Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume XXXIII, SALT II, 1972–1980

161. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski) to President Carter¹

Washington, April 15, 1977.

SUBJECT

• Defining the US Position for SALT Negotiations

On the basis of the conversations with you and Secretaries Vance and Brown, and taking into account the memoranda they have submitted as well as your own marginal notations on my earlier memorandum,² I take it our SALT position will be along the following lines, subject to a resolution of the undecided issues listed at the end of this memorandum.

1. Negotiating Strategy

Secretary Vance will begin immediately a series of meetings with Ambassador Dobrynin, essentially “thinking out loud.” His aim would be to develop a consensus, as far as possible, on the contents of SALT II, and at least a preliminary agreement on some elements of SALT III.

Assuming these talks make some progress, the next step would be an exchange of letters between you and Brezhnev consolidating the areas of agreement and resolving any remaining issues.

Following this exchange, formal negotiations would then resume in Geneva.

2. Our Basic Approach

Our point of departure will be the deferral Option II, including the following particulars:

A. Backfire

We will accept a high-level Soviet assurance that in no instance will the Backfire bomber be deployed or used as a strategic system.

—In addition, we will press for a series of constraints to reinforce this basic assurance.

We would propose that the Backfire:

(1) will not participate in training activities associated with intercontinental strategic missions of Soviet heavy bombers;

(2) will not be tested, based or otherwise associated with tankers employed with heavy bombers or with tankers of comparable capability;

(3) will not be used at or flown to bases lying north of 63° north latitude;

(4) will not be modified to increase its range/payload capability;

(5) will not be equipped with an air-launched cruise missile with a range over 600 km.

—We will also propose that the Soviets give us a separate statement setting forth the maximum number of Backfires that will be produced during the period of the SALT II agreement (i.e., through December 1985).

B. Cruise Missiles

—Limitations on sea-based and land-based cruise missiles with a range over 600 km will be deferred until SALT III (some undecided questions in this connection are in Section 3).

—Air-launched cruise missiles, with a range between 600 km and 2500 km, will be deployed only on heavy bombers, and banned from deployment on other aircraft. The US is not prepared to count each such heavy bomber as the equivalent of a MIRVed missile and thus to be counted against the MIRV ceiling; the US might be willing to limit the number of heavy bombers so equipped with ALCM’s to no more than 200, or, as an alternative, the US could accept an outcome in which the number of heavy bombers equipped with ALCM’s was pegged to the total number of Backfires deployed.

C. Reductions

We will propose a reduction in SALT II from the Vladivostok aggregate of 2400 to 2200, or as a fallback, 2300; this level would be reached within an agreed period during the lifetime of the SALT II agreement, say within a year or 18 months after entry into force of the agreement.

—In this connection, the US will seek to incorporate into the SALT II agreement, or in a separate document if necessary, a joint commitment to undertake immediately negotiations toward completion in SALT III of a comprehensive agreement, including substantial additional reductions in the aggregate number of strategic delivery vehicles (without necessarily specifying the numerical level).

—Should it prove impossible to agree on a reduction from 2400 to 2200–2300 in the SALT II agreement, the US would then require that the commitment to negotiate a comprehensive agreement in SALT III specify as an agreed objective that the aggregate will be reduced to 1800–2000.

—We will propose, in connection with the reduction in the SALT II aggregate to 2200–2300, to reduce the level of MIRVed missiles from 1320 to 1250; and, in this connection, also propose that there be a joint commitment to negotiate in SALT III a further reduction in the MIRV level, including the establishment of subceilings for land-based ICBM MIRV’s.

D. Mobile Missiles

The US will not agree to ban mobile ICBM development or deployment as a part of SALT II; we will continue to press for arrangements that permit a distinction between the SS–20 and the SS–16 if the latter is to be deployed.

E. Associated Measures

The US will seek to include in a SALT II agreement, or in a parallel agreement, mutual notification procedures for missile test firings. A satisfactory SALT II agreement must also include a resolution of the issues of (a) data base (exchanging numbers of various categories of limited systems expressed in broad terms; e.g., so many MIRV launchers, heavy bombers, etc.); (b) adequate measures to verify the number and type of MIRVed missiles and launchers; (c) prohibitions against deliberate concealment practices, including a ban on encryption of telemetry.

3. Undecided Issues

A. Since the Soviets will at some point exceed the level of 550 MIRVed ICBM’s, should we propose some understanding on restraint in their buildup of MIRV’s beyond this level?³

—If so, would we be prepared to reciprocate, and in what area: cruise missile testing and deployments?⁴

B. Should we press for a commitment now or an understanding that SALT III will include restrictions in the development of new ICBM’s, as we proposed in our comprehensive agreement?⁵

—If so, would we be prepared to discuss similar restrictions on B–1 or Trident, if the Soviets make such a counterproposal?⁶

—Or, is it preferable to leave this entire question for the actual negotiations?

C. Should we commit ourselves not to test any cruise missiles beyond a range of 2500 km, including those cruise missiles which are not limited in SALT II? If so, what is the Soviet quid pro quo?⁷

—Should we also propose (as recommended by Secretary Vance and Paul Warnke) that for a period of two years, no sea-launched or land-based cruise missiles with a range greater than 2000 km would be deployed?⁸

D. Should we propose as a Backfire “constraint” that there be a one-for-one replacement of Backfire for older medium bombers, thereby setting an implicit ceiling on all Soviet medium bombers? (Secretary Brown proposed this: it would be a severe constraint.)

1. Source: Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Harold Brown Papers, Box 11, Harold Brown–Private File, SALT 1977. Top Secret; Sensitive. Sent for action. Carter wrote at the top of the first page: “Zbig—Let’s set up mtg soon—Me, you, Cy, Harold, VP, Paul.” For the account of that meeting, see Document 163.
2. Presumably Document 154.
3. Carter wrote “Yes” in the margin next to this point.
4. Carter wrote “Try mutual, equal restraint” in the margin next to this point.
5. Carter wrote “Propose—not press” in the margin next to this point.
6. Carter wrote “Yes” in the margin next to this point.
7. Carter wrote “no” in the margin next to this point.
8. Carter wrote “Let’s not get into this now” in the margin next to this point.