196. Telegram 94316 From the Department of State to the Embassy in India1 2

Subject:

  • Indian Criticism of U.S.

Ref:

  • New Delhi 5201

1. We too have been disturbed by recent increase in public criticism of U.S. by Mrs. Gandhi, Chavan, and others. In fact, when reftel arrived here we were in process of drafting instructions for you to respond in way you already have with Dhar and Parthasarathy. We commend your taking the initiative and your intention to raise problem with Chavan. When you see him, think you could usefully draw on following in addition to points you made in reftel.

—One premise of mature relationship which we supposedly are seeking is mutual restraint in criticism of each other and willingness to use private government to government channels to sort our problems rather than resorting to public name-calling.

—We can appreciate Indian concerns on lifting of the arms embargo, even if we do not agree with Indian viewpoint, and we recognize genuine public sentiment that exists in India on this issue. On other hand, we do not understand or appreciate recent wave of public criticism of USG by Indian leaders, particularly implication that USG represents “sea threat” to India.

—U.S. has refrained from public criticism of India over handling of Sikkim affair as we appreciate Indian sensitivities on this score and have no desire to further damage Indian image in U.S. recent speeches indicate similar restraint on Indian side seems to be lacking.

—As we have repeatedly stated, most recently by Secretary Simon in his April 18 bombay speech, U.S. wants good relations with India. However, this has to be 2-way street. It is for GOI to decide if it wishes to create public climate that makes it impossible for U.S. to have mature and friendly relations with India by using us as domestic political whipping boy. We would hope GOI would desist from such an approach, which would adversely affect Indo-U.S. relations.

3. Comment. Our experience in past couple of years has been that Indians may tone down or drop attacks if we take tough line. For reasons you cite this approach may prove less effective at present time, but nonetheless we think it worthwhile to try to put stopper on these attacks before they become part of election campaign rhetoric.

Kissinger
  1. Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy Files. Confidential. It was drafted by Brown; cleared by NEA; and approved by Sisco and Atherton.
  2. Under Secretary Sisco remarked on the recent increase in public criticism of the United States. He advised Ambassador Saxbe to take a hard line, noting that in the past, this had dampened Indian criticism.