Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume XXIX, Eastern Europe; Eastern Mediterranean, 1969–1972

414. Memorandum From Harold Saunders of the National Security Council Staff to the Presidentʼs Deputy Assistant for National Security Affairs (Haig)¹

Washington, May 5, 1972.

SUBJECT

• Cyprus Situation

I understand that you asked Sam about the attached cable² reporting that Ambassador Bush, at Joe Siscoʼs apparent instigation, had told Waldheim we do not support Turkeyʼs “tougher line” on the Cypriot-Czech arms and resumption of the intercommunal talks. I understand the concern that State may be edging instinctively toward unconsidered involvement in the Cyprus situation, and we need to keep a hand on that. We also have an interest in not souring our relationship with Turkey, especially after the Prime Ministerʼs successful visit. Those concerns stand alongside our general interest in avoiding a confrontation over Cyprus and since some of the elements in the situation seem to have changed in recent days, it may be worth putting the present problem in perspective.

Background

Early last week the UN finally got Makarios to agree to an arrangement for its control over the Czech arms which also satisfied the Greeks.³ It goes considerably further than a simple UN “inspection” arrangement worked out in a similar situation in 1966, and the UN representative in Cyprus felt that it should satisfy Turkish requirements and clear the way for resumption of the intercommunal talks.

With the Czech arms issue presumably resolved, Waldheim then issued an appeal for resumption of the intercommunal talks⁴ according to the format agreed upon before the recent crisis broke last February. That format, you will remember, called for participation of the Greek and Turkish Cypriots, mainland Greek and Turk representatives and a UN representative. Waldheim was especially concerned to get the intercommunal talks restarted before the semi-annual Security Council meeting next month for renewal of the UN peace-keeping mandate on Cyprus. He is particularly worried that some of the governments that contribute troops to the peace-keeping force will begin withdrawing them if there seems to be no effort to move toward a settlement. The Canadians, who supply one of the most effective units, are talking about pulling out this summer.

The Greek Cypriots and Greece have both indicated their interest in starting the new intercommunal talks. But—to the UNʼs surprise—the Turks have shifted now to a much tougher posture which threatens the whole concept. To begin with, the Turks say that the UN-Makarios agreement on control of the Czech arms does not go far enough and is not satisfactory. Then in a reversal of their agreement last fall, the Turks are demanding that Waldheim obtain advance assurances from Makarios that (1) the Greek and Turk Cypriots negotiate on the basis of full equality; (2) the intercommunal talks be predicated on the understanding that the outcome will be an independent Cypriot state in which the two communities are “partners”; (3) enosis as an eventual solution be explicitly excluded; (4) the agenda focus on Turk interests (constitutional compromise) only. These Turkish preconditions are probably more than Makarios, or even the mainland Greeks, can accept. They actually amount to getting advance substantive commitments which the UN assiduously avoided in arranging the five-party format last fall and winter.

The toughening of the Turkish position results in part from the change of government in Turkey.⁵ There is, in effect, no government right now, and none of the caretakers wants to shoulder responsibility for beginning talks on a basis that would make them look soft on the Cyprus issue.

It was under these circumstances that Sisco and Bush decided—without asking us—to inform Waldheim that we do not support the tougher Turkish line. Sisco has laid down the principle that we do not want to get out in front and therefore want Waldheim to carry the ball. However, he has taken the line with the Turks—again without checking with us—that we thought the UN-Makarios agreement on the Czech arms was sufficient and that we felt the intercommunal talks were the best hope for progress. He has also pointed out the desirability of Turkeyʼs avoiding the appearance before the Security Council debate of being the party that killed the intercommunal talks.

Conclusions

The problem is how to keep the Turkish position from isolating Turkey, damaging Greek-Turkish harmony and creating a renewed sense of crisis on Cyprus. Whereas in February the Turks stood back with some confidence that the Greeks would not double-cross them, the present situation re-introduces the old aspect of Greek-Turkish confrontation. The Turks seem disillusioned with Greek handling of the Cyprus issue in the last two months and suspect that Athens, Makarios and Grivas may all be secretly lining up behind enosis. The fact that Turkey is without a government means that no one is available with the courage to put down those suspicions.

State is naturally concerned to see a new impasse in the way of talks, but the issue is how far we go in making this an issue in US-Turkish relations. State has started out taking the position that the Turkish stand is too rigid and has suggested to the Turks that they not get themselves in a box. Ambassador Handley in Ankara notes, however, that the prospects of successful démarches at this time are “very dismal.”⁶ To begin with the government crisis immobilizes them for the moment. Moreover, they appear determined not to see the Cypriot intercommunal talks restarted just for the sake of reducing immediate tension but want them to deal constructively with the Cypriot problem. Until now the Greeks have been doing Turkeyʼs work of softening up Makarios, but now the Greeks seem to have backed off and the Turks apparently may be moving to apply pressure themselves—if one can ascribe any strategy to their moves at all in the current political crisis.

The danger in Stateʼs approach is that if we oppose the Turks too obviously, it will appear that we are ganging up with the Greeks and Makarios against them. So the art is not to encourage them on their present course but to avoid confrontation with them.

As I deduce your position, it would be that:

• —we should let Waldheim carry the main brunt of the argument with the Turks now;
• —we should not give the Turks the impression we are ganging up against them;
• —we could talk to the Turks when the new government gets its feet on the ground about avoiding isolation when the Security Council debate nears;
• —we can take a straightforward position, as we have for some time, of favoring intercommunal talks as long as we can do so in a low-key way without putting ourselves in open opposition to the Turks.

Is this a fair statement of the position?⁷

Recommendation: If you have not already done so, that you call Sisco and make sure he understands that we want a crack at any additional moves he is considering concerning Cyprus. Unless he gets this word from the right level he is likely to keep moving us into a position that challenges Turkey.⁸

1. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 592, Country Files—Middle East, Cyprus, Vol. I Jan 1969–June 30, 1974. Secret; Exdis. Sent for action. Kissinger crossed out Haigʼs name as recipient of the memorandum and wrote his own initials above it.
2. Telegram 76361 to USUN, May 2. Attached but not printed.
3. As reported in telegram 887 from Nicosia, April 20. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 592, Country Files—Middle East, Cyprus, Vol. I Jan 1969–June 30, 1974)
4. Waldheim reported to the Security Council on June 15 that the appeal had been made on May 18.
5. Erim resigned on April 17 over opposition to the expansion of government powers to combat terrorism.
6. In telegram 3231 from Ankara, May 3. (Ibid.)
7. Kissinger initialed the “Yes” option and added the handwritten note: “But above all I want the firmist possible démarches and I want all of them cleared here.”
8. In telegram 2871 from Athens, May 22, the Embassy reported that it had been informed by Greek officials that Turkey had dropped its preconditions to the resumption of intercommunal talks. (Ibid., RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 27 CYP)