulls off a fait accompli, there probably wonʼt be many tears shed.

But, of course, everything is not so simple. Early on in the game, this whole situation will be put into a U.S.-Soviet framework, a free world-communist framework, a neutral-NATO framework.

Dr. Kissinger: When will that happen?

Mr. Sisco: It has already started, Henry. And it will move even faster. I think we have only two real alternatives. We can go with the good offices of Waldheim and the UN or we can go with American good offices. If you want, I can lay out the pros and cons of both approaches for you.

Mr. Karamessines: There is one other factor I would like to mention at this point. As you probably know, the intercommunal talks are due to resume, under a new formula, in late February. (to Dr. Kissinger) You were asking before why the Greeks are moving now. The Czech arms issue is one reason. It is also a fact that both Greece and Turkey have compatible systems of government now. It may be that the Greeks want to move before the new talks start. Otherwise, actions taken after the talks begin would look worse than they do now.

There is one other thing. Makarios may be prepared to turn over the arms to the UN. But I understand there may be periodic UN inspections. How would he react to that?

Mr. Sisco: We can be flexible. Itʼs not a great problem. We must remember that this situation can lead to a war, even viewed in the context of the Peking trip.

Dr. Kissinger: Who would be fighting? I thought Greece and Turkey were in agreement.

Mr. Sisco: Letʼs say Makarios turns down the ultimatum. There have been hints from Greece that they would pull out and let Grivas go at Makarios. There could then be Turkish intervention. This would then mean that Greek forces could go in.

Dr. Kissinger: They canʼt pull out and then go back in.

Mr. Sisco: When the Greeks talk about pulling out, they are referring to their officers in the National Guard.

Dr. Kissinger: How would it be possible to have a scenario like this if the Greeks and Turks agree?

Mr. Sisco: One way it could come about would be if the Soviets did some saber-rattling and if the Turkish Government backed Cyprus, against another NATO member trying to dismember Cyprus.

Dr. Kissinger: Greece and Turkey presumably would not move in. Presumably, the Greek National Guard and Grivas would go after Makarios. Isnʼt that right?

Mr. Sisco: In my judgment, that may be the first round. There are different points of view, though, about which side has the most popular support. There are different points of view, too, about the loyalty of the National Guard—and to which side it is loyal.

If Grivas is unleashed, the Turkish minorities in many areas will be attacked by Greek Cypriots. Where the Turkish minorities are concentrated, they will hit Grivas. Grivas doesnʼt have more than a couple of hundred men. He is banking on a strategy of mass support. Does he have this support? That is a difficult judgment to make. If Grivas is unleashed, how long will it be before Greece and Turkey intervene to finish the job?

Mr. Karamessines: I donʼt think there is any danger of this becoming an international war. After all, Greece and Turkey are in cahoots.

Dr. Kissinger: Isnʼt it better that they are in cahoots?

Mr. Karamessines: Iʼm not so sure about that. The Greeks have the firepower to seize the situation if they want to. There is a big question, though, about whether the population will be content with this type of a solution.

Dr. Kissinger: If it is such a big question, why would the Greeks attempt to do it?

Mr. Sisco: They are trying to remove Makarios, within the concept of a unified Cypriot Government. If it doesnʼt work, there is a possibility of getting direct Greek and Turkish intervention. That would result in enosis, a carving up of Cyprus.

Dr. Kissinger: Why do we care about that? It wouldnʼt be a great disaster.

Mr. Sisco: I basically agree with you.

Mr. Irwin: The danger, I think, is a possible Soviet involvement.

Dr. Kissinger: The real danger is a protracted civil war, essentially a guerrilla war, in Cyprus. If the problem can be solved in 24 hours, though, why would it bother us?

Mr. Sisco: Because it will be presented as NATO aggression directed against a neutral country.

Dr. Kissinger: I think we have two problems. The first is what will happen, and the second is how it will be presented. If we have a fast-moving situation, that will present one set of problems. If it is a prolonged situation, developing over a period of weeks, we will have another set of problems. What is our expectation?

Mr. Sisco: My guess is that we will have a prolonged problem.

Dr. Kissinger: (to Mr. Irwin) Jack, what do you think?

Mr. Irwin: One issue we have to consider is what the Soviet interest is in all of this. What did they [the Soviets] do the last time?

Mr. Sisco: We never really knew what they were willing to do because our good offices brought about a political solution.

Dr. Kissinger: Werenʼt our good offices used after the civil war started?

Mr. Sisco: That was in the first round. The second round was different. Makarios upset the status quo, but there was no actual Turkish intervention.

Dr. Kissinger: What year was that?

Mr. Sisco: 1967–1968.

Dr. Kissinger: Isnʼt that when Vance went out there?

Mr. Sisco: Yes. I donʼt think the Soviets are anxious to get involved to the extent that they would have to supply forces. My guess is they would provide a lot of political support. There are, as you probably know, a number of communist elements in Cyprus.

Dr. Kissinger: (to Mr. Sisco) Joe, are you leaning to the good offices of the UN or the U.S.?

Mr. Sisco: Iʼm leaning first to the UN, mainly because they have a new Secretary General and because there are a lot of lumps to be taken. I think we should lean in the direction of the UN, but I also think we should keep open the option of our providing good offices—if all three parties want us to play a role. We have prepared a cable—and I will send it to you for clearance in an hour or so—giving a brief analysis of the situation and asking the Embassies for their views.⁹

Dr. Kissinger: Who is the cable for?

Mr. Sisco: Our Ambassadors in Greece, Turkey and Cyprus. If you want, we can add some guidance for Tasca to use in his meeting with Papadopoulos tomorrow morning. I think Tasca can simply use tomorrowʼs meeting as a listening exercise.

Dr. Kissinger: Leaving aside for the moment who should undertake the role of good offices, we should decide (1) whether it is in our interest to get involved and (2) if it is in our interest to get involved, when should we do so? Should we do it now, or should we wait to see other reactions? Suppose your predictions come true and Makarios goes to the UN after he rejects the ultimatum. Then we would not have to yell at Greece and Turkey. If he does go to the UN, I assume our stance would be not to egg him on.

Mr. Sisco: Thatʼs right. I suggest we follow for the moment a waiting strategy. In the meantime, we should establish a dialogue with our Embassies. Tasca is not doing anything. When we first heard about the problem, we told him to do nothing.

Dr. Kissinger: Who are our Ambassadors in Turkey and Cyprus?

Mr. Sisco: Handley is in Turkey and Popper is in Cyprus. All three Ambassadors are very competent.

Dr. Kissinger: Yes, they are. But Tasca gets excited.

Mr. Sisco: I suggest that we listen to Papadopoulos tomorrow. Maybe Greece is right. Maybe they can pull off a fait accompli.

Dr. Kissinger: Can we keep the Ambassadors calm?

Mr. Sisco: Yes.

Mr. Karamessines: Itʼs possible Greece may react quickly to Makariosʼ rejection and send in its forces.

Dr. Kissinger: So what?

Mr. Karamessines: Nothing. I just mention it because I think we ought to take it into account.

Mr. Sisco: We do need some indicators from CIA because the intelligence I have says that the Turks could intervene—with paratroopers—within 24 hours. In order to send troops over by ship, they would need 72 hours. I think Tom should supply us with the latest military indicators.

Dr. Kissinger: What are we trying to prevent? Is it in the U.S. interest to take action to prevent a quick solution to a problem—even though we donʼt like the solution? Is it in the U.S. interest to prevent a long drawn out situation from developing and which may involve other countries? I think the answer to the latter question is yes. The mere fact that Greece and Turkey agree on the solution is not in itself conclusive, although I think we should discuss it. We donʼt want a protracted civil war, with outside forces involved. That would be a repetition of the India-Pakistan problem in Cyprus.

Mr. Nutter: If Greece and Turkey are working together, how long will it take them to get a military solution?

Mr. Karamessines: The Czech arms just arrived, and Turkey said it would stand by. Therefore, the Greeks can take over promptly if they want. Popular support, though, would be an iffy thing. A fair percentage of the people—about half—are committed to Makarios. After the initial shooting is over, these people might constitute a large base for guerrilla war. This is something we shouldnʼt ignore.

Dr. Kissinger: Therefore?

Mr. Karamessines: I was just trying to point out that the Greek forces would probably have no great difficulty in taking over once they decide to make the move.

Dr. Kissinger: I think Joeʼs proposal is reasonable. (to Mr. Sisco) Can we see the cable?

Mr. Sisco: Sure. Do you agree that Tasca should just listen to Papadopoulos tomorrow?

Dr. Kissinger: Yes, if he can do it. Is there anything else we have to consider?

Mr. Boyatt: Even if Greek forces can take over in 24 hours, Makarios could still go the Security Council and start a debate.

Dr. Kissinger: Why is the U.S. protecting Makarios against Greece and Turkey at such an early stage of the game? I have nothing for or against Makarios, but the implication of everything you are all saying is that we should be protecting him. Why?

Mr. Saunders: We have to think about what we would do if the issue is taken to the Security Council.

Dr. Kissinger: What do the British think about this whole thing?

Mr. Sisco: We talked to them, and they made the same points to the Greeks that we did—mainly that the Greeks were making a “dangerous” move.

Mr. Herz: We will have a bad time at the UN getting the seven blocking votes we would need to prevent a vote of condemnation against Greece.

Dr. Kissinger: How do we know thatʼs what we want to do?

Mr. Irwin: I suggested that we not do anything during the next 24 hours.

Dr. Kissinger: If Makarios is overthrown it will be a different situation in the Security Council than if he is still in power. The question is do we want to get involved now?

Mr. Sisco: I wouldnʼt put the question is terms of getting involved now. I would say that we should proceed with caution. I donʼt know if we want to get involved at all.

Dr. Kissinger: I agree.

Adm. Moorer: It seems to me that for the first time Greece and Turkey are working together—and now we are unhappy about that.

Dr. Kissinger: (to Mr. Sisco) I remember, Joe, last spring you were saying if we could only get Greece and Turkey to work together at the UN. Thatʼs been done—and the two of them are now working against Makarios. Does everyone agree that the first thing we have to do is get the information from our Embassies?

All Agreed.

Mr. Irwin: We should also wait to see what happens during the next 24 hours.

Dr. Kissinger: Thatʼs right. The situation may not play out at all the way we expect it to.

Mr. Irwin: Will we have a meeting tomorrow?

Dr. Kissinger: We may. In any case, I want to talk to the President. (to Mr. Sisco) Joe, you will send over the cable?

Mr. Sisco: Yes.

Dr. Kissinger: Okay. We are tilting towards sending out the cable.

1. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–084, WSAG Minutes, Originals, 1972. Secret. The meeting took place in the White House Situation Room.
2. Document 399.
3. As instructed in telegram 25233 to Athens, Ankara, Nicosia, USUN, and Moscow, February 12. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 592, Country Files—Middle East, Cyprus, Vol. I Jan 1969–June 30, 1974)
4. Telegrams 760 and 762 from Athens; see Document 396 and footnote 2 thereto.
5. All brackets in the original.
6. Reference is to telegram 23559 to Athens, February 11; see footnote 2, Document 394.
7. See Document 396.
8. Not further identified.
9. Document 399.