294. Editorial Note

On August 17, 1971, Assistant to the President Kissinger met Soviet Ambassador Dobrynin in the Map Room at the White House from 1:10 to 3:04 p.m. to discuss a Soviet proposal for a summit meeting, as well as other issues, including the Berlin negotiations. (Record of Schedule; Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box 438, Miscellany, 1968–76) According to the memorandum of conversation, the exchange on Berlin was as follows:

Dobrynin then pulled out a slip of paper and discussed the Berlin issue. He said he had received instructions to get in touch with me immediately on the basis of a cable he had received that Falin had sent to Moscow. Apparently Rush had said that he was bound by Presidential instructions to deviate from the agreements already reached. Dobrynin said that it was making a very bad impression, if an agreement reached by the highest authorities was overthrown again later by the bureaucracy. I explained to Dobrynin that our problem was as follows: Neither our bureaucracy nor our allies knew of the agreement. Therefore we had to go through a procedure of negotiations. [Page 841] Sometimes the formulations might have to be altered. I wanted him to know, however, that if there were a deadlock we would break it in favor of the agreed position, unless overwhelming difficulties arose. I read to him the telegram from Rush [Document 291]speaking of Abrasimov’s rough tactics towards the British Ambassador which certainly didn’t help matters. Dobrynin said that speaking confidentially the Soviet Ambassadors in Eastern Europe were not used to diplomacy. They were usually drawn from party organizations and when they met opposition they didn’t realize that they were not dealing with party subordinates. This was the trouble with Abrasimov. Falin would certainly have acted differently.” (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 492, President’s Trip Files, Dobrynin/Kissinger, 1971, Vol. 7 [Part 2])

Kissinger forwarded the memorandum of conversation to the President at the Western White House in San Clemente, California on August 24. Wishing only to see “a minimum of papers” while on vacation, Nixon reportedly only “glanced at the top page” of the covering memorandum, which summarized the conversation. (Ibid.) The memorandum is scheduled for publication in Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, volume XIII. See also William Burr, editor, The Kissinger Transcripts: The Top-Secret Talks with Beijing and Moscow, pages 42–46.

Although he evidently did not read them before meeting Dobrynin, Kissinger also received special-channel messages from Bahr and Rush on August 17. The text of the message from Bahr, as translated from the original German by the editor, reads:

  • “1) Also on behalf of Rush:
  • “2) No more worries. Relax!
  • “3) Access better than hoped for.
  • “4) Only consulate general and Federal passports remain open.
  • “5) We hope to be done tomorrow. Rush will report how that is now possible.
  • “6) Many factors had to come together for a Berlin settlement; the good connection between us was perhaps not the least important. Thanks and greetings.” (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Kissinger Office Files, Box 60, Country Files, Europe, Egon Bahr, Berlin File [1 of 3]) For the German text of Bahr’s message, see also Akten zur Auswärtigen Politik der Bundesrepublik Deutschland, 1971, Vol. 2, p. 1247.

Using a “cryptic style,” Rush telephoned the text of his message from Berlin to Frankfurt, where it was then forwarded via the special Navy channel to Washington. “A new formula developed Sunday [August 15] and approved by our Allies Sunday evening,” he explained, “broke the impasse and averted the impending crisis. It also opened the way to complete agreement which I am sure you will find satisfactory.” After noting that the telegraphic traffic from Berlin would provide the “full formal details,” Rush concluded: “All credit is due to the President [Page 842] and thank God you are his invaluable right arm.” (Ibid., Box 59, Ambassador Rush, Berlin, Vol. 2) After his meeting with Dobrynin, Kissinger told Nixon: “I just got a message from Rush.” Although “we’ll never get credit for it,” Kissinger commended Rush as “a good man.” Nixon replied: “Shows you about having one of your own, doesn’t it, Henry?” (Ibid., White House Tapes, Recording of Conversation Between Nixon and Kissinger, August 17, 1971, 3:05–3:23 p.m., Oval Office, Conversation 566–14)

In a telephone conversation the next morning, August 18, Kissinger read Dobrynin the text of the message from Bahr and reported sending both Bahr and Rush identical messages the previous afternoon “to say there are nothing except orders coming from President and me.” (Ibid., NSC Files, Kissinger Office Files, Country Files, Europe, Box 57, Berlin and European Security, Vol. II [2 of 2]) Neither message has been found.