268. Editorial Note
On July 19, 1971, the day after returning to Washington from his secret trip to Beijing, Assistant to the President Kissinger sent a special channel message on the Berlin negotiations to Ambassador Rush in Bonn: “As you can gather Berlin has not been at the forefront of our attention. You can proceed with deliberate speed but leave a little margin as long as you can. We still do not have Moscow’s reaction to the Peking caper.” (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Kissinger Office Files, Box 59, Country Files, Europe, Ambassador Rush, Berlin, Vol. 2) In his reply on July 20, Rush congratulated Kissinger: “Your spectacular accomplishments in Peking have left us all in a state of awe. It is one of the really great diplomatic feats of our time, and all Americans should be deeply grateful to the President and you.” Turning to Berlin, Rush promised a full report after the Ambassadorial meeting of July 22 and his talks the next day with German State Secretary Bahr and Soviet Ambassador Falin. (Ibid.) On July 22, [Page 777] Bahr also sent Kissinger a message on China and Berlin. The text, translated from the original German by the editor, reads:
- “1)
-
Very hearty congratulations on your visit to Peking and the way you did it. The Russians here appear very worried and somewhat emotional. I now have the impression that they will respond rationally.
“Moscow must be interested in creating as many faits accompli as possible before the President visits Peking.
- “2)
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In addition to the information via Rush: I hope that the three of us [Bahr, Rush, and Falin] can successfully complete our discussions in the next ten days. At that time, you will receive the agreed texts, which will be ad referendum. The Chancellor has declined to comment until everything is known. The Russians are ready to finish, even officially, by the middle of August.
“Warm regards.” (Ibid., Box 60, Country Files, Europe, Egon Bahr, Berlin File, [1 of 3])
Kissinger later commented that the message from Bahr was “a useful piece of intelligence, indicating that the fear of our Kremlinologists that an opening to Peking would wreck our relations with Moscow was false.” (White House Years, page 830)