216. Memorandum of Conversation1 2
PARTICIPANTS:
- Aziz Ahmed, Minister of State for Foreign Affairs, Pakistan Personal Secretary to the Minister
- Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Secretary of State
- Peter W. Rodman, NSC Staff
Aziz Ahmed: Did you have a good visit to China?
Kissinger: Yes. It was very positive. We talked about your situation, and they are still concerned. We told them we would begin selling increased amounts of arms to you. They wanted us to sell you A–7s. We told them someone would be coming over. Their concern for India seems the same.
What is the situation in Bangladesh?
Aziz Ahmed: We think it is stabilizing.
Kissinger: Good.
Aziz Ahmed: But the Soviets don’t want us to believe that. The Soviet Ambassador came in with a message: Keep out of it. It was put in pleasant terms, of course—praising the Prime Minister’s policy of noninterfering. It seemed what they were trying to do was convey a message to China that China should keep out of it.
[Page 2]Kissinger: That’s what the Indians seem to be worried about. I saw Chavan briefly today.
Aziz Ahmed: I said to them I was surprised to see Kemal Singh leaving the option to intervene open. He said: “We’ve restrained them. “I asked: “What is the situation there? “He said: “It’s very serious.” I said: “Is there a possibility of another coup?” He said: “Yes, because the Army is divided. Some are against the government, the younger people.” It added up to the fact they have infiltrated pretty deeply into the intelligence services and the army.
Kissinger: It could be.
Aziz Ahmed: When they say there might be a coup, it could be they’re working on one.
Kissinger: It might well be.
Aziz Ahmed: Though there was a mission to Delhi. from Bangladesh, our report was that neither side was satisfied.
Kissinger: Certainly the Indians weren’t. Chavan told me.
Aziz Ahmed: The Indians may not want to be satisfied, as long as this government is in office.
Kissinger: Chavan told me he is “worried” there may be another exodus of Hindus. This is how they would arrange it.
Aziz Ahmed: I warned the Bangladesh people in New York to be careful about this. Our Ambassadors are ready to go. There is already agreement on both sides. This could provoke India.
One problem is overflights over each other’s territory. It’s tied up with a case we have tied up in ICAO, a case against India. They said we had to withdraw it. We said to them we couldn’t withdraw it because we couldn’t explain it to our people, but we wouldn’t revive it.
I’ll see Chavan tomorrow. I’ll tell him the ball is in his court. Now that we’ve restored relations with Bangladesh, they are showing no interest in allowing overflights. This is what we suspect.
[Page 3]Our Chief of Air Staff went to Washington last month. He was extremely well treated. His presentation was well received.
Kissinger: To whom did he make his presentation?
Aziz Ahmed: The Pentagon. And Atherton. There was no positive response but they gave him a joyride in the plane, and let some of the chaps come and train.
Kissinger: That was good.
Aziz Ahmed: I’d put it to you: Could there be some movement on this? Deliveries would take a year even if they are approved.
Kissinger: Let me give you an answer by mid-January.
Aziz Ahmed: I hope the answer will be positive.
Kissinger: It certainly won’t be negative. It might be we have to delay a little more. But we have the intention of doing it. How many do you need?
Aziz Ahmed: 110. To replace the F–86’s, which are virtually phased out. We’ve got the Mig–19.
Kissinger: Is that any good?
Aziz Ahmed: Our people think not. Even the seat wasn’t ejectable, so we got a new seat put in, in England. It’s better than the Soviet one.
Kissinger: You have the Chinese one? I’ve heard it’s better.
Aziz Ahmed: Yes. The range is improved, but it’s still limited. Only 25 miles across the border. It’s nothing, really. It means you can’t hit their forces.
Kissinger: Our intention is to find the right moment. You definitely won’t be turned down. We’ve been through these phases before.
Please give my regards to your Prime Minister. I’m a great admirer of his. And so is my wife.
Aziz Ahmed: That’s even better!
[Page 4]Kissinger: We warned the Indians very severely against military action in Bangladesh. I think they won’t do military action—he was very strong on that—but I think a coup might be possible. Talking about the refugees kept it open.
Aziz Ahmed: They are worried about Chinese intervention?
Kissinger: They are worried about this patrol that was ambushed. Do you think the Chinese would act?
Aziz Ahmed: They would have to. Because if they don’t, they are out as far as the subcontinent is concerned. They always say, “We resolutely support you.” They would have to if Bangladesh was blatantly attacked.
Kissinger: I didn’t think in ’71 that they’d let it happen.
Aziz Ahmed: Didn’t you?
Kissinger: We were prepared to give them military protection against the Soviet Union if they acted. But they didn’t.
[The meeting ended.]
- Source: Ford Library, National Security Adviser Files, Presidential Country Files for Middle East and South Asia, Box 27, Pakistan (5). Secret; Nodis. The meeting took place in the American Ambassador’s Residence.↩
- Secretary of State Kissinger met with Ambassador Ahmed to discuss Pakistan’s relations with India and arms supply. Ahmed requested the sale of 110 A–7 fighter/attack aircraft.↩