246. Intelligence Note Prepared in the Bureau of Intelligence and Research, RARN–341 2
CUBA: NEW ORLEANS PLUS KOSYGIN EQUALS WHAT?
Castro’s defiance of US travel controls in New Orleans and Kosygin’s visit to Cuba, both of which took place the last week of October, may have important implications for Cuba-USSR-US relations. The Cuban leader clearly wanted to dramatize his grievances against the US to both the Soviets and the world. But his attitudes toward the US remain unclear: one possible interpretation of the New Orleans venture is that Castro is opposed to any accommodation; another is that he is seeking US concessions in a way that would enable him to trumpet such moves as a victory for Cuba.
What point is Castro trying to make? When Castro’s personal pilot and Cuba’s representative at a number of important aviation meetings flies a group of Cuban sugar technicians to an international conference in New Orleans without US visas, it seems clear that Castro himself is trying to make some point. Although he is ostensibly protesting US travel controls, the question remains, why did he choose to do so in this manner at this time? (The Cubans made no special efforts to attend the two previous conferences of this organization, in Taiwan and Puerto Rico respectively.) Certainly from Castro’s point of view [Page 2] the moment must seem propitious—given US moves toward the People’s Republic of China and increasing pressures in Latin America to bring Cuba back into the hemispheric family—to dramatize his opposition to “discriminatory” US policies against Cuba. But the authorization of such a move just prior to the arrival of Kosygin in Cuba suggests that the triangular US-Soviet-Cuban relationship may also be involved.
Possibly, a Cuban “declaration of independence.” While Castro’s New Orleans move was obviously designed to embarrass the US, such a swashbuckling approach to international affairs does not have the earmarks of a plan coordinated with the Soviets in advance. Interesting in this regard is the strong likelihood that one of the purposes of Kosygin’s trip was to reassure Castro about any deals with the US over Cuba during President Nixon’s forthcoming trip to Moscow. If so, Castro’s New Orleans challenge could well have been, at least in part, an effort to show the Soviets that he remains determined to deal with the US in his own way. Such a “declaration of independence” also might have been meant to enhance Castro’s image as a David beleaguered by the US Goliath among Third World countries in the “Group of 77,” which met in Lima that same week.
One interpretation: Castro hostile to any accommodation. While Castro probably wants the Soviets to let him deal with the US in his own way, what he wants from the US, if anything, is another question. In this regard, one could interpret the New Orleans incident as an effort by Castro to dramatize to the Soviets, and to other nations as well, his hostility toward any accommodation with the US. Further, one could read [Page 3] the condemnation of the “imperialist blockade” of Cuba in the communique following Kosygin’s visit as a sign that the Soviets have decided to go along with such an anti-US stance.
If so, however, Castro takes a certain risk. But if Castro genuinely wants to avoid any accommodation with the US, he takes the risk in dramatizing his opposition to US policy that his actions could prompt increasing pressures for accommodation. It would seem logical, for example, to argue that Castro’s efforts to dramatize his opposition to US policy are an indication that he wants that policy to change. While Castro is not always logical, he most probably realizes that the same world climate that makes it propitious for him to protest “discriminatory” US policies could help to generate pressures on the US for a policy change, as well as pressures on him to assume a more conciliatory stance. Indeed, given the recent US moves on China, he might even fear—if opposed to any accommodation—that a dramatic protest against US travel controls would itself prompt some change in US policy toward Cuba.
Another interpretation: seeking US concessions. Castro’s defiance of the US in New Orleans does serve to make clear once again that he has no intention of making a conciliatory gesture toward the US. Bust such international theatrics are a far cry from the days of the 1966 Tricontinental Congress in Havana: then, Castro was bidding for the support of a few violent revolutionaries against the US. (The Kosygin-visit communique provides further evidence that Castro’s current focus is more the Third World generally.) Perhaps today, unlike earlier years, Castro has begun to hope that the US may eventually change its Cuba policy—or [Page 4] at least be pushed in that direction by world opinion. Although he will likely continue to play the theme of an “enemy to the north,” he may also have come to believe that he can get some new political mileage domestically from a changed US policy toward Cuba. (For a more adequate discussion of possible ambiguities in Castro’s attitudes toward the US, see RARS–7,3 especially section IV.)
In other words, Castro’s New Orleans move could be interpreted as evidence that he is seeking US concessions. His stance is uncompromising, to be sure, though this may be in part an initial bargaining tactic. At the same time, if seeking concessions, he is doing so in his own way—e.g., in a way that would enable him to trumpet any such US moves as an important “victory” for Cuba. In this light, the denunciation of US policies against Cuba in the Kosygin-visit communique could indicate, among other things, that the Soviets got Castro’s message.
- Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL CUBA–US. Confidential; No Foreign Dissem. Drafted by Herr and cleared by Summ. RARS–7, “Cuba: Difficult Choices for Castro,” is published as Document 244. In an October 26 memorandum, Nachmanoff reported to Haig that a Cuban commercial airplane had landed in New Orleans without permission, in violation of FAA regulations and U.S. travel restrictions. (Ibid., Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 781, Country Files, Latin America, Cuba, Vol. III, 1971) In an October 19 intelligence memorandum, the CIA speculated that the reason behind Kosygin’s visit to Cuba was to highlight the Soviet Union’s commitment to Cuba. (Central Intelligence Agency, Office of Current Intelligence, Job 79–T00831A)↩
- The Bureau of Intelligence and Research analyzed the reasons for a Cuban violation of U.S. travel controls and a visit to the island by Kosygin.↩
- RARS–7, “Cuba: Difficult Choices for Castro”, October 1, 1971 (CONFIDENTIAL/NO FOREIGN DISSEM/ CONTROLLED DISSEM).↩