Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume XXIX, Eastern Europe; Eastern Mediterranean, 1969–1972

42. Report Prepared in the Central Intelligence Agency¹

Bonn, June 26, 1970.

Report from Mr. Valtin

1. Valtin had a lengthy meeting with State Secretary Ahlers this afternoon. His information on subjects which are not directly related will be separately reported.

2. On Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty he was unequivocal in assuring us that there has been no West German decision to close them down. As a matter of fact, and while a number of ranking officials have concerned themselves with the problem of the Radios informally in recent months, the subject has not been on the agenda for the Cabinet or any other decision-making body, nor has any meeting been held of those officials who would have to be consulted on any basic decision on the Radios (and this would have to include Ahlers).

3. After we had told him that the question of the Radiosʼ future was one of the reasons for Mr. Valtinʼs visit to Germany at this time, Ahlers (citing recent license renewal) said that he saw no problem. He asked whether the U.S. Government wanted the Radios to continue. We answered positively and then expounded at length, giving the essence of last weekʼs Fessenden démarche (without referring to it as such), describing in some detail the responsible manner in which the radio management handles broadcasts, and emphasizing the points made in the reference (CA–18, 26 June 70, paragraph 5–D). Ahlers then said that in the light of these factors he felt quite sure that the FRG would allow the Radios to continue to operate as at present. We then told Ahlers that we had just been told differently and briefed him in confidence on the meeting with Minister Ehmke and State Secretary Bahr. He exploded, called Bahr an “all-out appeaser” (his characterization of Ehmke was only slightly less harsh), and then advised us per paragraph two above.

4. The discussion brought out the following comments by Ahlers:

A. The Radios, as foreign owned and controlled propaganda instruments operating from German soil, clearly do present a problem to the FRG in terms of both sovereignty and its attempts at normalization with the Bloc which are now underway. The “appeasers” see it largely in the latter light, but there are also a number of important officials, otherwise firmly persuaded of the continued need for the ideological struggle with Communism, who see a real problem in the Radios from the sovereignty angle.

B. The number of officials who are concerned about the Radios, and who are inclined not to allow them to continue as now constituted and located, is increasing.

C. The German Press is becoming more concerned and pressure is gradually developing, at least in terms of questions being raised with the Federal Press Office, but also, even if it is yet less so, in editorials and the running of anti-radio articles.

D. The retention of the Radios as now constituted and located will thus not be an easy matter at best.

E. Moreover, in the light of the Ehmke/Bahr position and the manner in which at least Bahr can be depended upon to pursue it, there is really only one way to forestall a FRG decision against the Radios: To get to Chancellor Brandt and persuade him otherwise. That effort may not succeed but it is the only route that offers any chance for success.

F. To prevent this from becoming a matter of public controversy (which, according to Ahlers, it is certain to become if the problem is handled as a formal USG/FRG issue), the consultations/negotiations should be kept within an unofficial channel.

5. Ahlers promised to be of assistance, both in keeping us informed of developments and, at the right moment, by exerting influence on Chancellor Brandt and others who are still open to discussion on this problem.

6. He agreed that, in view of Ehmkeʼs “no hurry” posture (CA–18, 26 June 70, paragraph 7), there is no need for immediate action vis-à-vis Chancellor Brandt (but Ahlers also agreed to flash word to us in case unanticipated developments make a quick action essential after all). We told him that the next step would be for us to report our findings to Washington and that we would get in touch with him after the problem had been considered there.

7. DCM Fessenden has been briefed on the above.

1. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 379, Subject Files, Radio Free Europe & Radio Liberty, Vol. I. Secret. A typed note at the top of the page reads: “USC Attachment to CA–19, 26 June 1970.” A covering memorandum from Sonnenfeldt to Kissinger reads: “Attached is a paper for this morningʼs 40 Committee meeting, which has just been delivered by CIA and should be distributed to the Committee members.”